Sweden is well known as a high tax society and it is also well known for its spending on welfare. Just over 50 percent of GDP is consumed by taxation. This is an enormous amount of money. How is it possible to avoid strong conflicts between the citizen and the state? Must not this huge appetite for funding tempt the democratic state to pass the borderline and become almost a despotic state? How are human rights protected?

In the course of attempts by the Thatcher administration to restrain the publication of Spycatcher, the memoirs of a former member of the security and intelligence services, the United Kingdom’s most senior civil servant, the Cabinet Secretary, was subjected to several days of intense cross-examination before Justice Powell in New South Wales and in the High Court in London. Sir Robert Armstrong’s testimony ranged across the recent history of government reactions to the proposed publication of sensitive information by former members of the security services and has since become a significant piece in the jigsaw of the British constitution.

This article examines the relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe’s Social Charter. It considers the differing approaches to the protection of economic and social rights and the relationship between the two legal orders. It further examines whether the EU should consider acceding to the European Social Charter so as to ensure the effective protection of economic and social rights.

Kojève once wrote in a reply to Leo Strauss that the philosopher who contemplates action faces a conflict that constitutes the only authentic tragedy left in the Christian or bourgeois world:

One is inclined to add that the acting philosopher has a notoriously comic side, too, a side that has been exploited throughout the history of literature, from Aristophanes’ ‘The Clouds’ to the modern trope of the moronic impotence of the inept professor. But just as the comic fiction of Aristophanes’ ‘Clouds’ ultimately turned out to have had an actual tragic effect on Socrates’ life and death, so the modern depiction of the helpless philosopher is but a reflex on the troubled relation of philosophy and action.

Sometime around the year 1469, Giovanni Andrea, the Papal Librarian at the Vatican, noted that the Middle Ages were at an end and the modern world had just begun. From his standpoint at the intellectual centre of Christendom, a major transition was occurring.

All across Europe, Law, too, was in a state of transition at this time. We may take as our starting point an early piece of evidence of these changes which comes from the Southern Netherlands. It comes from the small village of St Peters, a village in which legal disputes were decided by local alderman, men who had had no formal legal training but who were very experienced in applying the customary law of the area. An issue had arisen whether a legal right of way had been gained by long use.

Brexit has the capacity to impact heavily on the agricultural sector across the United Kingdom in that it is a sector which has been both in receipt of substantial expenditure under the Common Agricultural Policy and subject to a pattern of close regulation at European Union level. This article will explore the legal implications for post-Brexit agricultural support, proceeding in three stages. First, there will be an outline of the current structure of the industry, with particular reference to its diversity in terms of physical landscape, operational scale and legal foundations. Secondly, there will be discussion of emerging policy within both central UK government and the devolved administrations. In this context, specific attention will be directed to the likely extent of funding and the proposed drive towards higher standards in environmental protection and animal welfare. And, in each case, account will also be taken of specific implications which flow from overarching World Trade Organization rules. Thirdly, there will be consideration of the potentially difficult issues which arise as a result of agriculture being a devolved matter, different policy imperatives already becoming evident across the constituent parts of the UK. For the present, the prospect is that a bespoke support regime will survive Brexit and, in this sense, agricultural ‘exceptionalism’ will continue. However, the more precise form of such a regime remains as yet work-in-progress and its realisation will present considerable challenges not only in political terms, but also by reason of the complex legal geometry in which World Trade Organization rules and the constitutional rights of the devolved administrations are weighty factors.

The impetus for this chapter is the extraordinary difficulties surrounding the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. It aims to provide a framework within which to explore trust in EU law. The question of trust has become even more significant since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty with the emergence of the fiscal crisis in Greece and in the wider eurozone. This chapter initially seeks to locate the question of trust within the much-discussed notion of the democratic deficit in the EU, drawing on the work of Snell. It argues that the question of democratic deficit raises questions about trust in the EU, and that institutionalised distrust is what is required in order to secure appropriate trust in EU law and governance. It then examines the nature of trust before turning to two major crises of distrust in the EU: the Irish referenda on the Lisbon Treaty and the ongoing difficulties presented to the eurozone of the indebtedness of some of its members.

Cases involving the posting of workers will inevitably involve international elements and therefore issues of private international law. Historically, it has been assumed that English employment law is territorial: in particular section 204 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that the provisions of the Act apply irrespective of the law applicable to the contract. This contribution examines this proposition through the perspective of private international law principles, and also considers the compatibility of section 204 with the private international law rules in the Posted Workers Directive and the new definition of overriding mandatory rules in the Rome I Regulation.

Long examined by the academic literature as a challenging technical-legal fiction with a strong geopolitical impact, border carbon adjustment is on its way to becoming a European reality. This Article provides an overview of the European legislative process with a comparison of the initial Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) project presented by the Commission in July 2021 with the positions formalised by the European Parliament and the Council in 2022. With a detour through the doctrine of international law and building upon the work of Professor Thomas Cottier on the concept of Common Concern of Humankind (‘CCH’) in international law, the Article examines the European CBAM, and more broadly, the recent multiplication of unilateral environmental initiatives with extraterritorial impacts, as a contextual transition from a logic of coexistence to a logic of cooperation in the field of environmental policies. It concludes on the necessity to design the European CBAM accordingly, by redistributing its direct revenues and developing open and inclusive cooperation frameworks, to accelerate this transition in the field of industrial decarbonisation.

The emergence of private party liability in damages is EU law has been much discussed by academics, but it is clear from the case law of the Court of Justice that we do not yet have a principle of private party liability analogous to the principle of Member State liability. This chapter examines under what conditions it would be justified to claim that there was indeed a general principle of private party liability in EU law. Furthermore, the chapter explains that the introduction of the general principle of private party liability would require a thorough clarification of some of the most fundamental, yet still unclear, concepts of EU law, such as direct effect, the horizontal applicability of EU norms and the principle of effective judicial protection. It is argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to introduce a general regime of private party liability in damages is not without controversy and that the judicial creation of the principle will be legitimate only if adequate normative justification is provided for its presence in EU law. In this respect, it has to be recognised that EU competition law is not an adequate legal setting for the general regime to be born, because it does not bring to light tensions arising in other contexts.

The proposal for a new General Data Protection Regulation has been billed as a harbinger of increased harmonisation, better enforcement and modernised rules within the area of data protection law. Through an analysis of several central elements in the draft Regulation—and European data protection law in general—as well as an assessment of the practical implications the proposal is likely to have if adopted, this chapter challenges whether the proposal will be able to deliver the harmonised rules that have been promised. It focuses particularly on the proposed regulations scope of application, its legal architecture, the use of discretionary provisions and related issues.

It is argued that the proposal not only fails to address the root causes of why the current data protection directive (Directive 95/46) failed to bring about harmonisation and effective rules, but also looks set to transplant them into the new regulation.

In this chapter the authors discuss the personal scope of the Directive on the Posting of Workers (Dir 96/71/EC) and the implementation thereof in the Member States. The comparative findings are based on two studies conducted by the authors on behalf of the European Commission in 2010/2011. The authors argue that the concepts of ‘posting’ and ‘posted worker’ are crucial for a proper understanding of the scope of application of the Directive and its interaction with the Rome I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations (Reg 593/2008). A clear and enforceable demarcation of the personal scope will help the Member States to combat abuse of the freedom to provide services and to distinguish more clearly between posting and other types of labour mobility. The proposal submitted by the European Commission to that effect (COM (2012) 131) is judged to be an important step in the right direction.

Is it legitimate to use discriminatory policies to achieve equality? As official support for reverse discrimination or affirmative action policies becomes more common among member states of the European Union, so does the potential for legal challenge. Yet no clear answer has yet been given by the European Court of Justice. The controversial European Court of Justice decision in Kalanke, striking down an affirmative action policy, was followed only two years later by that in Marschall, which signalled a significant change in approach to affirmative action policies. This change of attitude is likely to be tested in a variety of different ways in the near future. The next affirmative action case, Badeck, is now awaiting the opinion of the Advocate General, and a Swedish case is waiting in the wings. Both these cases are likely to take the Court into far stormier waters than those already traversed in Kalanke and Marschall.

This is a critical analysis—in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law—of the judgment in R v MAFF, ex p First City Trading, or at least of that part of the judgment concerning the domestic reach of general principles of law. Laws J held that the legal status of the general principles ‘made’ by the ECJ is inferior to that of the principles enshrined in the Treaty, and that therefore the domestic reach of the former is narrower than that of the latter. In the years since the judgment was delivered, however, it does not appear to have been considered by the ECJ and there seems to have been little academic evaluation of its cogency and implications. One commentator considered that the distinction drawn by the judge seemed correct. Another was critical, asserting that ‘the distinction between principles based on Treaty provisions and general principles of law cannot be deduced from the case law of the Court of Justice’. The possible entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which recognises that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (and thus presumably the rights, freedoms and principles within it) has ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’, makes it appropriate to revisit the judgment and consider whether Laws J’s approach was correct.

In May 1998, the Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government, unanimously decided, in accordance with Article 121(2) EC, that eleven Member States fulfilled the necessary conditions to move towards the third and final stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) with the adoption of the single currency on 1 January 1999. This article will discuss the legal position of the Member States which did not initially progress to the third stage of EMU, in particular, the opt-outs exercised by the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark. There follows an analysis of the extent of the UK and Danish opt-outs and the derogation which exists in relation to Sweden (and previously Greece) together with the role of these Member States in the new institutional framework as in operation from 1 January 1999. The current political discussions on the Euro taking place within the UK and Denmark will be highlighted.

This article considers the possible relationship between EU legislation governing private international law and legislation governing substantive law in the light of recent moves towards ‘full harmonisation’ and calls for greater consistency and coherence in European law-making. For this purpose, it considers the Product Liability Directive and the special product liability provisions in Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations and asks how the understanding of ‘product liability’ compares in these two instruments, especially in relation to the distinctions between public and private law, general and special regulation and contract and tort.

This Article deals with selected issues of judicial protection that arise in the context of the sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia and Belarus after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As most cases challenging the sanctions are pending, this Article draws lessons from the previous case law on EU restrictive measures. It explores what aspects of the sanctions escape judicial review, then profiles of external (or formal) legality of the sanctions, of internal (or substantive) legality, and concludes by assessing the overall role of the Court in EU foreign affairs. The discussion shows that the case law in this area of EU administrative law converges to a great extent with other areas of EU competence, but tensions remain in how the Court may impose substantial constraints to executive discretion in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Government by the people presupposes that citizens are fully aware of public matters and properly informed. Nowadays, this is well understood and increasingly accepted. However, there is still disagreement as to how citizens are to check their government and what the limits of such control should be. In my view, it is essential that this scrutiny is generally available to all citizens and that it is provided in binding legal terms, the application of which is subject to legal appeal. However, a less stringent standard of scrutiny is often provided. Indeed, confusion between concepts is patent in this field and overshadows what is really at issue—the recognition of a fundamental right for citizens, which forms a basis for the exercise of several other rights. The right of citizens to review the exercise of public power is ultimately the foundation of both the principle of democracy and popular sovereignty.