We argue that syndicates associate venture capitalists (VCs) with uneven skill levels in order to lower their expected gains from threatening to stop financing: Non-continued participation would send a milder negative signal to alternative financiers. This can explain the empirical observations that i) early-round syndicates regularly associate VCs with different levels of experience and ii) follow-on syndicates often involve none of the early-round VCs. Consistent with the theory, we find empirically that the heterogeneity of VC experience levels in a syndicate is i) negatively related to the extent to which the founders of the VC-backed firm are professionally well connected and ii) positively related to the likelihood of syndicate switching in a later round.

We confirm prior evidence that bonds on average are offered at prices below their immediate post-offer secondary market prices. However, in cases where banks lead–manage their own bond offerings the underpricing is significantly less as compared with other non-self-marketed offerings. These findings are robust across various matched samples and selection models. Our results suggest that the bond offering process is characterized by substantive agency conflicts between shareholders of corporations (issuers) and underwriters.

This article uses the enactment of China’s 2007 Property Law (the Law), which reduces the risk of expropriation by local governments, as the setting to investigate the importance of property rights protection for private firm investment. Using propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms facing weaker property rights protection prior to the Law significantly increase their investment and investment efficiency after the Law. Cross-sectional analyses document evidence consistent with a decrease in firms’ perceived expropriation risk as the main mechanism underlying the Law’s effect. Finally, we show that the Law improves local economic outcomes and employment.

We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail risk. We document a persistent increase in tail risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd–Frank Act. We show that this post-crisis difference in tail risk for large and small banks is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status of large banks being reinforced by the Dodd–Frank designation: Naming the banks whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. gave investors a list of banks the government deemed as TBTF.

Consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has led to larger banks. I find that low-income households face reduced access to credit when local banks are large. This result appears to stem from large banks’ comparative disadvantage using soft information, which is particularly important for lending to low-income households. In contrast, the size of local banks has little or no effect on high-income households. Consistent with low-income parents’ credit constraints limiting investment in their children’s human capital, areas with larger banks exhibit a greater sensitivity of educational attainment to parental income, and less intergenerational economic mobility.

Analyzing 48 foreign exchange (FX) rates and 1.2 million FX-related news articles over a 35-year period, using digital textual analysis, we find that a currency reversal investment strategy that buys (sells) currencies with low (high) media sentiment offers strong positive and statistically significant returns and Sharpe ratios. The results are robust and the strategy adds value over other currency premia determinants. Analysts’ forecasts systematically mispredict the reversal strategy. This is the first article to show that price reversals based on media sentiment are a well-defined feature of the FX market.

We study how patenting enhances customer capital and creates financial value in a product market characterized by information asymmetry between firm insiders and customers. We find that firms with more and higher quality patents develop greater customer capital, as measured by more positive customer perceptions of product novelty and quality. To establish causality, we exploit the exogenous variation in the random assignment of patent examiners to review applications and use the average examiner leniency as an instrument for patent grants. Our mediation analysis documents a positive impact of patenting on firm performance and financial market valuation through enhanced customer capital.

This article examines the severity of the 2008 arbitrage crash in the convertible bond market by estimating how expensive it would have been to liquidate portfolio securities immediately. We consider whether funds actually demanded immediate liquidity or were able to delay trades. Our results indicate that the cost of immediacy was high, but that convertible bond sellers could largely avoid selling at fire sale prices. These results can be explained by dealers recognizing when trades are liquidity-motivated rather than information-based and by a shift to riskless principal trading, allowing dealers to avoid taking bonds into inventory.

The opening of equity markets to foreign investment by developing countries appears to generate an enormously large positive growth effect (see Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), Journal of Financial Economics 77, 3–55) in spite of a relatively small role of such markets for financing investment in most economies. We propose a spillover channel from equity market opening to lower costs of bank loans, which helps to explain this puzzle. From analyzing bank loan data associated with China’s introduction of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors program, we find significant support for this channel. Furthermore, we show that a reduction in the risk premium in loans is an important mechanism.

Due to the government-driven mergers of large banks, many competing firms in Japan ended up borrowing from a common lender. Using firm-level data, we find that the capital investments of competing firms that share a common lender decrease by 15% of the mean. When a common lender can exercise its voice through its former employees serving as firms’ executive directors, investments fall significantly further. Competing firms that share a common lender increase markups and profitability ratios, suggesting that the lender induces strategic coordination among its borrowers to reduce their competitive pressures. Firms use saved resources from weaker competition for cash cushions.

We show that bank competition diminishes banks’ incentives to produce information about prospective borrowers. We exploit the deregulation of U.S. interstate branching as a shock to competition and use borrowers’ stock returns after loan announcements to measure bank information production. Positive loan announcement returns are reduced in states that deregulate interstate branching, especially for opaque and bank-dependent firms and smaller banks that rely on soft information. Existing (i.e., inside) banks reduce information production more than new (i.e., outside) banks after deregulation, suggesting that they do so to deter borrower poaching. Furthermore, the probability of a covenant violation increases following deregulation.

Pricing is integral to insurance design, directly influencing firm behavior and moral hazard, though its effects are insufficiently understood. I study a quasi-experiment in which deposit insurance premiums were changed for U.S. banks with unequal timing, generating differentials between banks in both levels and risk-based “steepness” of premiums. I find evidence that differentials in premiums resulted in distortions, including regulatory arbitrage, but also provided strong incentives to curb moral hazard. I find that firms that faced stronger pricing incentives to become (or remain) safer were more likely to subsequently do so than similar firms that faced weaker pricing incentives.

We study household credit responses to Hurricane Harvey using new, geographically granular data on credit cards, mortgages, and flooding. Estimates from a differences-in-differences design that exploits the flooding gradient show that affected households only borrow at low-interest rates, often using promotional (zero interest) cards and that they quickly pay down balances. We also document that take-up of forbearance (borrowing by missing mortgage payments without penalty) increases with flooding. These results are attenuated in floodplains, particularly in structures subject by code to physical hardening. Our results indicate that credit acts as a substitute for the lack of physical hardening.

We study the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on the bond market. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. corporate bonds, we document that the presence of CDSs significantly increases bond liquidity and reduces yield spreads for investment grade bonds. We show that CDSs influence the bond market by lowering the impact of fire sales of institutional bondholders and facilitating inventory management for bond dealers who absorb fire sale shocks. However, the liquidity provision role of CDSs gets weakened after the CDS Big Bang in 2009, potentially because of the requirement of large upfront payments.

We examine the structural stability of Gaussian shadow rate term structure models in a sample of Treasury yields that includes the “effective lower bound” (ELB) period from 2008 to 2015. After highlighting the challenges of testing for structural breaks in a latent-factor model, we proceed to document various pieces of empirical evidence for a structural break. As one of several practical implications, the expected policy rate paths during ELB years are notably shallower in our model that accommodates a structural break compared with a model that imposes structurally stability.

Using an international sample of IPO firms and two country-level measures of financial literacy, we find strong evidence that financial literacy is negatively associated with IPO underpricing. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of financial literacy in reducing IPO underpricing is more pronounced when the information environment is less transparent. Employing path analysis, we document that information friction, firm transparency, and stock market participation are mechanisms that mediate this relationship. Our study contributes to and extends the literature by providing strong evidence that citizens’ financial literacy has an important and consistent influence on IPO underpricing.

This article proposes a novel way to estimate consumer switching costs and uses Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide this estimate for the loan market. I show that when a distressed bank’s closure forced firms to switch, they started borrowing at lower interest rates instantly and permanently and that this drop revealed the lower bound of firms’ ex ante switching costs. A healthy bank’s closure showed no such effect. The article’s findings suggest that distressed banks hold up and overcharge firms and that by closing and resolving such banks with good-bank/bad-bank separation regulators can improve firm financing.

In a general equilibrium framework, we show that banks may “buy” political influence at a discount: They offer disproportionately small campaign contributions compared to the influence they exert, thus generating abnormal returns. We distinguish between the direct effect of contributions which, as a cost, reduce bank returns, and the indirect effect of contributions which boost returns via inducing bank-favoring policies. Therefore, abnormal returns may or may not increase with the amount of contributions, depending on which effect dominates: Stricter capital requirements decrease contributions and abnormal returns. When politicians attach more weight to households’ welfare, contributions increase and abnormal returns decrease.