This essay argues that policies aimed at suppressing drug use exacerbate the nation's opioid problem. It neither endorses drug use nor advocates legalizing the consumption and sale of all substances in all circumstances. Instead, it contends that trying to suppress drug markets is the wrong goal, and in the midst of an addiction crisis it can be deadly. There is no single, correct drug policy; the right approach depends crucially on the substance at issue, the patterns of use and supply, and the jurisdiction's culture, institutions, and material resources. Decriminalization is no panacea for a nation's drug problems. Nevertheless, either de jure or de facto decriminalization of personal drug possession is a necessary condition for mitigating this crisis.

Lainie Ross, in her article in this issue, criticizes on ethical grounds a number of factors in the University of Minnesota program that allows unrelated strangers to donate kidneys for transplant. I have to admit that when the transplant center at the University proposed allowing the practice of what came to be called nondirected donation, I was skeptical about a number of the same issues that trouble Dr. Ross. But as my colleagues and I examined and discussed the ethics of such a plan, along with the risks to prospective donors, their possible motivations, and the logistics of performing the surgeries under conditions of anonymity between donor and recipient, among other factors, we came to believe that such donations can be ethically acceptable. As a product of frequent meetings over the course of a year in advance of the first nondirected donation, we set out to craft a process that would first and foremost meet the test of an ethical approach to organ donation and transplant, the description of which was published in the New England Journal of Medicine in August 2000.

On June 25, 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the first time in a right to refuse medical treatment case. The court's holding (by a majority of five of the nine justices) was essentially as follows: The right to liberty, which is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, encompasses a person's decision to reject life-sustaining treatment; competent people are entitled to reject life-support and states are therefore prohibited from preventing people from making that choice. States may, however, regulate the exercise of the right, to ensure that the decision to stop treatment is indeed what the patient would have wanted. Asking for “clear and convincing evidence” of an incompetent patient's wishes (which means a demonstration that the person herself deliberately and thoughtfully made the decision in advance, or perhaps formally appointed someone else to make that decision for her) is a legitimate form of regulation by the state: It furthers the quest for what the person would have wanted and protects incompetent individuals from decisions made by others which might be influenced by the others’ interest instead of being based solely on what the individual would have wanted.

The government-sponsored Tuskegee syphilis study had a huge impact on U.S. research ethics and policy. Study investigators regarded subjects as “mere means” to their research ends, which led to a variety of ethical violations. Investigators used deception so that subjects would see participation as therapeutic — researchers promoted the therapeutic misconception because this advanced study objectives. The research would produce important information, and this justified lying to research subjects.

Today we see this sort of intentional deception as unjustified no matter how important a study might be. But what do we make of the claim that the syphilis study had value? As James Jones reported, its objectives were to test the prevailing views that syphilis affected blacks and whites differently, and that the disease was less harmful to blacks than whites. U.S. Public Health Service researchers and officials assumed the study had sufficient value to justify not only deceiving subjects, but also depriving them of safe and effective treatment.

The purpose of this article is to re-visit how rationing is defined for a health-care context, Two reasons justify returning to this topic. First, the variability as to how rationing has been defined in the legal, medical, and philosophical literature justifies a careful examination to identify its critical features. Second, I believe that if the definitions typically employed in the literature, several of which are discussed below, are compared to those that would be offered by the American public, ethically weighty dissimilarities would be apparent. Disparate characterizations are worrisome because serious “disconnections” between policymakers’ understandings, rhetoric, and priorities and those of the general public are more likely.

There is no doubt that industry-sponsored biomedical research is under the microscope. Unfortunately, this new era of skepticism prematurely rushes in doubts of the ethos of science. Skepticism can lead to positive changes, but only when timely and supported by sound reasoning. Snapshot views and theories, especially those that result in costly new regulations and inefficient policies often do more harm than good. Many critics would have the reader doubt scientific integrity because they believe that the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and biomedical research poses an unavoidable and dangerous conflict of interest. However, these conflicts are neither unavoidable nor dangerous per se.

For more than twenty years, Opinion 6.01 of the American Medical Association's (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics has specified that “a physician's fee for medical services should be based on the value of the service provided by the physician to the patient.” In 1994, the AMA amended Opinion 6.01, adding a new statement that “a physician's fee should not be made contingent on the successful outcome of medical treatment.”

We believe that the amendment is wholly indefensible. Therefore, in this essay, we argue that the AMA should lift this prohibition and encourage the use of result-based compensation for medical services in appropriate circumstances.

The 1994 amendment dramatically changed the significance and scope of Opinion 6.01. Result-based compensation arrangements clearly satisfy the original version of Opinion 6.01 because they base compensation on the “value of the services provided … to the patient.” Yet, it is equally clear that result-based compensation arrangements violate the amended version of Opinion 6.01 because they necessarily make compensation “contingent on the successful outcome of medical treatment.”

The firearms data infrastructure in the United States is severely limited in scope and fragmented in nature. Improved data systems are needed in order to address gun violence and promote productive conversation about gun policy. In the absence of federal leadership in firearms data systems improvement, motivated states may take proactive steps to stitch gaps in data systems. We propose that states evaluate the gaps in their systems, expand data collection, and improve data presentation and availability.

The ethics of involving persons with cognitive impairments and/or mental illness in research continues to gain academic and public attention. Concerns about the ability of such persons to provide ethically and legally valid consent and about the appropriateness of their research involvement in certain categories of studies have resulted in publication of guidelines, position papers, standards, and court decisions. These analyses address not only when and from whom informed consent may be obtained but also under what conditions it is ethically permissible to involve persons in research who are too decisionally impaired to provide their own consent.

It is an advance in research ethics that there is heightened appreciation of the need for greater protections for, and possibly research participation limitations on, persons unable to give their own consent. In our zeal to protect potentially vulnerable subjects, however, we must craft new protections carefully. Prudence is required in shaping and implementing any new protections.

Refusal of lifesaving treatment, and such refusal by advance directive, are widely recognized as ethically and legally permissible. Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED) is not. Ethically and legally, how does VSED compare with these two more established ways for patients to control the end of life? Is it more questionable because with VSED the patient intends to cause her death, or because those who assist it with palliative care could be assisting a suicide?

In fact the ethical and legal basis for VSED is virtually as strong as for refusing lifesaving treatment and less problematic than the basis for refusing treatment by advance directive. VSED should take its proper place among the accepted, permissible ways by which people can control the time and manner of death.

There is perhaps no area of law that so effectively protects human health and thereby advances the right to the highest attainable standard of health, as tobacco control. Globally, tobacco is responsible for 1 in 10 adult deaths, and is on track to kill 10 million people per year, mostly in developing countries, representing a US$200 billion drain on the global economy. Yet experience in recent decades has shown that a range of tobacco control measures, such as comprehensive bans on smoking in public places, tobacco taxes, and limits on tobacco advertising, can greatly reduce smoking prevalence. These measures have slowly curtailed the epidemic, despite strong opposition from various sectors led by the tobacco industry. It is fitting that tobacco control is the focus of a recent, widely ratified global treaty (the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control) and of increasing national litigation, often directly linked to countries’ human rights commitments.

With new, effective, and expensive health care services, the American health care sector has become an even greater source of business and wealth opportunities. All kinds of health care providers and suppliers are competing for patients and dollars. The key to wealth in today’s health care sector is the physician. Only physicians can certify to third-party payers that health care services, medical devices, or pharmaceutical products are necessary for patient care. That certification initiates the process by which the item, service, or treatment modality is ordered, delivered, and paid for. Thus, organizations that can exert control over physicians stand to gain financially.

With more than 95% of school-aged youth enrolled in schools for 6 hours per day for up to 13 years, schools offer a broad reach to obesity prevention initiatives. Schools reach students of all races and ethnic backgrounds, income levels, and U.S. regions. Therefore, integrating health promotion activities into schools may equalize health disparities by providing access to a healthy environment for most of the nation’s youth, regardless of background. In addition, health behaviors, including physical activity (PA) and nutrition, are related to academic achievement.

While the realm of bioethics has traditionally focused on the rights of the individual and held autonomy as a defining principle, public health ethics has at its core a commitment to the promotion of the common good. While these two domains may at times conflict, concepts arising in one may also be informative for concepts arising in the other. One example of this is the concept of a “right not to know.” Recent debate suggests that just as there is a “right to know” information about one's genetic status, there is a parallel “right not to know” when it comes to genetic information that if communicated, could be detrimental to an individual's social or psychological well-being. As new genetic technologies continue to change the nature of genetic testing and screening, it is crucial that normative frameworks to guide and assess genetic public health initiatives be developed. In this context, the question of whether a “right not to know” may also be said to exist for populations on a public health level merits attention.

Physicians nationwide, already worried by an increasing number of professional liability lawsuits and an expanding scope of liability, now face a new and potentially more troublesome development that had its genesis in what many thought was an extraordinary court decision. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, a psychiatrist was held, in a suit brought by the victim's parents, to be liable for negligence in the death of a woman who was murdered by a patient of that physician. The court held that even though the physician had complied with the traditional duty of protecting the patient's confidentiality, he nonetheless had a duty to warn the victim of the potential threat against her life. Tarasoff was eventually followed by a number of decisions that imposed liability on physicians under similar circumstances.

This article reviews and analyzes the original Tarasoff decision and subsequent judicial rulings on this subject. In addition, the authors briefly explore the historical backdrop of this decision and suggest practical steps that physicians can take to deal with the conflicting duties of protecting confidentiality and protecting potential victims from the danger posed by patients.

Recent years have brought increasing pressure from the public and the courts for truly informed patient consents to medical treatment and surgical procedures. Many courts have recognized that a patient's signature on a consent form is no assurance that the patient has received sufficient information, much less that he or she truly understood the information. A Pennsylvania court articulated this principle this way:

The capacity to treat pain has never been greater; but, as you will read in the articles that follow, the problem of undertreated and neglected pain in the United States persists. Deep-seated perceptions and practices undergird this strong and well-documented pattern of neglect. Among the reasons frequently noted for the inadequacy of treatment for pain, however, is that the legal system actually penalizes effective interventions to relieve pain while it leaves neglect of pain unthreatened. It is the mission of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME) to explore areas, such as this one, where developments in medicine directly encounter the law and, in turn, create ethical issues for clinicians, regulators, patients, and lawyers.

This special issue of the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics is part of a multi-year project in which ASLME, with the wonderful support of the Mayday Fund, has worked to address legal and regulatory barriers to effective pain relief.

The Centers for Disease Control published its long awaited guidelines for preventing transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and hepatitis B virus to patients on July 12, 1991. The guidelines recommend voluntary HIV and HBV testing of all health care workers performing exposure-prone invasive procedures. Special safeguards are applicable to any worker who is infected with HIV or the most virulent form of hepatitis B—i.e., hepatitis B e antigen positive (HBeAg). HIV or HBsAg-positive health care workers should not carry out exposure-prone invasive procedures unless an expert panel has approved and provided individualized guidance, and the patient is informed about the HCW's serological status.

Characteristics of exposureprone procedures include digital palpitation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the worker's fingers and a sharp instrument in a poorly visualized or confined anatomic site.