The United Kingdom 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union – challenges of pursuing the decision to withdraw – challenges for the UK constitution in commencing, executing, concluding, and legitimising EU withdrawal – domestic constitutional requirements for triggering Article 50 TEU – roles of UK government, UK Parliament, and devolved institutions in Brexit – a second referendum or a national general election on withdrawal terms – exiting the EU as a challenge of the UK’s political constitution – Brexit as exposing limitations of the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and architecture – Brexit as an unprecedented event and the centrality of politics – constitutional factors contributing to the outcome of the referendum – concerns about sovereignty and the (im)possibility of a national response – potential implications of the referendum for the UK and for the EU

Judicial accountability – Court administration – Judicial politics – Judicial councils – Assessment and appointment of judges – Disciplinary responsibility – Liability of judges – Italy

Second pillar v. first pillar – From Union to Community powers and vice versa – Court's jurisdiction under different headings – Jurisdiction after Lisbon – Choice of legal bases in cross-pillar situations – Dual competence? – Different combinations

Comparative perspective – Guardians of subsidiarity in United States? Not senators, not state legislators – Contrast with EU – EU parliaments do double duty – COSAC – Re-entry of federal courts on the scene – In EU: possible lessening of pressure on European Court – Insufficient time

A discernible rift between the rhetoric of political constitutionalism and the real policy of authoritarian populists – The rhetoric focused on political constitutionalism and popular sovereignty as a façade and a utilitarian argument justifying the introduction of counter-constitutional changes through statute laws – Captured apex courts turned into useful devices of power consolidation – The analysis of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court – The Constitutional Tribunal as an ‘inverted court’ used increasingly often to actively shape the government’s Eurosceptic policy – A double face of the Supreme Court – The new Chambers of the Supreme Court introduced to be politically abused by authoritarian populists – Systemic interactions between two captured apex courts have a synergy effect with regard to the process of the denormativisation of the constitution – The deepening politicisation of the apex courts creates a favourable environment for further rule of law deterioration.

Boundaries within EU policies – Common Foreign and Security Policy – EU external relations – Management of boundaries – Institutional interpretation – External action objectives – Linking policies to objectives – Restrictive measures – Area of Freedom Security and Justice – Securitisation of migration – Energy policy – Development – Multilateral diplomacy – Global strategy

Now that the EU Constitution has been adopted, one might be inclined to think that the debate on the position of human rights in the legal order of the European Union has come to an end. For more than 25 years academics and politicians have discussed the desirability of EC/EU accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and have argued for or against a separate bill of fundamental rights. That is all over now: Article I-7 of the Constitution provides for Union accession to the European Convention, whereas part II incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

It would seem, therefore, that a solid framework for the protection of human rights in the EU legal order has been put in place. The rest will be a matter of implementation: taking fundamental rights into account when drafting and executing European legislation; invoking these rights before the Court of Justice; lodging complaints with the European Court of Human Rights when the EU institutions, despite everything, failed to secure these rights. All very important, albeit that some may find the daily application of human rights not as sexy as the large constitutional questions of the past.

So is this the ‘end of history’ for human rights? Quite the opposite. The best is yet to come!

Political parties are important for the functioning and consolidation of democracy – citizens should defend their rights against parties with agendas that conflict with the principles of liberal democracy – the types of actions that are permissible for citizens depends on the conditions of political legitimacy and the closeness to power of non-liberal-democratic parties – theories of both (un-)civil disobedience and violent self-defence are relevant here

Minimal constitutional amendment at accession forced constitutional courts in new member states to make great efforts to avoid conflicts with EC and EU law – The importance of expanding the equation of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’ beyond judicial actors, by involving political institutions – The case of constitutional amendment in Estonia and Latvia – The concern over fundamental rights protection versus EC market regulation in Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic – Co-operative constitutionalism beyond judicial dialogues.

Infringement actions and EU values – constitutional backsliding in Hungary and Poland – the role of the Court of Justice – judicial independence and Article 19 TEU – the Charter of Fundamental Rights – the toolkit to protect EU values – political and judicial mechanisms – a bottom-up approach

The Supreme Court en banc was forced to make a rushed judgment in a situation of confusion, uncertainty and absence of legal certainty prevailing in the Estonian and the EU legal environment.

Dissenting justice Jaak Luik

On 12 September 2012 the Bundesverfassungsgericht gave the green light for Germany to ratify the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), but made ratification conditional upon international law arrangements to be made to guarantee an interpretation of the ESM Treaty which would be in line with the German Grundgesetz. Although the constitutional challenge in Germany, which is the largest ‘donor’ to the ESM, was certainly of core importance as to whether the member states would be able to launch the mechanism at all, the constitutional challenges in other member states also deserve academic attention. The reference for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Ireland raised serious questions concerning the conformity of the ESM Treaty with EU law. In its Pringle decision the Court of Justice dismissed the concerns raised in the reference as being unfounded.

This article focuses on the compatibility of the ‘emergency voting’ mechanism set out in Article 4(4) ESM Treaty with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and sovereignty raised before the Supreme Court of Estonia. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia [Eesti Vabariigipõhiseadus] (henceforth: the Constitution) and the Acts of the Republic of Estonia do not foresee a separate constitutional court or the possibility of an individual constitutional petition. Thus, the issue of the constitutionality of the emergency voting procedure contained in the ESM Treaty was raised ex officio in abstract constitutional review proceedings by the Estonian Chancellor of Justice [Õiguskantsler], which ‘in Estonia combines the function of the general body of petition and the guardian of constitutionality.’ The petition for review focused on the fact that substantial budgetary decisions could be made in the future under the emergency voting procedure without the involvement of the Estonian parliament. According to the petition, ‘[w]ith accession to the Treaty the budgetary policy choices of the Riigikogu will diminish.’

Impact of fundamental rights on the social ‘acquis’ – Limited extension of social rights from the integration of the ‘acquis’ into the Charter of Fundamental Rights – How the Charter contributed to the renewed force of the economic freedoms – Shift from fundamental rights to ‘essential principles’ of uncertain nature in the European Pillar of Social Rights – Possible transformation in the approach to social issues through interdisciplinarity

Relations between the judiciary and the elected authorities (i.e. the legislative and the executive) in each country and at all times are among the most sensitive from the point of view of statehood. There is an obvious truth expressed in the famous saying of Lord Acton: ‘Power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely’2. The universal calling of judges is to restrain executive and legislative branches of government in their efforts to increase their power, especially at the expense of individuals. A state where there is no sufficiently strong counterweight to the natural omnipotence of the people’s representatives is not in line with the principle of the rule of law, because there is no one to remind the elected powers that their mandate has its limits – contemporarily established in particular by constitutional norms and the international regime for the protection of human rights.3 Naturally, courts do not directly take part in a political discourse, even though some kind of judicial review of the acts of public authorities exists virtually everywhere; these should not be characterised as an interference in political matters.4 The mutual respect of the judiciary and elected authorities proves the maturity of the state constitutional system, regardless of how far-reaching the powers are of judges to examine the constitutionality of legislation.

Time for the European Court of Human Rights to interpret Article 6 ECHR to encompasses a subjective right for domestic judges to their own independence – Overview of the existing case law on the principle of judicial independence – Such a right currently not present in case law – Judges are obliged to frame their complaints, while at their heart independence-related, in terms of other substantive Convention rights – Court cannot properly address one of the fundamental aspects of these cases – Lower protection for the domestic judges – Other international legal orders do include such a subjective right to a judge’s independence – Several arguments for the European Court of Human Rights to similarly acknowledge such a right under the Convention – Few difficulties in integrating such a right into the existing case law

Part One: Referenda required to amend Irish Constitution. Referenda on accession to EEC, the Single European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam. Development by courts of rules for fairness of referendum campaigns. Referendum Acts and Referendum Commission.

Part Two: First Nice Referendum dominated by euro-anxiety, Irish neutrality and enlargement. Second referendum on same subject not unusual and acceptable according to domestic criteria. Concessions and clarifications. Effect on the Convention on the Future of Europe.

Part Three: implications for the Constitutional Treaty.