Undertaking to write about the future of the United Nations may well be regarded as a risky if not a downright foolhardy enterprise, particularly in 1965, between the tragicomedy of the nineteenth General Assembly and the great uncertainty of the twentieth session. For many people, the question is whether the United Nations has a future, and for some of them this question is purely rhetorical. I think that it has, or that, at any rate, general international organization has a future. Whatever may happen to the United Nations, I find it difficult to conceive that the men who conduct the foreign relations of states will ever again consider that they can dispense with a comprehensive institutional mechanism or that they will, in the foreseeable future, contrive a global mechanism fundamentally different in character from the United Nations. Objectively, the operation of the international system requires an organizational framework virtually coextensive with the system; just as education requires schools and universities and medicine requires hospitals and clinics, so international relations require at least as much organizational apparatus as the United Nations system provides. Moreover, there is evidence that this objective need has penetrated the consciousness of most statesmen. The questions that they have asked about international organization in the last twenty years have not included the question of whether it is sensible to equip the international system with a general institutional structure.

The new international nuclear regime requires accession to fullscope safeguards and an acceptance of the formal restraints imposed by the London Nuclear Suppliers Group on the worldwide availability of sensitive nuclear technology, materials, and equipment. The underside of the nuclear market, however, consists of surreptitious transfers by suppliers to special recipient states. Pakistan has capitalized on the existence of such a market to acquire the means to make nuclear weapons. Though South Asia is likely to be the first region outside of the central strategic system to harbor nuclear-armed national rivals, the situation is manageable through the imposition of innovative institutionalized constraints on the region. Neutrally conceived, these constraints can be adapted for other regions facing nuclearization. In the long run, the imbalance of capabilities between India and Pakistan will manifest itself in the nuclear field as it has in others.

The similarity of state structures throughout Eastern Europe helps to explain why the reactions of states in that area to the international economic disturbances of the past decade resemble each other and why they differ from those of states outside the socialist bloc. Similar state structures, however, do not explain why the economic strategies of the East European states themselves in response to international economic shocks in the 1970s and 1980s diverged so noticeably. The role of state structure is to define “kto/kovo” (who can do what to whom) relationships in the state and economy. In this way state structures define problems that political leaders must solve, possibilities among which they may choose, and political resources and allies upon which they may draw in the course of their decision making. In contrast, strategy choices–“what is to be done”–are the outcomes of political processes in which leaders mobilize resources and allies to capture positions of power from which they can pursue the purposes they advocate. Thus differences in foreign economic strategies among member states in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance reflected differences in the dynamic interaction of the form and content of political processes that occurred within common state structures.

Italy's political economy is characterized by international weakness and internal fragmentation and polarization. Since 1947, Italy's foreign economic policies have been defined by a broadly-based political and social coalition dominated by the Christian Democratic party (DC). This coalition has incorporated or maintained close links with ministerial bureaucracies, the Bank of Italy, state-controlled industrial and commercial enterprises, large corporations, and Catholic trade unions. It has attempted to foster a postwar climate receptive to business interests and to foreign investment; one which would facilitate the maintenance of a stable domestic political and social order. At the same time, the DC coalition is so fragmented by factionalism and personal competition that economic policy making has lacked direction and has been marked by personalism and by improvisation. Italian policy makers operate in a precarious environment in that they must use political and economic weaknessin order to mobilize the international assistance needed to maintain the internal social order as well as external economic survival.

The so-called “Chinese Question” in the United Nations has been an issue in UN politics for the last seventeen years. It has hampered the operation of the UN and influenced the course of post-World War II international politics. Yet little study has been done with regard to the attitudes of the Communist Chinese themselves toward the UN.

An economist in an international organization has certain obligations as a member of his profession, as a citizen of his country, and as an international civil servant. These are not always readily harmonized in the individual. For economists from different backgrounds (i.e., economies which are capitalistic, welfare-oriented, underdeveloped, etc.), of different nationalities, and working in different capacities with organizations of differing international functions, there can surely be no single prototype. There may nonetheless be some generalizations which can be made about the role of this sort of professional in this occupational setting. Where may the lines be drawn between the pursuit of truth, however relative it may be, and the advocacy of policies? To what extent must the economist align himself with the practical when that is the enemy of the desirable? Does an economist withdraw from the heady atmosphere of academic recognition into bureaucratic anonymity when he fills out the twenty-page employment form of an international organization; or does he escape from the pallid world of equilibrating models into the invigorating arena of problems, pressure and power? Is an economist trained in a particular school of thought—whether Marxist, Keynesian, Chicago or institutionalist—under any obligation to suppress or dilute the distinctive point of view he initially brings to bear on economic problems?

At the present time scientific opinion has shifted to the view that man can, in certain circumstances and at certain places, modify at least local weather conditions in limited ways. Many believe that man can dissipate certain “cold” fogs in limited areas for short periods; that he can increase rainfall or snowfall by perhaps ten to fifteen percent in a local area in narrowly limited circumstances; that he can probably convert hail into less dangerous forms of precipitation, also in narrowly limited circumstances.1 Some experiments are being conducted to learn more about such phenomena as hurricanes and lightning. Man still needs to learn much more and to develop faster computers before he can begin to think of safely undertaking intentional modification on anything more than a local and highly selected basis. Nevertheless, it is clear that even the limited effects thus far produced do not stop at some predetermined boundary; both nationally and internationally attempts to modify weather can be expected to cause dislocations and friction.

Eight generalizations are extracted from two partially competing perspectives (Johan Galtung's “feudal interaction” and Jorge Dominguez's “international fragmentation”) on center-periphery interaction patterns. Seven of these generalizations are tested by examining head of state, governmental and ministerial visits to and from the Arab world between 1946 and 1975. Neither perspective is fully supported or disconfirmed by the data. Dominguez's emphases on limited resources and local problems, however, which lead in turn to relatively high intra-subsystemic interaction between peripheral actors and changing center-periphery patterns, appear to provide a more accurate analytical base than does the static model, with its emphasis on high levels of asymmetry and concentration, advanced by Galtung. Further tests of the two perspectives will be necessary in order to assess fully the geographical scope and the type of interaction patterns covered by these diachronic findings.

Managing foreign affairs is in no small measure about anticipating the actions (and non-actions) of others, and about taking steps to limit the unexpected—and the undesired. Law has long been recognized as important to these tasks. Nevertheless, standard IR treatments often overlook important properties of law, even when trying to account for international law's effects on behavior. Chief among these overlooked properties is the fact that legal rules are formulated for general use, which means their provisions lack determinate meaning in relation to the full range of facts they may be applied to. Selecting and using legal rules to guide or assess behavior thus requires interpretation. Self-interested actors may differ regarding the applicability, scope, or meaning of individual rules, and still more so where multiple legal rules are in play. In situations where political stakes are high, powerful actors may not be content to leave all options on the table. Instead they may use interpretative tactics to mingle obligations from different agreements and, where needed, to augment relevant legal obligations in efforts to prospectively ensure, in the mode of Riker's heresthetics, that interlocutors feel compelled by legal circumstances to enact the more powerful actor's preferences. I demonstrate how agreement mingling and augmentation function in complex legal environments by reexaming US efforts to insulate its citizens from unwanted exercises of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

We welcome David Levi-Faur's critique of our article, both because it serves to stimulate debate on this important topic and because it provides us with the opportunity to elaborate on our arguments and touch on their wider potential applicability. Levi-Faur does not take issue with our central empirical finding—that American legal style is spreading to other jurisdictions—nor with our normative assessment of the mixed blessings of this trend. We agree with Levi-Faur that many questions concerning legal change have been largely overlooked by political scientists, and we agree that he raises a number of points that highlight the need for refinements of our argument. Yet, for all that we agree on, we disagree strongly with Levi-Faur's analysis and his main lines of criticism. His core criticisms concern our conceptualization of the dependent variable in our study, our purported disregard of alternative explanations, and our inadequate attention to the importers of American law and processes of “localization.” In this article, we respond to each of these criticisms in turn. We then discuss the generalizability of our argument beyond Europe and Japan. We conclude with suggestions for further research.

Examination of the literature on the influence of the secretary-general forcefully suggests two conclusions about that literature: It is large and growing rapidly, yet tihere is little in the way of systematic explanation of the behavior of the secretary-general. The scholarly literature is filled with statements that tell us the kindls of things we should be studying (for example, superpower rivalries and the “special right” of the secretary-general), but what they represent are alternative research concerns. They do not constitute conceptual tools for empirical analysis that would help us devise and evaluate propositions setting Ifortti relationships about human action in tihe context of international organizations. No doubt these studies have added to our descriptive knowledge of the secretary-general, and this knowledge possibly alerts us to complex processes at work in and out of the United Nations. Yet two qualifications must be noted. First, the identification of complexity should be the beginning and not the end of empirical inquiry. Second, the actual value of descriptive knowledge remains problematical when it is presented without clarifying the generalizations used as criteria to select facts. Without explicitness we have no way of validating the reliability of criteria used for sorting out “important” information. We are placed in the position of not being certain that the particular study contains all relevant information and not knowing whether the information presented is relevant.

The English parliamentary system emerged from the dramatic struggle between the English Parliament and the Crown over the principle of political or “democratic” control. For leaders of the Commons such as Edward Coke a single false step beyond the line of the sovereign's endurance meant the Tower of London. Another struggle in a different key and on a different level has begun with little publicity on the Continent. The European Parliamentary Assembly in the newly established European Communities is seeking to assert some degree of control and influence not only over the mushrooming Commissions, but also over the powerful Councils of Ministers. Obviously, there is no danger of an irate Council of Ministers confining the obstreperous parliamentarians to the dungeons of Strasbourg. Moreover, the European Parliamentary Assembly is far from being a parliament. Members of the Community “executive” such as Jean Monnet have encouraged rather than fought the Assembly. In these as in other respects the analogy with the development of the English parliamentary system must not be pressed too far. But the broad contours of the contest, the pressures and counter-pressures, the use and abuse of legal argument, and the reliance on genuine and fabricated precedent offer an interesting study in the development of a parliamentary body.

The transformation of the political environment of Western Europe in the mid-1960's has been only partially completed. On the one hand, in many economic sectors relations among the six members1 of the European economic communities are set within the context of a new process and a new institutional method of community building and are being modified by the notion of a common interest beyond six sets of national interests. But, on the other hand, the relations among the Six in the “political” realm—that is, in the sphere of foreign and defense policy—have not yet been transformed by common institutions. It is in this area that the confrontation between traditional methods of interstate relations and the new community m thod is currently taking place, and it is here that the ultimate validity of the concept of European unification will face its most difficult test. Therefore, a crucial question in Europe today is whether or not the Six will be able to organize their political life on a collective basis as they have done in many economic sectors.

Collective security is a term that has been applied to a variety of different arrangements. Originally and traditionally, it denoted the League of Nations type of security system. Lately, it has been used to describe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with its inter-governmental machinery, as well as other regional or non-regional defense pacts

Change has been the one constant in the brief but eventful history of the United Nations. Whatever its shortcomings, the UN has proved itself responsive to the turbulent forces of a dynamic age. Whether it will be able to marshal these forces, to channel them for productive ends, remains to be seen.