Intellectual property (IP) is the legal mechanism that transforms intangible instances into tradeable commodities. While creating the conditions for extraction of value and capital accumulation across all domains of economic and social life, IP law defines at the same time the boundaries of commodification by determining the scope of the public domain. Within this traditional framework, opponents of neo-liberal market expansionism have championed the role of IP doctrines and principles such as fair use, exceptions and limitations. However, new informational capitalism relies primarily on non-IP forms of appropriation and de facto control. To a large extent, commodification of intangibles and capital accumulation is no longer distressed by – and even benefits from – traditional public-domain-enhancing IP doctrines. This challenges traditional IP narratives and calls for a new foundation for a truly counter-hegemonic discourse in IP law.

Martijn Hesselink’s ‘progressive code’ stands on a century-old leftist tradition. What makes the project unique, however, is the transfer from the nation-state context to the European context and its reliance on principles instead of a fully composed catalogue of rights and obligations. My main criticisms are ultimately the lack of a convincing and fully developed background on both sides of his intellectual construct: the public and the private sphere. Martijn Hesselink has an idealising notion of the public sphere, which he does not yet support with a corresponding EU constitutional theory of the public sphere, and he marginalises society as its own private sphere. The understanding of the public sphere needs to be theoretically and conceptually better grounded in order to be convincing and he would have to recognise that the role and function of the private sphere remain a blind spot in the ‘progressive code’.

When are religious employers exempt from the prohibition of discrimination (i.e., when can they discriminate against non-adherents)? The European Union (EU) Equality Framework Directive exempts religious employers from the prohibition of religious discrimination, but the scope of the religious ethos exemption is disputed and its interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Egenberger and IR v JQ has been criticised for being ultra vires and for disrespecting the constitutional identities of the EU Member States. This article clarifies the religious ethos exemption, by examining the underlying legal and normative issues that determine its scope. It shows that the scope of the exemption depends not just on the Framework Directive but also on the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law and that between EU law and international law. Thus, this article not only provides clarity regarding the religious ethos exemption, but also uses these judgements as an opportunity to revisit these related constitutional issues, and in particular the role of the CJEU and EU legislature in defining the place of national constitutional identity in EU law.

This article rethinks the corporation and ‘the social contract with business’ for the post-pandemic era. It uses a double historical orientation centred on the turbulence of the 1930s in Europe and America to insist on the company’s relationship with government, and to explore transformations in the social contract now needed to socialise and ecologise global business. One part of this history looks forward, from Adolf Berle’s modern corporation to the neoliberal corporation and regulatory governance. The article criticises a transformation of regulatory priorities in this era, closely analysing the shift to procedural mandates and questioning the corporate law tactic of ‘enlightening’ companies. The second part looks backwards to industrial modernism and Walter Rathenau in Germany in the interwar era, and also earlier (the late 1890s), to salvage a different understanding of the company and social contract, built around more constructivist visions of law, government and social consciousness. This part of the article is insistent about the metaphysical aspects of law and about developing law’s equalising powers around corporate impactfulness and injustice. It promotes ‘thought’ about collectivism (John Keynes) and the legal and regulatory recalibration that is needed to confront certain amassing challenges of the present. The article makes institutional transformation about shifting onto a different historical axis, whereby we might re-learn collectivist ambitions around the company that co-evolves with law and government, live to the public interest. It proposes a new social contract with business and a new regulatory modus involving law’s ‘Creabimus’ and ‘regulating dangerously’ for situations of widely adverse corporate impactfulness.

The tension between the cosmopolitan vocation of the economy and the national character of politics has lately reached a considerable level of pressure, as control over some political economic determinants of growth has been gradually acquired by European Union (EU) institutions at the expense of national political communities. In his book Authoritarian Liberalism, Michael Wilkinson calls this development a depoliticisation of fundamental decisions concerning economic and socio-economic relationships, a process which has culminated in the Maastricht Treaty. In my comment, I intend to explore the argument concerning depoliticisation, by examining the relationship between economy and politics from a constitutional standpoint. While I agree with the author that depoliticisation has been systematically translated into a political mode of screening decisions concerning economy behind the narrative of necessary and unavoidable developments within the European project, I take a difference stance on the meaning and risks of depoliticisation. I shall argue that a certain form of depoliticisation is intrinsic to any process of constitutionalisation understood as a reflex of a political will. I then shall explain that European constitutional culture’s anti-political prejudice may have at times transfigured depoliticisation into a technique to tame and restrict disagreement.

This Article addresses the question of how to explain and justify the allocation of politically sensitive legal questions to civil courts in the European Union. It proposes a pluralist theoretical view on interactions of private law adjudication with legislative initiatives in the process of building a European political community. This is elaborated on the basis of a reconstruction of the interaction between judicial and legislative processes in three high-profile cases (concerning non-discrimination, housing and climate change) in light of three theoretical perspectives: social justice, constitutionalism and public sphere theory. The first two perspectives shed light on the legal-political dimension of private legal questions in the European Union and manners in which to handle the plurality of sources and institutions in this field. They do, however, not fully clarify the distinction and relation between Habermasian discourses of justification and discourses of application of law in European Private Law adjudication. The Article suggests that public sphere theory, with a basis in Fraser’s work on transnationalisation, can complement the theoretical understanding of the role of judges in European Private Law. It is submitted that the interaction between national and European levels of adjudication helps maintain transnational deliberative spheres in which the legal-political stakes behind private law can be discussed. This opens up space for the inclusion of different voices in democratic deliberations on questions of social justice. Private law adjudication may thus be considered to contribute to the initiation of discourses of justification which serve the re-imagination of a European political community.

In The Redress of Law, Emilios Christodoulidis explores the philosophical foundations of market constitutionalism and shows how its embedded rationality shapes global governance. The author delves into critical phenomenology to lift the veil of ignorance on the fact that market constitutionalism has replaced political rationality with economic reasoning. By grounding its theory in the continental critical theory, ranging from Marxism to Weil’s existentialism and Luhmann’s systems theory, the book shows how the redress of law is also a practice that could radically transform the global political economy. However, the challenge is to displace the modern thinking of market constitutionalism that is rooted in functional differentiation and privileges constituted rather than constituent power. Such market thinking has allowed global governance experts to simplify and reduce to numbers complex polical, cultural and social phenomena embedded in constitutional legal regimes. The disembedding of law from society through functional differentiation, and the sole preoccupation of legal experts with constituted power, have contributed to the depoliticisation of constitutionalism as both theory and practice. A quintessential example of market constitutionalism in practice are global governance indicators. These indexes entail comparisons among legal regimes that empower private market rules as the final arbiter of local redistributive policies while bracketing historical, genealogical and reflexive connections to law’s social realities. The book offers several strategies of ‘redress of law’ such as rupture, contradiction and open dialectic, aiming to foreground political rather than market constitutionalism and to revamp the dialectic between constituted power exemplified by constitutional texts and constituent power, exemplified by strikes. This Article praises Christodoulidis’s sophisticated theoretical framework grounded in critical phenomenology, but at the same time pushes the author’s argument beyond the book itself. By questioning the practical implications of the redress of law, the focus on legal assumptions in global governance shows how legal experts in a variety of legal fields beyond constitutionalism have reproduced existing inequalities defined in terms of market, social and colonial hierarchies.

This symposium analyses European Union (EU) law as a means for both perpetuating commodification processes and potentially mitigating their consequences. This issue framing essay traces the evolutionary trajectory of commodification as a conceptual framework in contemporary intellectual debates, zeroing in on the most prominent theoretical frameworks underpinning its usage. It then relates the evolution of these debates more concretely to the context of the EU as a major institutional forum for the concept’s actualisation. Lastly, it connects these narratives to current conversations on the law’s role in constituting capitalism and consolidating its attendant structural inequalities. In so doing, it also canvasses the contributions that make up this symposium, showing how each enhances the discussion of commodification in the EU context.

The Rejoinder offers a first response to the reviews of The Redress of Law, published in this issue of ELO, and further pursues certain lines of theoretical inquiry in engagement with the reviewers’ suggestions and objections.

In recent years, legal scholars have dismantled influential economic accounts of the private nature of money, demonstrating that money is better understood as a ‘governance project’ and a public resource that is created and regulated by the state. Legal theories of money could lend support to the ECB’s recent use of ‘unorthodox’ monetary policy to stabilise the euro, and could further support proposals for the innovative use of monetary policy to combat inequality. However, legal writing on money to date has primarily sought to challenge neoclassical economics – a body of thought that denies the impact that distributions of credit by the state play in shaping processes of value formation in the economy. Two further dimensions of the nature of money have received less attention from legal scholars to date: first, the question of how money comes to have an economic value (an important component of ‘moneyness’), and, second, how the international functions of credit money as currency in international trade and finance may limit the capacities of governments to manage money differently. In this article, I offer a revised account of the legal nature of money that is more attentive to the transnational nature of the legal regimes and institutions that enable the production of sovereign credit monies in the contemporary global political economy. My analysis complicates both the suggestion that the ECB can address inequality in the eurozone by means of unorthodox monetary policy and the widely made counter-argument that the only solution to the constitutional crisis in the European Union (EU) is the creation of a political sovereign imbued with stronger fiscal powers. I find that unless the current transnational legal arrangements that enable the production and governance of money are addressed, no states will be able to act as ‘centralised and legitimate political authorities’ that can control capitalist credit money in accordance with democratic imperatives.

As the Second World War was drawing to a close in 1944, two great works of political economy were published. One of them was Friedrich August von Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom,1 inspiring the defenders of free market movements ever since and up to the present. The other was Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.2 This essay will focus on Polanyi but also pay tribute to Hayek. Contrasting the two helps to understand both of them better. Of the two, Hayek, the Nobel prize winner, is of course more widely known and by far more influential. But Polanyi’s work, too, has achieved and has been attracting as of recently such attention that one of the Directors of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne proclaimed that ‘we are all Polanyian now’,3 not only in economic sociology, but also in related disciplines, including, of course, political economy and political theory. A plethora of aspects of The Great Transformation are very widely discussed. This essay will be concerned with the not-so-well explored importance of Polanyi’s work for European Law and legal scholarship in general, including his theorems on the ‘embedded economy’, his conceptualisation of labour as a ‘fictitious commodity’ as well as the notion of counter-movements. It will then juxtapose Polanyi’s expectation of a new international order with the development of the European integration project and sketch out the contours of the democracy-enhancing conflicts law and its affinities with Polanyian core normative principles.

This article revisits the present and future of the direct effect principle and submits solutions for its appropriate understanding and enforcement. Once the topic has been put into context and it has been shown why direct effect is an evolving notion whose scope goes beyond the Van Gend & Loos judgement and the doctrine originating from it, the study presents five intertwined arguments. First, direct effect has two facets since, aside from a subjective-substitutive form of direct effect, there exists an objective-oppositive manifestation of direct effect, whereby a directly effective European Union (EU) provision entails the disapplication of national law, without either conferring immediately an individual right or replacing the domestic norm in governing the case at hand. Second, the article claims that the obligation to disapply is triggered always by primacy and direct effect, never by primacy alone. In fact, justifying disapplication on the basis only of the primacy principle and not on primacy and direct effect is likely to undermine the logic implied in the relationship between the EU legal order and domestic legal systems. Third, there are legitimate derogations from the obligation to immediately disapply a conflicting domestic provision with EU law endowed with direct effect in so far as they are admitted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the condition that the replacement of a national provision by an EU norm may harm individual rights and/or question the national identity clause enshrined in Article 4(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). Fourth, the test on clarity, precision and unconditionality for assessing whether an EU norm is directly effective, as it was conceived by the CJEU, is no longer a pillar in the conceptualisation and practice of direct effect. As a matter of fact, only unconditionality, in practice, proves to be the core element of direct effect. Moreover, direct effect and direct applicability are equivalent concepts since unconditionality, as the condicio sine qua non of direct effect, coincides with direct applicability. Fifth, a distinctive quality of direct effect, along with unconditionality, is the creation of an advantage resulting from the application of EU law and the subsequent disapplication of national law. This implies that an EU directly effective provision can never be only in malam partem (ie, detrimental for the individual) and thus disapplication, lacking the existence of an advantage for the individual, shall never come into play. The article concludes that the duty to refine the doctrine of direct effect must be performed, ultimately, by the CJEU. Indeed, only the CJEU can offer guidance to national authorities, since it has an interpretive monopoly on the ifs, whens and hows of direct effect. To this end, it is vital that the EU judges, by rejecting argumentative minimalism brought to its extreme, come to reassert their constitutional role and re-establish the common core of the EU system, beginning with the principles that created and shaped it.

A wind of change is blowing through the European judicial landscape. During the past decade, the European Union (EU) judiciary has undergone its biggest institutional overhaul in generations, the rise of authoritarian populism in Central and Eastern Europe has prompted a Rule of Law crisis, several supreme and constitutional courts challenged the supremacy of EU law, while the Court of Justice re-articulated the scope of the duty to refer under Article 267 TFEU and, for the first time, found that domestic last-instance courts breaching it triggered state liability. This Article argues that these and similar developments, once looked at together, suggest that something fundamental has shifted in the EU’s judicial architecture. A new form of judicial federalism has emerged, which departs from the traditional way in which relations between EU and Member State courts used to be structured. Although this new federalism is multifaceted and is marked by both centripetal and centrifugal forces, its distinguishing feature is a stronger centralisation, which manifests itself in a considerably expanded federal judiciary, a greater emphasis on hierarchy, a more careful use of European judicial resources, as well as tighter supervision of national procedures and court structures.

Restoring ecosystems and enhancing biodiversity is one of many regulatory ambitions under the European Green Deal. The motivations to do so include, but are not limited to, enabling carbon removal by capturing and storing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in land. The business model of such schemes is to help the EU and its Member States meet their climate obligations whilst safeguarding biodiversity, and when relevant, enable sustainable agricultural practices by creating transferable carbon credits awarded to land managers pursuing such practices. The idea of introducing market-based mechanisms in the management of ecosystem services is not a novelty, but the increasing prominence of carbon removals in the European Green Deal and its related legislative actions warrants careful consideration of legal quandaries about how such removals are to be carried out, why, where and by whom.

The general principle of effective judicial protection grants the right to obtain a remedy in the fields covered by EU law and is an essential component of the EU enforcement toolkit. Recent jurisprudential developments have complexified the role of this principle, by transforming it into a vehicle for the enforcement of the rule of law in the EU. As a result, the principle of effective judicial protection appears as the factotum of the EU legal system: it acts as a fundamental right and is an expression of the EU rule of law; furthermore, it is a legal basis to influence national fundamental rights and to impose procedural obligations on the EU institutions. This overview Article offers a novel account of the evolution of this principle in the EU legal landscape. First, it reflects on the trajectory of this evolving principle in the EU case law and in the academic discourse. Second, it identifies conceptual issues surrounding the role of effective judicial protection in the EU legal order in the light of the latest jurisprudential developments.