Questions of the mutual recognition, or not, of the ministry of different Churches have been high on the ecumenical agenda for many years. Roman Catholic sacramental theology, manifest inter alia in Canon Law, has a clear understanding of the validity or invalidity of sacraments, including holy orders. Validity is a strong word and implies that sacramental acts which are not valid are de facto ineffective.

This article deals with the relation between God and the secular legal systems of Western liberal democracies. It provides a normative argument for the compatibility of God and secular legal reasoning. In our age, in which believing in God is no longer socially axiomatic and the right to religious freedom protects all kinds of theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs, creeds and first philosophies, it seems contrary to religious neutrality for secular legal systems to single out God. This article instead argues that, although God and religion are inextricably intertwined, they affect the legal system in different ways because they are ontologically different. God cannot be reduced to a mere component of theistic religion. A proper understanding of secularisation might call for keeping God outside the legal system but not for driving God out of the public sphere of democratic societies. Secular legal systems are not atheist legal systems; they are legal systems ‘without religion’ but not ‘without God’. Secularisation implies some degree of minimal recognition of God as a metalegal concept. The specific degree of recognition of God appropriate for any given political community depends on its cultural and communitarian identity and should be subject to the rules of democratic procedures and majorities. This is the metalegal God.

Details of complaints under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 are beginning to come into the public domain. In particular, they raise questions as to the appropriate penalties to be imposed on a respondent, although even more worrying may be the anecdotal misunderstanding among some of the clergy about the moral behaviour expected of them. In addition, procedural questions remain that are not addressed in the written determinations. Such questions include the proper interest in making, and the motive behind, a complaint; the admissibility of hearsay evidence to support a complaint; and episcopal intervention and the bishop's role in reaching his decision.

The seal of the confessional was part of the canon law applied in England before the Reformation. It was also part of that law which was continued in force at the Reformation, as is confirmed by the proviso to canon 113 of the 1603 Canons. This proviso is still in force and proprio vigore binds the clergy of the Church of England. By the Act of Uniformity, 1662, the hearing of confessions was enjoined upon those clergy in certain circumstances; the law places no limit upon the frequency of their being heard. It is unsurprising that there are infrequent references to the seal of the confessional since the Reformation; such cases as there are are inconclusive. Nevertheless, although the seal of the confessional may be waived by the penitent, the refusal by an Anglican clergyman to disclose what was said within sacramental confession is based upon a duty imposed on him by the ecclesiastical law rather than upon an evidential privilege. An Anglican clergyman in breach of that duty would be in grave danger of censure by the ecclesiastical courts and such censure might well lead to his deprivation and possible deposition from Holy Orders. The ecclesiastical law is part of the general law of the land and must be applied in both the ecclesiastical and secular courts. Both courts must therefore enforce that clerical duty and uphold any refusal by an Anglican clergyman to answer questions in breach of the seal of the confessional.

Are the University of Cambridge and its colleges peculiars? The university has always claimed independence from episcopal authority for itself and its colleges. A struggle was resolved in 1434 by a tribunal set up by the Pope, in which the Prior of the monastery of Barnwell heard both sides and decided that the University and its colleges were to be exempt from the supervision of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of the Bishop of Ely, in whose diocese the University was situated. This became known as the Barnwell Process. It established the University and it colleges as peculiars defined as having an Ordinary other than the diocesan bishop. Colleges founded later but before the Reformation claimed the same privileges. At the Reformation, the authority of the Pope was replaced by that of the King and the Archbishop of Canterbury, but the privileges that the University and its colleges enjoyed continued to apply. Post-Reformation foundations of colleges tended to claim the same exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction, but without documented evidence. This article argues that the continued acceptance by the Bishop of Ely of the University and its colleges as extra-diocesan confirms them to be peculiars within the legal definition.

The Marriage (Wales) Act 2010 illustrates that a disestablished church will always occupy an intermediate position between an established church and one which has never been established: the Church in Wales needed an Act to reform its marriage law, whereas paradoxically the Church of England legislated for itself by Measure. The article outlines how the provisions on marriage evolved during the passage of the disestablishment legislation; accepts the validity of contemporaneous arguments based on inconsistency; and outlines previous occasions when the marriage laws of England and of Wales have fallen out of step. It concludes by accepting that the continued establishment of the marriage law in Wales is inconsistent, but that any change is likely to depend on a wholesale reform of marriage law.

One of the main goals of the Second Vatican Council (the 50th anniversary of whose opening will be celebrated in 2012) was the unity of all Christians. Not least among its achievements was the fact that it launched the Catholic Church into the Ecumenical Movement and also paved the way for a global revision of the Church's Code of Canon Law. This article reflects from a Roman Catholic perspective on aspects to do with canon law and ecumenism. It does so in the light of the Council's teaching and reception. Conciliar hermeneutics and questions left open at the Council are considered. In conclusion, the author suggests that greater attention to the Church's charismatic principle and missionary mandate underlined at the Council offers wide scope for continuing exploration among Anglican and Roman Catholic canonists in the cause of unity.

Churches, in common with other unincorporated associations, thrive on a healthy dynamic amongst their members whose energies and gifts, properly harnessed, can serve to promote mission and witness, to build up the community of faith and to evangelise with vigour and integrity. Not infrequently, however, in both aspiration and application, the conduct of believers (individually and corporately) can fall short of that paradigm and the result can be destructive and debilitating. This paper identifies and explores areas within the current structures of the Church of England where express provision already exists for a formal process of mediation or other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), suggesting that greater use of mediation in the future would be beneficial to the Church of England functionally, spiritually and (not least) financially.1

The first statutory reference to a Vicar General in Man appears in an Act of Tynwald (the ancient Manx Legislative Assembly and which stil exists and operates today as a modern and democratically elected body) namely section 3 of ‘a book of spiritual laws and customs of the Island’.

The Labour Government (1997–2010) created a large number of new laws affecting religion. The Blair and Brown years saw the incorporation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, the creation of religiously-aggravated offences, the recognition of civil partnerships, and a tide of legislation affecting education, charities and equality law, which saw the extension of the law to cover discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. And all this legislation has resulted in an abundance of case law. There is more ‘religion law’ – national and international law affecting religion – than ever before. And, for some time, there has been an implicit tension in English law between this new religion law and older laws protecting religion. These old laws, many still on the statute books, were based upon a different premise. They often sought to protect Christianity in general (or the Church of England in particular) as the norm, while providing some degree of toleration for other faiths. Moreover, the legal regulation of religion was characterised by a lightness of touch. The new religion law, by contrast, is facilitative, seeking to protect religious freedom mainly as an individual right which needs to be balanced against other rights. No special protection is afforded to any one religion and protection is often afforded to non-religious beliefs. The new legal framework affords utmost importance to the concept of religious neutrality as the State takes on the role of facilitating the religious market place. The tension between the old laws on religion and the new ‘religion law’ can be seen, for example, in the abolition of the offence of blasphemy (which favoured the Church of England in particular) and its replacement by offences concerning religious hatred (which covers all religions). This tension has recently come to the fore in the Court of Appeal ruling in the application for leave to appeal in McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited.

Society has historically viewed suicide with hostility and fear. For centuries this hostility was reflected in the English civil law, which condemned suicide as homicide, and in the Church's position towards suicide victims, which historically considered suicide to be a mortal sin. Under the current canon law, set out in Canon B 38, it is the duty of the minister to bury all parishioners, those who die in the parish, or those entered on the electoral roll of the parish according to the rites of the Church of England, except for (among others) those who ‘being of sound mind have laid violent hands upon themselves’. This canon has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years as society's attitudes towards suicide have become more tolerant. As a result, General Synod recently voted that this canon should be amended. This article explores the development of the law relating to suicide victims in order to understand the Church's current position. It then considers the shortcomings of the current canon law and reviews the position adopted by the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches. Finally, it examines the proposals for changing Canon B 38.

The Law Commission has consulted on provisional proposals for reform of the law governing how and where couples can get married in England and Wales. This article gives an overview of those proposals, with particular focus on religious weddings, including Anglican weddings. It examines proposed changes to each aspect of the process of getting married, from the preliminaries to the people required to officiate at the wedding, the permitted locations and the rules governing the content of the ceremony. The article argues that the legal status of marriage itself is highly flexible, recognising a range of unions. The proposed reforms aim to reflect the diverse range of views about the meaning of marriage, and ensure that the way in which the law recognises a legally binding wedding fits with the many different traditions according to which religious groups celebrate the formation of marriage.

Mr Chairman, Vicar General, Worshipful Chancellors, ladies and gentlemen. This is the second time that I have been privileged to address this Society. Three years ago I spoke after a good dinner at Corpus Christi, Cambridge, when members' critical faculties had undoubtedly been dimmed by the College claret! It is quite a different thing to speak to you today on a dull Saturday in the solemn environs of Westminster Cathedral, especially as in 1987 I spoke as a diocesan bishop and today I speak as one of those living in what is euphemistically called “retirement”. It is a demanding way of life in which one lacks the resources and the defences long taken for granted, and of course, it is subject to the changes and chances of British Rail for which I profoundly apologise. I had an unscheduled bus journey of an hour and three quarters round the villages of my former diocese this morning.

I hope that I shall have the sympathy of the Society in attempting to respond to a request to speak about the legal implications of a body which had no standing in canon, ecclesiastical, civil or common law. The Lambeth Conference was a gathering of persons individually invited by the Archbishop of Canterbury to meet him for three weeks in the University of Kent at Canterbury. Finance for the meeting came from a number of corporate bodies but none of them had any control over what happened. The Archbishop had asked a number of persons to assist him in the organisation of the meeting but the ultimate control of it was in his hands, subject to the willingness of those who were there to fall in with what was proposed. During the last week of the meeting some seventy resolutions were passed, but none of them, with one possible exception, has any legal effect of any kind.