In this essay, I recount the history of the founding and early years of the Journal of Law and Religion from its origins in the Committee on Religion and Law through the editorial transitions in 1988 that led to a second phase of JLR’s history. In recounting this history, I focus on the exceptional scholars who brought JLR into existence and nurtured its growth during those early years, creating, in the process, not only new academic endeavor but a community and a kind of family.

After its initial founding by the Council on Religion and Law at Harvard, the Journal of Law and Religion had its first life at Hamline University School of Law beginning in 1983. This essay is a history of its second life—from 1987/1988 to 2013—describing the vision and the people who pursued that vision through the journal in those years and some of the roundtables and symposia it published.

The Journal of Law and Religion began publishing as part of the larger revival and reimagination of the academic encounter with religion. More specifically, it sought from the start to examine an entire panoply of issues: secular law regarding religion, religious views of secular law and the state, political philosophy, political theology, religious law, and legal and religious pluralism as overarching ideas. What was at stake to the journal’s founders was not just intellectual curiosity but their conviction that this kaleidoscope of concerns was essential to reconstituting a healthy polity, to play a role in responding to a crisis of values that afflicted both religion and the secular state. The journal has also sought to consider questions across the full range of world religions, including non-Western religions. Again, this is not expanding the canon for its own sake. The larger story of legal systems and religions in all their specificity and complex interactions, as revealed by rigorous and imaginative analysis, could ideally help establish a counter-narrative to the simple pieties of modernity. The challenges today, especially our current state of political polarization, which envelops religion in its wake, are different, but they demand the same careful, expansive, scholarly agenda.

In this article, the author develops an Islamic normative legal theoretical framework by using three key Islamic methodological approaches—(1) juridical theory of law (uṣūl), (2) legal maxims (qawāʿid), and (3) purposive-based theory (maqāṣid)—in light of Ronald Dworkin’s notions of rules, principles, and policies, respectively. While uṣūl is used to develop rules, qawāʿid and maqāṣid provide the normative values that govern rulemaking. In addition to presenting a coherent model of Islamic normative legal theory, the author examines legitimacy issues of Islamic law that relate to links of rules to sharīʿa revealed texts and applies the Islamic normative legal theoretical framework to contemporary rulings on the environment, organ transplants, and Islamic finance. The case studies show that using the integrated normative framework would yield more ethical rulings than those that focus on juridical methods (uṣūl) only. The author argues that while the extent of legal legitimacy can vary across different rulings, the application of the Islamic normative legal framework ensures normative legitimacy in all cases, ensuring the moral character of Islamic law.

This article explores the connection between the ecclesiology and the beliefs on church-state relations of Baptists in the mid-twentieth-century United States. The author analyzes white Baptists’ reactions to the US Supreme Court rulings in Everson v. Board of Education (1947) and McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), both of which inaugurated the modern era of strict separationist Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The author also traces the development of Baptist beliefs on how the institutional church relates to individual salvation—beliefs that distinguished Baptists from both Catholics and most other Protestants—and statements from US Baptist leadership supporting church-state separation. The author demonstrates that Baptists’ beliefs on the internal, individualistic, and non-sacramental nature of salvation induced them to see any government-sponsored religious activity as likely corrupting of a person’s genuine choice of salvation. Furthermore, Baptists’ origins as a persecuted minority in Europe and the United States reinforced their idea that government-sponsored religion would lead to the suppression of true Christianity. For both reasons, then, state-sponsored religion was not God’s design. Beginning with Everson and McCollum and continuing with later cases through the 1960s, Baptist’s strict separationism became the binding interpretation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause through Justice Hugo Black, who authored both the Everson and McCollum majority opinions. Although no longer a Baptist when the rulings were issued, Black retained his Baptist influence on church-state issues and enshrined strict separationism into American case law for decades, leading to a Baptist triumph that many Baptists themselves would later regret and attempt to reverse.

During the early twentieth century, Ivy League legal scholars developed a positivist jurisprudential method known as legal realism. Concerned with the law’s relationship to social conditions, legal realism methodologically triumphed in the elite legal academy and brought to a close what one historian has described as the “decline of natural law” in American jurisprudence. Catholic legal scholars in the United States responded to this decline by invoking the natural law philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and his nineteenth-century neoscholastic disciples, arguing that legal realism irredeemably divorced law and morality. In so doing, these scholars effectively inaugurated what the author terms the neoscholastic legal revival, a decades-long period of debate between Catholic natural lawyers and their positivist contemporaries about natural law’s foundational relationship to the US legal tradition. To explain the history and significance of this debate, the author uncovers the origins the neoscholastic legal revival in particular features of nineteenth-century European Catholic intellectual culture that were transmitted to the United States through the Society of Jesus, the world’s largest Catholic religious order. The author especially examines the lives and legacies of two American Jesuits, William J. Kenealy and Francis E. Lucey, who helped to lead the neoscholastic legal revival and who illustrate how recovering the revival’s forgotten history can enrich scholars’ understanding of this important period in US legal history.