There is general agreement that in Italy the establishment of a judicial council ensured an overall higher degree of independence. Nevertheless, this self-governance template was criticized for propping up an accountability imbalance and a certain degree of inefficiency. In order to understand this assessment, this article delves into the relevance of informal rules and practices in the operation of the Italian judicial council. More specifically, it focuses on the activities relating to appointments of court presidents and professional assessment. Based on this analysis, it makes some observations on the factors shaping informal practices and questions their impact on judicial values and the quality of Italian democracy. I argue that informal institutions have amplified the corporatist character of the Italian judiciary, but it would be wrong to portray them in negative terms only, because the operation of the Italian judicial council and judicial system also benefits from a healthy dose of informality, which allows for enduring legitimacy in a polarized society.

One year ago, the Qatar World Cup was in full swing, and Qatar was omnipresent in our public and private spheres. For many, the Qatar 2022 World Cup will forever be intimately connected with the plight of migrant workers. This Article dives into the confluence of spectacle, counter-marketing, international—labor and human rights—law, and local reforms, which came together in the long decade which followed FIFA’s fateful decision in December 2010 to give the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. It starts by situating the FIFA World Cup 2022 within Qatar’s drive for soft power and nation branding, before turning to re-counting how the 2022 World Cup was “ambushed” in the name of Qatar’s migrant workers and their rights, putting the issue on the global agenda and triggering the involvement of the ILO. Thereafter, the Article discusses the effects of this ambush counter-marketing by engaging with the labor reforms introduced by the Qatari government, while highlighting their limits in terms of scope and implementation. The Article concludes with a general discussion on the blind spots and shortcomings of the turn to counter-marketing as a strategy to vindicate international human rights or labor rights.

This Article argues that distributional concerns constitute the heart of environmental regulation; they are not restricted to pre-policy values or post-policy effects that need to dealt with. On the contrary, they characterize the selection of environmental policies, and their properties. Different interests, preferences, and values with respect to a policy instrument can be made commensurable using the language of distribution. The centrality of distribution as an organizing principle may be elusive on account of it being too vaguely construed or too narrowly defined. This necessitates the articulation of a typology of distributional concerns. To this end, it is suggested that the distribution of benefits and burdens, distribution of responsibility, distribution of membership and distribution of capabilities could be useful categories to develop and assess environmental regulation. This framework is then applied to an unsuspecting candidate, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).

The Japanese Constitution has never experienced any amendment since its enactment in 1947. This article claims that the reason is not the Japanese people’s support of it from the heart. The hypothesis presented in this article is that many other political, structural and cultural reasons have gradually deprived the Constitution’s normative force among people, and have made constitutional amendment unnecessary in Japanese politics.

Even throughout a global pandemic, climate change continues to be a fiercely discussed topic—both politically and legally—the world over. Particularly in light of the many Covid-19 related financial aid programs (including transnational ones) and the associated economic stabilization and reconstruction plans, a sustainable climate policy and legal order should be expected to play a role for an economy that has fallen into a slump. Nevertheless, a lively discussion on how best to achieve climate protection continues to take place in already established systems such as the private law system. Here, as far as climate change is concerned, tort law appears to be the focus of these discussions. The extent to which tort law and the issue of climate change can be brought together is also increasingly being discussed in Germany. This article attempts to shed light on the questions of how tort law could contribute to the mitigation of climate change and how climate change could fit into the law of torts of the German civil law legal system.

Mark Mazower's latest book, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations intelligently weaves in the League of Nations as the primary informant of the United Nations to deconstruct any claims of discontinuities between the two institutions. In doing so, Mazower offers an eloquent polemic against the literature's tendency to idolize the United Nations' founding as a symbolic and material break from empire. Exploring the dark sides of its intellectual origins and early years, however, Mazower points to the decolonization movement to argue for the potential of the United Nations as a site of emancipatory struggle — his book concludes with a reinvestment in its promise of a more inclusive and just world order. The issue left to the reader, and which I hope to address in this review essay, is the legitimacy of Mazower's claim that the United Nations has indeed escaped its imperial heritage.

Large-scale investments in farmland can generate adverse effects on food security, minority groups, and the environment. Consequently, this Article analyzes to what extent international investment law has the potential to prevent those effects, considering the current investment treaty reform towards a symmetrical mechanism promoting sustainable development. First this Article presents the current substantive standard on expropriation of large-scale investments in farmland and the regulatory space left for host states. This Article then frames a potential public interest clause that would have the effect of granting due protection to investors and the right to regulate to host states, while not undermining the public interest and also preventing the adverse effects of these investments.

Using the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea as a foil, the aim of this article is three-fold. First, it offers an internal critique of the influential answers that normative theory and international jurisprudence provide to the paradox of constitutionalism. Second, building on critical engagement with these approaches, this article mobilizes constitutional theory to find a constructive response to the crisis in Ukraine that goes beyond the prescriptions offered either by normative theory or international jurisprudence. In doing so, it seeks to sketch a broad constitutional framework not for post but rather for early-conflict constitution-making. The final aim of this article is to contribute to a richer self-understanding of constitutional theory vis-à-vis its disciplinary neighbors.

“Twenty years ago today our country fell into deep ditches of darkness—twenty years later, today, we are a country united and a nation elevated.”

Those were the words of Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Mushikiwabo, on 7 April 2014, as he spoke to the Rwandan People at the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of the Rwandan genocide. Thousands of Rwandans gathered at Rwanda's main sports stadium, the Amahoro stadium, in Kigali to mourn their losses together. Ban Kimoon, the UN Secretary-General, lit a flame at the Kigali Genocide Memorial Center and not only expressed his solidarity with all Rwandans, but also emphasized that the United Nations could and should have done more to avoid the most devastating chapter in Rwanda's history.

The European Council of Lisbon (December 2000) formally adopted the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a means to implement the Lisbon Strategy, a package of policies aimed at promoting economic and social innovations in the member states. The Open Method of Coordination is a means of governance based on the cooperation of member states. The formal introduction of the OMC, based on policy coordination at European level in order to induce change in national policies, triggered a lively scholarly debate on the role of new modes of governance in the EU. New modes of governance are roughly defined as non-hierarchical forms of political steering that rely on policy coordination among a multitude of institutional actors and across government levels. Scholars have coined a variety of terms to capture the characteristics of these governance modes, such as soft modes of governance, network governance, multilevel governance, experimental governance or, as we call it here and elsewhere, innovative governance. Despite the wide variety of terms, scholars hold several assumptions in common. Thus, most scholars assume that new modes of governance have only recently emerged. Furthermore, they assume that such modes of governance particularly emerge in policy areas where the Union lacks competences, while some form of common action is needed. Finally, many scholars take it for granted that non–hierarchical modes of governance result in weak impacts.

The concept of rupture straddles the space between revolution and reform, anarchy and order—a paradoxical term to demarcate, on the one hand, the possibility of a complete falling away of one systematization, without necessarily initiating some new regime, and on the other hand, the conditions of improvement and renewal, an opportunity of reassessment, and quite often re-entrenchment. Thus, rupture is not necessarily the same as speaking about revolution, or even emancipation for that matter, because it does not necessitate any giving up of a certain system of ideas or authority, at least not in any longstanding sense. To put it bluntly, it is neither progressive nor reactionary, but in some sense, perhaps best understood, and I will expand on this shortly, as simply the very conditions of establishing and/or maintaining any symbolic order (by which I mean the albeit uneasy synthesis of political, social, economic, religious relationships that constitute what ends up getting called a ‘system’ or ‘order'). Rupture is a strategy, in other words, of both understanding and political action, but which itself carries no necessary affiliation with any ideological disposition. We might say, therefore, to speak of rupture is to enlist a set of concerns, disagreements, traditions, ideas, and so on, that are useful when attempting not just to describe a situation, but to move towards some political decision as a group, though what exactly that would be is open to contestation.

The present article seeks to identify the particular culture that undergirds the practice of EU law, by drawing from Paul Kahn’s Cultural Analysis of Law. It will do so by extracting from his work certain models for understanding the imaginative life of a political community, most importantly those of the rule of law and of political action, which in Kahn’s observation of American realities stand in competition to one another. This will lead us, first, to consider the particular place held by European integration, as a messianic project of collective transformation. While this might seem to structure the practice of EU law in a way that is consistent with Kahn’s description of political action, such a view, we will then submit, does not consider the particular place of law in the EU’s legal culture, as the very substance in which the European order appears incarnated, and which provides the impetus for much of its development. To account for these two dimensions in the political imaginary of the EU, it is argued that, unlike Kahn’s description of the American context, the rule of law and political action do not stand in tension with one another. Instead, the practice of EU law operates under an idiosyncratic frame of experience, which can be usefully associated to Robert Cover’s notion of “lawful messianism,” and which synthesizes key aspects of Kahn’s account of the rule of law and political action. Finally, to illustrate the operation of just that culture of lawful messianism and its persistence to this day, the article turns to the place of the rule of law as a “foundational value” of the European legal system and recent developments around this particular norm of EU law.

This special issue aims to investigate the regulatory challenges facing the EU with regard to security governance in the broad area of the fight against financial crimes and by adopting a wider outlook on how to map and understand these phenomena in their salient contexts. In recent years, security as a key word can be witnessed as increasingly penetrating policies on a national, international, and supranational level. This development is also visible in EU policies, inter alia in the EU's policy concerning the area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ). Coupling the word security to the concept of governance in the somewhat thought-provoking phrase “security governance” prominently cements its position in the entirety of processes and mechanisms that steer people as well as corporations or markets. Security in the EU internal context concerns to a great extent the fight against terrorism and its financing as well as the policing of EU borders. Security in this regard concerns the structure of EU law and how it can be justified at the macro-level.

The European Green Deal and the European Climate Law highlight the EU’s commitment to strive for carbon neutrality. Considering the magnitude of the global challenge, it is evident that a green transition will not succeed without the efforts of every sector, including financial institutions. Concerns have been raised that central banks may, in fact, contribute to the increase of greenhouse gas emissions and, in consequence, aggravate global warming. This all has currently resulted in a rapid expansion of the debate on the potential role of central banks, and in particular the ECB, to consider climate objectives. In the European context, however, it is often argued that environmental sustainability lies outside the ECB’s traditional core mandate to focus on price stability. This article aims to introduce the environmental integration principle, laid down in Article 11 TFEU, in the ECB’s legal framework, and provide an analysis of the possibilities for and limitations to the greening of the ECB's monetary policy based on this provision. Although Article 11 TFEU has great potential with regards to the greening of sectoral policies, in legal literature, the provision has not gained enough academic attention in terms of the financial sector.

Economic interventionism in the form of subsidization and operation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is today among the main frontlines of international trade conflicts. Along with trade restrictions and new legislation designed to impact cross-border investment, mergers, and acquisitions, the use of subsidies and countervailing measures by governments and trade-distorting effects of SOEs have lately caused harsh controversies within and outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) between its members. Going forward, there are reasons to expect these tensions to intensify rather than diminish in number and importance. This Special Issue aims at examining the development of international trade rules regulating state interventionism against the background of the Covid-19 global pandemic and present shifts in global geopolitics and the economy. This introduction, in presenting the state of the art on the questions tackled by this Special Issue and highlighting its contribution to existing literature on the topic, offers different considerations aimed at bringing together various trends emerging from the Articles contained in this Special Issue. It also explores avenues for further research and reflection.

On 2 October 2013, Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). The protocol, that has so far been signed by sixteen States and ratified by Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, San Marino and Slovenia, will enter into force in case of ratification by at least ten Member States. If the protocol becomes effective, it will expand the European Court of Human Rights’ competence to give advisory opinions upon request by domestic high courts and tribunals.

The aim of this paper is not to relitigate Qatar’s human rights record but to assess the effectiveness of its labor reforms: the principal concern is dispute resolution and enforceability. While Qatar instituted a broad suite of labor law reforms in the years preceding the World Cup, questions remain about whether they have improved access to justice for migrant workers. More attention needs to be given to the dispute settlement system established by Law No. 13 of 2017 to assess if new legal norms translate into enforceable rights. It is argued that the labor dispute system has largely failed by not taking into account the circumstances that define the employer-employee relationship in Qatar, especially the stark imbalance in power. While reforms might endure at the level of formal law, the dispute system will fail to deliver genuine justice to workers unless it is refashioned.

Amidst the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic, the German Federal Constitutional Court rendered a little-noticed, but potentially far-reaching decision regarding European integration. When it declared the law ratifying the Unitary Patent Court Agreement unconstitutional, it did so because it is a treaty “supplementing or being otherwise closely tied to the EU”, in other words, a satellite treaty, inter-se agreement, or more generally: an international law agreement furthering European integration outside the EU law framework. This commonly used integration technique is therefore going to be a lot more difficult in future whenever Germany is involved. At the same time, the court order gives all German citizens a far-reaching right to have laws ratifying such treaties checked before the Constitutional Court, which is a significant extension compared to its earlier case-law. In future cases of disagreement, EU Member States may have to find different ways to proceed than resorting to international law, such as using the enhanced cooperation mechanism.

The recent years saw the rise in discourse to undo the liberal-democratic amendments introduced between 1999 and 2002 and restore the Indonesian 1945 Constitution to its original 1945 version. Some Indonesian public figures believe that these amendments are not legitimate, because they are deemed to have eliminated the basic values of the original 1945 Constitution which was built on the “integralist” concept as propounded by its main architect Soepomo. According to the integralist conception, the state should be seen as a family in which the government played a role as a wise father who can bring its people to the right choice. This article seeks to prove that these amendments are legitimate although they constitute a “dismemberment” of the original 1945 Constitution. This is because the original 1945 Constitution was formed only by a handful of elites in an institution established by the Japanese occupying power in early 1945. By contrast, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) who was in charge of the four amendments to the 1945 Constitution had a greater democratic legitimacy compared to the drafters of the original Constitution given that they were elected through the 1999 elections. Furthermore, the original 1945 Constitution was never intended to operate beyond the Indonesian revolutionary period, which ended in 1949. It was expected that the document be significantly changed or even replaced by the People’s Consultative Assembly through the amendment process.