We develop a new approach to understanding which legal questions the Supreme Court chooses to address. We show that the Supreme Court is more likely to resolve ideologically polarizing legal questions. This result is based on a new technique for estimating the ideology of a doctrine, which we implement using a dataset of intercircuit splits. We use this technique to identify legal issues that are ideologically polarizing and show they are more likely to be addressed by the Supreme Court than less polarizing issues. Our results demonstrate how the Supreme Court uses certiorari to advance its ideological policymaking goals.

Though once commonplace, presidents no longer nominate individuals with legislative experience to the U.S. Supreme Court. What difference does this shift make? Drawing on theories that connect judicial background characteristics to decision-making, I test whether legislative background impacts federal judicial review. Using nonparametric matching and almost 150 years of judicial review decisions, I find that, while such experience decreases the likelihood of striking down a law, the effect is small. By contrast, partisanship has a much stronger impact, with justices more likely to strike down laws when the enacting Congressional majority is a different party from their appointing president.

Recently there have been extraordinary instances of public and political elite complaints toward the Supreme Court. Through a survey experiment, we find that when respondents read that a copartisan executive is offended by recent Supreme Court decisions and threatening to ignore future decisions, respondents increase their support of executives’ not complying with and going public against the Court. Additionally, we find that partisans reward candidates by voting for them at higher rates if they ignore a Court decision that harmed the participant’s party. Our findings hold implications for continued institutional arrangements and our understanding of the functioning of our democracy.

Previous studies show that Supreme Court justices defer to congressional preferences by striking down fewer Acts of Congress to restore the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy following the introduction of court-curbing bills. This assumes the Supreme Court acts as a guardian of the entire judiciary, but prior work has not explicitly tested this. We create a theory of “guardian” behavior and test the likelihood that the Court engages in this behavior following the introduction of court-curbing bills. We find that the Supreme Court actively corrects lower court instances of judicial review, a stronger response than previously suggested.

Numerous benefits materialize when people extend legitimacy to institutions; consequently, many investigations of the legitimacy of the police have been reported. However, several critical issues remain unanswered. My paper’s purpose is to revisit the question of willingness to grant police legitimacy, focusing on a nationally representative sample of African Americans. I test hypotheses connecting police legitimacy with experiences with unfair treatment by legal authorities, ingroup attachments, attitudes toward systemic racism, and engagement with Black Lives Matter. My findings reveal significant connections between experience with discrimination, ingroup attachments, and beliefs about systemic racism but little relationship between BLM attitudes and police legitimacy.

Though widely used in studies of judicial politics, American Bar Association (ABA) ratings have a partisan bias. As a result, when researchers include ABA ratings and ideology in a model together, the results may be biased toward non-findings with respect to the effect of ideology, qualifications, or both. This study leverages new data on the ABA rating process to create a valid and reliable new measure for the qualifications of nominees to the US Courts of Appeals. In an empirical example, I test the new measure against alternative specifications to demonstrate its potential. The empirical example also presents a new data set on circuit court confirmation hearing speech. The findings contrast with well-established conclusions from previous studies.

Despite increased political attention to instances of legislative obstruction in recent years, little is known about the public’s attitudes toward these procedural techniques. I evaluate these attitudes in the context of the last two decades of nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court with three complementary analyses. In the first, nationally representative survey evidence reveals an overriding political dimension to Americans’ attitudes over the use of tactics to delay the confirmation process. The president’s copartisans express considerably higher levels of opposition to delayed consideration of a nominee than individuals politically opposed to the president. In the second and third, evidence from observational surveys and a survey experiment shows that these attitudes vary depending on the type of the obstruction under consideration, with Americans less supportive of the use of forms of obstruction that entirely preclude procedural consideration of a nominee, such as refusing to hold hearings, than more established methods that do not, like the filibuster or document requests. These findings reveal that the American public has internalized the political stakes of judicial nominations and suggest that obstruction may have electoral consequences in an era of extreme polarization.

Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of direct electoral accountability, voters may factor its outputs into their voting decisions because elected representatives can affect the Court’s powers and composition. In this paper, we uncover an ironic predicament that faces candidates running on reforming this institution. Citizens who possess higher levels of diffuse support for the Court are more likely to rank it as an important factor in their voting logic. But because this diffuse support has sorted along partisan lines, candidate messaging about reform may not motivate partisans who have lost support for the Court because they view it as less important than other pressing issues. Thus, although Democrats are sympathetic to reform, Democratic candidates may have weak incentives to promote reform given low levels of diffuse support among their constituents. This dynamic mitigates against the possibility of a public or congressional backlash against the Court, preserving the status quo.

Many court observers have argued that judges are capable of avoiding the use of extraneous factors in decision-making. This study examines the influence of seemingly irrelevant heuristics on real-world courtroom proceedings. Drawing on theories from neighboring disciplines, I hypothesize that physically attractive attorneys have greater success in US federal court. Using a generalizable causal inference strategy and a dataset of over 1,000 cases and 3,000 votes, I find support for my expectations using multiple measures of attractiveness. These findings raise serious normative concerns about equality and underscore the need to adjust traditional models of judicial behavior to account for inherent biases.

Judges who hear multiple cases a day may become exhausted by the time later cases are heard, increasing susceptibility to cognitive depletion, yet the role of workload fatigue in decision-making from hearing cases has rarely been tested in the U.S. One problem is the lack of public data—most U.S. courts do not maintain time-stamped records of case hearings. Using an original dataset of all traffic cases heard in Pulaski County, Arkansas in 2019 and 2020, we examine whether decision fatigue affects case outcomes. We find that charges are less likely to be dismissed in arraignment hearings at the end of a court session than in those at the beginning. This pattern, however, does not hold for trial hearings, suggesting that the effects of fatigue may be context-specific. We suggest policy recommendations to mitigate the effects of decision fatigue in lower courts—courts having the most contact with citizens.

Examining oral argument in the Australian High Court and comparing to the U.S. Supreme Court, this article shows that institutional design drives judicial interruptive behavior. Many of the same individual- and case-level factors predict oral argument behavior. Notably, despite orthodoxy of the High Court as “apolitical,” ideology strongly predicts interruptions, just as in the United States. Yet, important divergent institutional design features between the two apex courts translate into meaningful behavioral differences, with the greater power of the Chief Justice resulting in differences in interruptions. Finally, gender effects are lower and only identifiable with new methodological techniques we develop and apply.

A growing theoretical literature identifies how the process of constitutional review shapes judicial decision-making, legislative behavior, and even the constitutionality of legislation and executive actions. However, the empirical interrogation of these theoretical arguments is limited by the absence of a common protocol for coding constitutional review decisions across courts and time. We introduce such a coding protocol and database (CompLaw) of rulings by 42 constitutional courts. To illustrate the value of CompLaw, we examine a heretofore untested empirical implication about how review timing relates to rulings of unconstitutionality (Ward and Gabel 2019). First, we conduct a nuanced analysis of rulings by the French Constitutional Council over a 13-year period. We then examine the relationship between review timing and strike rates with a set of national constitutional courts in one year. Our data analysis highlights the benefits and flexibility of the CompLaw coding protocol for scholars of judicial review.