Terrorist acts have, for a long time, constituted a major concern for the international community. Yet the definition of terrorism has represented an area of international law where the divergence of views between States was significant. For some, the protection of the State and of the democratic values of the society laid at the heart of the debate, whereas others were more concerned with the risk of an unjustified repression of “freedom fighters.” These approaches, although apparently complementary, have proved to be irreconcilable in practice. At the United Nations’ level, this division of the international community prevented the emergence of a consensus over a horizontal definition of terrorism. This situation,-paradoxically did not impede the adoption of several international conventions dealing with specific aspects or forms of terrorism as well as of multiple resolutions on this issue.

The concept of the essence of a fundamental right—set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”)—operates as a constant reminder that our core values as Europeans are absolute. In other words, they are not up for balancing. As the seminal judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) in Schrems shows, where a measure imposes a limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right that is so intense and so comprehensive that it calls into question that right as such, that measure is incompatible with the Charter, as it deprives the right at issue of its essence. This is so without the need for a balancing exercise of competing interests, because a measure that compromises the very essence of a fundamental right is automatically disproportionate. Therefore, the present contribution supports the contention that in order for the concept of essence to function in a constitutionally meaningful way, both EU and national courts should apply the “respect-for-the-essence test” before undertaking a proportionality assessment.

One day before the historic trial against Radovan Karadžić was due to begin, Biljana Plavšić, a former Bosnian Serb leader, was released from prison after serving two-thirds of an 11-year sentence for war crimes. She flew in from Sweden to Belgrade, where she was welcomed by the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska. While Plavšić was on her way home, more than a hundred representatives of Bosnian nongovernmental organizations were heading from home to the Hague, to be present for the beginning of the Karadžić trial. Drawing on cases of returning war criminals, this article argues that similar to Bosnian citizens and war criminals who are commuting in different directions, cosmopolitan and local forms of justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina are also progressing in opposite destinations.

Generations of politicians and lawyers will have to read and re-read the recent ruling of the German Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009 regarding the Treaty of Lisbon (“Lisbon Case”) on almost a daily basis for many years to come. The Court, master of its own proceedings and not feeling bound by any doctrine of judicial self-restraint, has expounded in this decision at great length about its own philosophy of the European integration process. Based on its self-established theory, in which every German citizen is holder of a democratic right to a legislature that is endowed with substantial powers to determine the destiny of the German people, the Court examined the Treaty in each and every detail. The claimants, alleging through a constitutional complaint that this democratic right had been breached, could not point to any specific injury that they had suffered. In real terms, their constitutional complaints amounted to an ‘abstract' review of the Treaty, a remedy which the Basic Law reserves for the federal government, any government of a Land, or for a third of the members of the Bundestag. But the Court saw the constitutional complaints, which had been filed by the extreme right and the extreme left of the political spectrum, as a welcome opportunity to define the constitutional limits of the European integration process. Far from reflecting the views of the framers, the ruling reads like a political manifesto from the judges.

Sometimes less is more. Hence, it is not necessarily bad news if a judgment on a matter of fundamental public interest does not meet public expectations. And it certainly was not bad news that the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 12 September 2012 on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Treaty did not meet the exaggerated public expectations that had been fuelled by an unprecedented media-hype.

The increasing number of international judicial institutions, producing an ever-growing stream of decisions, has been one of the dominant features of the international legal order of the past two decades. The shift in quantity has gone hand in hand with a transformation in quality. Today, it is no longer convincing to only think of international courts in their role of settling disputes. While this function is as relevant as ever, many international judicial institutions have developed a further role in what is often called global governance. Their decisions have effects beyond individual disputes. They exceed the confines of concrete cases and bear on the general legal structures. The practice of international adjudication creates and shifts actors' normative expectations and as such develops legal normativity. Many actors use international judicial decisions in similar ways as they do formal sources of international law. To us, this role of international adjudication beyond the individual dispute is beyond dispute.

One does not approach a challenge with a backward view. Rather, we take on challenges by looking forward. In scholarship, taking a forward view is known as research. Law schools define themselves by their research. Scholarly work is what garners prestige from without and solidarity from within. Without a doubt, teaching itself also ranks highly, but excellent teaching begins with proper research. The connection between research and teaching is indispensable. Teaching flourishes where students are gradually introduced to the processes of research, giving them a feeling for the excitement of scholarly work. This forms the nexus between the older and younger generations of academics, continually opening and reopening their perspectives to innovation and the undiscovered. Semper apertus reads the seal of the University of Heidelberg from 1386.

I have read in the newspapers that foreign citizens, when travelling to the United States on a Visa, will undergo a data registration and have their fingerprints taken. Not willing to submit myself to this treatment, I decided therefore to cancel my guest lectures at New York University for March 2004. At this time, I would like to provide reasons for my decision – a decision that I find necessary and unavoidable in spite of my sympathies for American students and professors with whom I have for many years felt connected both in friendship and professional life. This is a decision that I would hope to be adopted also by other European Intellectuals and Teachers.

Given the remarkable consistency in Jacques Derrida's work over several decades, it is not hard to draw a line from “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” to his last seminars, on pardon and forgiveness. The aporias of forgiveness are analogous to those of the gift and of justice he had analyzed in detail in previous decades, as Derrida states in “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible” — to that extent his last seminars and lectures were part of the same deconstructive project on the possibility of justice. At the same time, Derrida postulates that forgiveness is an experience outside or heterogeneous to the rule of law. In considering this juncture in Derrida's work, this paper will juxtapose the logic and history of amnesty with Derrida's analysis of pardon: the latter pivots on a monotheistic heritage, a Biblical-Koranic sense that is demarcated from the former concept, that of amnesty between an ethics of forgiveness and the politics of forgetting.

Increasingly, populists and authoritarians have discovered for themselves the notion of constitutional identity as a practical excuse to sidestep transnational legal obligations, as well as to vindicate their constitutional projects on the whole from concerns about the rule of law and other shared European values. This has led some scholars to highlight the “dangers of constitutional identity,” brandishing it as an “inherently dangerous concept,” and suggesting that the concept ought to be abandoned. This Article argues that the anti-pluralist critiques of constitutional identity, while rightly criticizing the authoritarian appropriations of constitutional identity, ultimately go too far and draw the wrong conclusions. Simply dismissing the concept of constitutional identity will not lead to the disappearance of the meanings imparted through it. The authoritarian and populist appropriations of constitutional identity must be identified and understood as abuses of the concept. By eliding constitutional identity with its abuse, the anti-pluralist critique sacrifices a more intimate understanding of the realities of constitutional identity abuse to a likely unattainable normative vision of uncontested EU law primacy. In advancing this critique, I will further outline three potential avenues for understanding constitutional identity abuse, differentiating between its substantive, generative, and relational aspects. Constitutional identity claims can be abusive by virtue of their substantive content, how they have come about, as well as how they are advanced.

The article considers populism not as common ideology but as a common strategy for implementing various distinct ideologies. Constitutional democracy and populist strategy are inherently connected. Populist strategies develop a specific rhetoric which takes root in the features of constitutional democracy. The populist rhetoric manipulates the rule-of-law and the majoritarian pillars of constitutional democracy by convincing a fictional majority that constitutional democracy gives rise to a tyranny of minorities. Populism in action represents the second facet of the populist strategy. It corresponds to a specific constitutional strategy of legal and constitutional reforms aiming at disrupting constitutional democracy. After exposing my theoretical assumption, I move to a comparative study of two countries, France and Hungary, selected according to the most different cases approach. I analyze first how Viktor Orban based his constitutional strategy on a progressive deconstruction of the post-communist legacy. I study then how Marine le Pen’s strategy consisted of a comprehensive reform of the French semi-presidential system via referendum. I finally conclude by recalling the essential role academics have to play in the fight against populism. My last point is a provocation, what if calling populism by its real diversity (fascism, racism and antisemitism) was the most efficient way to fight them?

Since the very conception of the European integration, there has been one core question that has attracted much attention and yet it remains contested and in a way unanswered till present. What is the legal nature of the European integration - a query about what integration stands for (the descriptive dimension), how it is to be explained and construed (the explanatory dimension) and eventually what it should stand for (the normative dimension). With the lapse of time, and as integration has evolved, various legal, political, economical and even broader intellectual streams of mutually shared beliefs, we should call them narratives, have emerged all offering their own and separate visions of what constitutes the most appropriate answer. Among them, however, the constitutional narrative has come out as a sort of master or dominant narrative whose answers have reached and persuaded the widest circle of influential stakeholders with the greatest impact on the social construction of the European integration.

In Karlsruhe's recent request for a preliminary ruling, an unconventional monetary policy measure of the European Central Bank (ECB) finds an unconventional judicial response. Based on its mandate to enforce the fundamental right to vote, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) leaves no doubt about its view that the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT Programme) violates the law of the European Union and hence the German Basic Law, unless one reads them in a rather restrictive way. But as unconventional monetary policy steps up the need for the ECB to justify the legality of its measures, so does the FCC's unconventional expansion of the scope of judicial review raise questions which the recent decision in its—generally laudable—brevity leaves underexplored. In particular, the decision does not dwell much on the issue whether it is appropriate for a court to review issues of monetary policy, and which standard of review should apply. Only Judge Gerhardt calls the majority's standard of review into question when he doubts whether the requirement for transgressions of the European Union's competences to be “manifest” is a workable criterion for defining the scope of the FCC's ultra vires control.

Populist political movements claim to be democratic in expressing what the people want, against the political establishment. These claims are misconceived to begin with in presupposing a definitive unitary people. Nonetheless, constitutional democracies face a special challenge to resist these claims in principle because they are unmistakably democratic sounding claims; they purport to empower popular will so that the people can rule themselves. Populist movements can be successful at the ballot box and push political culture in antidemocratic directions through democratic means, all the while claiming democratic legitimacy. The very processes of democracy are under threat. Traditionally, political winners are not motivated to change the system that saw them elected; populists are different in this regard. The populist challenge prompts a revisit of the debate about the democratic legitimacy of judges being empowered to displace the decisions of elected legislative assemblies (the constitutional review debate). An underdeveloped aspect of the constitutional review debate was the scope for courts to intervene specifically in political processes to correct them when they have gone awry and to help prevent them going awry in the first place. Judicial intervention is costly in democratic terms, and yet democracy has to be protected. This Article analyzes the search for a balance between popular will shaping democratic processes and judicially managed constitutional limitations on popular will shaping those processes. The recommended judicial role is styled as courts protecting—not perfecting—democracy, and it is a John Hart Ely-inspired modification of a separation of powers defense of constitutional review. In addressing the populist challenge, courts can, in principle, try to be a step ahead in anticipating and, where they can, slowing degradation of democracy and thereby helping to prevent it.

Innumerable attempts have been made to explore the theoretical nature of federalism. Due to the long history, worldwide existence and interdisciplinary character of federalism, a plethora of literature has been written on the topic. Yet, these endeavours have not even resulted in a clear and commonly used definition of the term. Surely, it is one of the great dilemmas of this field of research that despite so much discussion, there is no settled common denominator of ‘federalism'. Whereas practical studies and exchange of experience between the various federal systems offer a more conventional research arena, comparative theoretical approaches are much more seldom. This is not the least because of the tremendous semantic challenges of a comparative theoretical approach. At first glance, it is sometimes difficult to understand the terminology of federalism, the meaning of which differs according to the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics. Even more difficulty arises when the substance of federal theories is discussed. Again, differences between theories may be due to different academic approaches, particularly between understanding federalism as an overall principle or as a more concrete concept of a federal state and, in particular, whether the constituent units of a federal state are states, and, if states, whether they are sovereign.

Sixty years after the promulgation of the German constitution, which from the beginning was distinguished by its “visionary openness towards Europe,” the German Federal Constitutional Court reassessed the historic process of European integration. It reviewed the compatibility of the legal foundations of the European Union with the German Basic Law and provided a thorough overview. The Treaty of Lisbon and its sweeping, integrating reform of the European Union is compatible with the Basic Law, the Court's Second Senate ruled, so long as it is applied within the framework outlined by the Federal Constitutional Court. However, the Court found that the German implementation law is not consistent with the Basic Law. Accordingly, the Court made clear that Germany can continue with the ratification of the treaty only after introducing a new implementation law. The 147-page decision could be summarised in the following way: The European Union is an association of sovereign states and, hence, a secondary political area.

On 12 December 2002, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declared inadmissible an application filed against Greece and Germany by 257 victims and relatives of victims of Nazi war crimes committed in Greece in 1944. This decision was not only the latest of a number of ECHR decisions concerning the judicial treatment of Nazi war crimes committed during the Second World War, but it also marked the second time that the Court had to deal with the question of whether states may rely on sovereign immunity in cases concerning breaches of peremptory and non-derogable jus cogens norms.

I have come to believe, over the last two decades of my consulting work outside of the United States, that the origins, growth and acceptance of clinical legal education throughout the world is the greatest single innovation in law school pedagogy – and certainly in student learning – since the “science” of the Socratic, case method was brought to Harvard by Christopher Columbus Langdell. I remember distinctly when I came to this conclusion. It was around the time of a conference held at beautiful Arrowhead Lake, in California, hosted by UCLA Law School and the University of London at the university's conference facility in the mountains of San Bernardino County, startlingly close to Los Angeles. The event was the Sixth International Clinical Conference, held in October of 2005, and it was the first truly international event in that series. Yes, it was an “international” clinical conference, and prior events had provided participants with something of an international flavor, and the event was sponsored by British and American law schools. This, however, was something new, something different.