This article analyses the effects of globalisation on wage inequality in a group of eight now-developed countries during the century prior to 1970, using the same dependent variable and methodology as research on the impact of globalisation since 1970. The results suggest that the impact of globalisation on wage inequality before 1970 was confined largely to the effects of the pre-1914 mass migrations in the United States and Canada. Powerful domestic forces – expanding native supplies of skilled labour, the growth of new skill-intensive industries, and fluctuations in the level of aggregate demand – were the main influences on wage inequality for most of the period.

A survey of industrial households conducted in 1889–90 is used to investigate participation in self-help organisations, such as sickness and death benefit clubs and friendly societies, and to examine whether payouts were important in seeing families through earnings crises. Formal self-help has been hypothesised to underpin the male breadwinner family form, reducing the risk incumbent in reliance on one source of earnings. The results here show that those households with multiple earners took out most insurance and also had recourse to informal strategies, such as eliciting greater labour force participation from other family members and economising on rent, when adversity carried male earnings down. Those reliant on a male breadwinner were left vulnerable. They insured less, benefits were insufficient to make up earnings shortfalls and they were unable to compensate for deficits through labour market strategies. Formal self-help was a complement to, not a substitute for, family employment.

There is a general consensus among scholars that centralised wage bargaining played a key role in the ability of Sweden to maintain wage moderation in the early post-World War II period. Conventional wisdom suggests that it worked through one of two mechanisms: internalisation of the negative externalities associated with excessive wage settlements or implicit contracts that favoured cooperation between capital and labour over conflict. We contend, instead, that centralised wage bargaining was introduced because Swedish firms and unions adopted the Rehn-Meidner plan. In this environment, centralised wage bargaining was used to facilitate wage compression from below and promote labour release. Wage moderation then was a result of shifts in the labour supply. In the final section of the article we argue that excessive wage compression in the 1970s sapped the morale and effort of skilled workers, pushed down productivity and profits and eventually led to the demise of centralised wage determination.

This article compares the effects of weather shocks on agricultural production in Britain, France and Germany during the late nineteenth century. Using semi-parametric models to estimate the non-linear agro-weather relationship we find that weather shocks explain between one third to two thirds of variations in agricultural production. Given the large size of the agricultural sector during this period, the high variance of agricultural production and the cyclical nature of weather shocks, the agro-weather relationship transmitted large effects on macroeconomic fluctuations over much of the period.

This article explores the means by which warfare influences domestic commodity markets. It is argued that England during the French Wars provides an ideal testing ground. Four categories of explanatory variables are taken as likely sources of documented changes in English commodity price disintegration during this period: weather, trade, policy and wartime events. Empirically, increases in price dispersion are related to all of the above categories. However, the primary means identified by which warfare influenced domestic commodity market integration was through international trade linkages and the arrival of news regarding wartime events.

German-style universal banks are widely believed to improve capital mobilisation and utilisation by stimulating savings, matching savers and investors, and offering business and investment advice to entrepreneurs. Using aggregate and firm-level evidence on deposit taking and branching, banks' liability structure, interlocking directorates between banks and industrial companies, and industrial investment patterns, this article investigates the role of universal banks in two European latecomer economies: Germany and Italy. Comparing the impact of these banks permits some distinction between institutional effects and country-specific effects. The findings suggest that universal banking took on differing forms in Germany and Italy, implying that apparently similar institutions can yield divergent economic outcomes depending on the context in which they develop. For both countries, the results also indicate that the universal banks made a modest impact on capital mobilisation, industrial investment, and economic growth.

A set of historical national accounts for the province of Holland in 1510/14 is estimated, including estimates of the size and composition of the labour force. This evidence shows that the economy of Holland was already very modern at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the result of a transformation of its economic structure between 1350 and 1500, and that structural transformation and per capita growth between 1510/14 and the beginning of the nineteenth century were limited. These results are confirmed by independent evidence about the long term development of real factor prices (rents and wages).

Were eighteenth-century financial markets efficient? Neal (1990) shows that the London and Amsterdam markets were integrated. Yet some scholars find that the London capital market was either not integrated across various classes of securities, or was comprised of ignorant investors who were not knowledgeable enough to arbitrage across securities with different maturities, or was even irrational at times. In this article, we demonstrate that these London capital market inefficiencies suggested by previous scholars arise from an incorrect comprehension of the pricing of the financial instrument they use. After examining certain features peculiar to India bonds overlooked by previous authors, we make it clear that the London domestic market was perfectly integrated and that investors were capable of handling and pricing sophisticated options.

Despite a stream of information from recent research, as well as analytical interpretations, we still lack a general picture of pre-1914 multinational banking based on a unifying empirical approach comparable to that recently developed by financial economists for the wave of banks' multinational expansion in the late twentieth century. The main purpose of this article, based on a unique dataset covering the foreign branches of British, French and German banks from 1880 to 1913, is to test in a similar theoretically-driven fashion the determinants of multinational banking during the first globalisation. The empirical strategy is based on an augmented gravity model in which geography and institutions interact with economic factors in determining the patterns of multinational banking. Contrary to what has emerged from recent studies on present multinational banking, I find that the ‘fundamentals’ of pre-1914 foreign branching cannot easily be fitted into a gravity-like model, and that no unifying pattern of foreign expansion can be inferred from the data.

In this paper we try to isolate and measure the respective importance of political and economic aspects in two critical episodes of France interwar. We do this by separating expectations of taxation and of devaluation that are implicitly included in the prices of various categories of French and foreign bonds. Concerning the 1924–26 crisis, we show first that there was no expectation of a government default; second that the rise of interest rates in 1925 results from expectations of a capital levy; third that no hyperinflation was ever expected. After stabilisation, we show that the markets expected an appreciation of the franc up to 1931 and a devaluation afterwards.

The purpose of this article is to present new evidence on living standards during the Spanish industrialisation process by means of secular trends in height. The data pertain to Elche, a town in the Valencia region of southeastern Spain that witnessed early and rapid industrial development in the context of Spain's delayed industrialisation and experienced strong immigration during the twentieth century. Thus, the relationship between biological standards of living and industrialisation and urbanisation is explored. The data suggest that the first stages of industrialisation in the late nineteenth century did not bring much improvement to workers' living conditions. The consequences to health and nutrition of Spain's Civil War and its aftermath are also examined. Finally, we comment on the process of general convergence in height that took place at the end of the period considered.

This article presents a quantitative test of the oft-repeated view that Italy's backward and poor South suffered from low ‘social capital’, a tendency to defect from co-operative engagements. The problem with such assertions is that they run the risk of taking as evidence in favour of the hypothesis the very observations that need to be explained. The analysis carried out in this work tries to break out of this impasse by analysing the conditions under which it was ex ante welfare-improving for farmers in early twentieth century Italy to join an unlimited liability rural co-operative bank which would give them access to cheaper credit, but also exposed them to the risk of their neighbours’ defection. These ‘co-ops’ are a prime testing ground for the cultural explanation in that they spread rapidly throughout Northern Italy in the late nineteenth century, but never gained a similar popularity in the South. I estimate the switching function for these co-ops in different parts of the country to test whether Northern and Southern farmers faced significantly different choice sets when making the decision to join. Identical choice sets but differential responses would of course favour the cultural explanation of the South's backwardness. The results suggest that for the same parameter values, the choice sets for North and South were indeed different.

I argue that Spain's long-term economic stagnation in the seventeenth century and beyond was the result of a process triggered by the windfall acquisition of precious metals from American mines, and driven by the consolidation of absolutist rule and the peculiar privilege structure of Spanish society in the sixteenth century. American treasure allowed the Spanish monarchs to command large amounts of credit and pursue an expansive imperial policy unlike that of any other Early Modern nation; when the cost of the Empire increased and mineral rents fell, the Crown increased the fiscal pressure while allowing skilled human capital to migrate into the tax-sheltered but largely unproductive nobility. I first provide evidence on the role of the silver windfall and the acquisition of nobility titles in the sixteenth century; of particular interest is a new data series of nobility lawsuits constructed from the population of cases housed at the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court in Valladolid. I then develop a unified theoretical framework that explains imperial policy as an optimal response given the existing institutions and the natural resource windfall, recreates the rent-seeking path followed by the Spanish Crown when mineral rents proved insufficient, and accounts for the long-term economic backwardness that Spain experienced in the following centuries as the result of an institutional lock-in.

We provide the first econometric study of foreign exchange market intervention for the UK during the sterling crises from 1964 from 1967. We use daily data on spot and forward dollar/sterling exchange rates and reserve movements which allows a more precise description of the loss of credibility during four currency crises. Reserve losses are consistent with exchange rate crises. External assistance given to sterling throughout this period shored up the reserves and allowed the sterling peg to be maintained.

This article presents econometric evidence of integration in rural and urban wages in Russia's Northwest in the late tsarist era. Using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to co-integration and error correction modelling, we show the flexibility of the rural wage in response to the lagged rural/urban wage ratio. Applying the model developed by Boyer and Hatton (1994) and Hatton and Williamson (1991a, 1991b, 1992), we show the similarity of the wage gap in northwest Russia in the late tsarist era to that during industrialisation in the US, England and Western Europe. Although our evidence does not necessarily describe countrywide trends, it does support for an industrialising region the more positive view of the degree and nature of late tsarist economic growth. Growth was not slowing down, and there is little evidence of constraints on migration by traditional agrarian institutions.

Technological change is often measured by economists and economic historians through productivity growth, but this article argues that technological change and productivity change are conceptually different. This proposition is demonstrated by considering the diffusion of technologies first within industries, and second across industries. In both cases, economic growth reaches higher levels when the technology becomes diffused, not when it is being generated via major technological breakthroughs. This emerges through high ratios of patents (as a measure of technological change) to industrial production when countries undergo their industrial revolutions. Finally I compare across countries, to show that leader countries developed the technologies before they developed education systems to extend them, whereas some catching-up countries probably drew on their depth of human capital to absorb new technologies from the leaders.

This article surveys cliometric research on the development of the French economy, with special emphasis on the fiscal and monetary history of the Revolution, the alleged retardation of the French economy in the nineteenth century, and the question of agricultural productivity in the early modern and industrial age.

The objective of this article is to study how people change their behaviour when taxes change. I follow the revenue from gift, inheritance and estate taxes in Sweden over more than a century. Second, I focus on a unique episode during the second half of the 1940s when gifts and gift tax revenue exploded. I have access to aggregate tax revenue data since 1884. Moreover, I have constructed a rich micro-data set of all gifts reported during the period 1942–9 in one county. A first main result is that gifts, inheritances and estates were never important sources of tax revenue. Tax revenue as a share of GDP and total government revenue had already reached peaks in the 1930s. The role of these taxes has instead primarily been equity and to provide integrity for other tax bases. Second, expectations were important. Gift tax revenue during the 1940s started to increase long before a new estate tax and increased wealth taxation were decided and implemented. The increase began even before the legislative process started. Third, economic power and economic control were important. Parents gave to their children to avoid taxes, but only when the expected gain became large enough and in ways that left them with as much economic power as possible.

Although mortality in Britain showed a long term decline from as early as the eighteenth century, it stagnated in the nineteenth century under the pressures of urbanisation and industrialisation. This paper examines the economic factors which lay behind the resumption of the mortality decline in Britain 1870–1914. A framework of analysis is developed which distinguishes factors in the physical environment (like population density) which affected mortality directly, from price and income movements which affected decisions about expenditure on sewers, water supplies, food, medical staff. A regression analysis of mortality in a sample of 36 towns in England and Wales suggests increases in the incomes of households and town council tax revenues were instrumental in the decline of mortality. This allowed extra spending not only on food, as McKeown emphasised, but also on a wide range of health-enhancing goods and services. The major improvement in the physical environment was the housing stock which rose faster than the population whilst its quality and dimensions were increasingly regulated by central and local government.

We analyse the Swedish general elections that took place in spring and autumn 1887. Our aim is to discover which groups of voters supported free trade and which protectionism. We find that while capital owners and wage earners consistently favoured free trade, in the spring election only the largest farmers supported protectionism. By autumn, political preferences among smallholders and middling farmers had shifted in favour of protectionism too. As these groups were not specialised in the production of import-competing goods, we assume that the political landslide in the autumn elections can be attributed to a loss of trust in the government.