For more than a decade natural scientists have been prominent amongst dissenting Soviet intellectuals. Much effort is expended in the Soviet Union in attempting to stimulate commitment to official values amongst the great mass of the population, and only a tiny minority of Soviet citizens is prepared publicly to question the party's image of Soviet society. Nevertheless amongst the scientific intelligentsia signs of widespread alienation are clear. Even when they fall far short of public dissent, natural scientists are constantly criticized in the party journals for a lack of adequate partiinost' or party spirit.

In dealing with the question of the overnomination of candidates in Irish constituencies, Lijphart and Irwin have found that overnomination does tend to injure a party's chances of electing more candidates given the vagaries of proportional representation with the single transferable vote. They conclude that ‘this favourable ten-to-one ratio appears to entail strong support for the proposition that overnomination can be dangerous and should be avoided’. My disagreement with them is not in their methods and findings, but in their interpretation of the significance of those findings.

The so-called cube ‘law’ has become ‘part of the political folklore of Great Britain’. Indeed it seems also to have passed into the general folklore of political science, having been applied to electoral systems having single-member constituencies contested by two major parties in the United States, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and South Africa.

The public institutions that support scientific research repeatedly face dilemmas of choice. Limited budgets require a high degree of selectivity in choosing which activities are to be supported. The criteria for selection involve a great variety of factors. Yet the justification for the support of any scientific research is most commonly expressed in such terms as ‘scientific promise’ or ‘relevance’ to some social or economic objective. Such justifications have a great deal of credibility, yet it is too frequently assumed that they correspond to the criteria actually employed in the selective support of specific science activities.

Legislators are likely to substantively represent groups to which they belong or with which they have some particular affinity. However, there are electoral systems that diminish this tendency and systems that promote it. More precisely, as district magnitude increases, representatives will be freer to focus on issues that are not decisive of vote choice for most voters. In this letter, we use a case of electoral reform and the nature of the post-reform chamber (Chile's Chamber of Deputies) to test whether increasing district magnitude makes it more likely that women will focus on women's issues. A series of tests on multiple sets of observations show robust results for the conclusion that as the number of candidates elected in a district increases, elected women become more likely to pursue women's issues.

How do politicians with coercive linkages govern? This article relies on original data on militia-linked mayors in Colombia from 1988 to 2015 derived from 42,000 pages of Colombian Supreme Court sentencing documents. Using a regression discontinuity design, it examines the governance records of militia-tied mayors who won the elections by a narrow margin. It finds that being ruled by a militia-linked mayor significantly reduces levels of insecurity and crime, but has pernicious effects on the provision of other public goods, especially education. I theorize that these politicians' (perverse) comparative advantage on security, combined with their crowding out of social spending, engenders these outcomes. I evaluate these mechanisms with data on the nature of paramilitary–mayor alliances, police reinforcements, municipal budgets, politicians' Twitter feeds, and in-depth interviews with paramilitary commanders and politicians. The article has implications for understanding the effects of voting for politicians with coercive ties on the quality of governance and democracy.

Racial and ethnic minorities are underrepresented in most Western democracies. This article investigates one potential root cause behind this pattern: minority and majority citizens might expect to feel discriminated against if they enter politics. Using data from three large-scale surveys, we find that minorities in both the United States and Sweden are less likely to expect to feel welcome than the majority population. These discrepancies in expected discrimination persist, even after controlling for other factors. Moreover, expected discrimination is not without political consequences: those who expect to feel less welcome are less likely to indicate an interest in running for political office. Finally, these results do not differ for politically engaged citizens who constitute a more realistic pool of potential candidates. We conclude by discussing what expectations of discrimination can tell us about the fairness of the political system and how these attitudes shape political ambition among minorities.

Democracies generate norms prescribing what behaviours and preferences are deemed acceptable. But what keeps these political norms in place? We expect that they are enforced by observers who disapprove of norm-breaching behaviour and are willing to apply sanctions that make it socially costly. We test this expectation with a survey in Spain, where respondents were shown pictures of individuals with different political views. We focus on norms against radical-right preferences, one of the most established political norms. In line with our expectations, individuals disapprove of radical-right preferences more than other political preferences. This makes them more likely to socially sanction those preferences, which they do mainly in indirect ways that do not force interaction with the person breaching the norm. We provide evidence on the individual-level predictors of norm enforcement. Our findings highlight the micro-level mechanisms by which social influence affects the behaviour of democratic citizens.

Building on recent developments in the literature, this article addresses a prominent research question in the study of civil conflict: what explains violence against civilians? We use a novel computational model to investigate the strategic incentives for victimization in a network setting; one that incorporates civilians’ strategic behavior. We argue that conflicts with high network competition—where conflict between any two actors is more likely—lead to higher rates of civilian victimization, irrespective of the conflict's overall intensity or total number of actors. We test our theory in a cross-national setting using event data to generate measures of both conflict intensity and network density. Empirical analysis supports our model's finding that conflict systems with high levels of network competition are associated with a higher level of violence against the civilian population.

A growing body of research demonstrates that political involvement by Christian religious leaders can undermine the religion's social influence. Do these negative consequences of politicization also extend to Islam? Contrary to scholarly and popular accounts that describe Islam as inherently political, we argue that Muslim religious leaders will weaken their religious authority when they engage with politics. We test this argument with a conjoint experiment implemented on a survey of more than 12,000 Sunni Muslim respondents in eleven Middle Eastern countries. The results show that connections to political issues or politically active religious movements decrease the perceived religious authority of Muslim clerics, including among respondents who approve of the clerics' political views. The article's findings shed light on how Muslims in the Middle East understand the relationship between religion and politics, and they contribute more broadly to understanding of how politicized religious leaders can have negative repercussions for religion.

In a recent article (‘On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Works of Mancur Olson Jr.’, this Journal, VI (1976), 257–72), David Marsh has attempted to test Mancur Olson's hypotheses concerning the rationale for individual or corporate membership of interest groups by using data from a study of the Confederation of British Industry. It is the purpose of this Note to defend Professor Olson's broad theoretical approach from some of Dr Marsh's criticisms. Olson applies the insights of established economic analysis to political theory; it is not his methodology which represents an innovation, but rather the use to which it is put. A defence of Olson's approach is, then, of necessity to some extent a more general defence of economic analysis.

Through an innovative analysis of audio recordings of plenary speeches, Dietrich, Hayes, and O'Brien (2019) find that women in the U.S. House of Representatives speak with greater emotional intensity about women than other issues. With vocal pitch as a new measure of personal issue commitment, the finding suggests that women legislators' efforts to work on behalf of women result from intrinsic motivation. I ask whether the same is true in an alternative parliamentary setting, the German Bundestag, where personal preferences play a very different role due to strict party discipline. The answer is yes. Analyzing audio and text data from more than 30,000 speeches in the Bundestag between 2011 and 2020, I find that women in the Bundestag address women more frequently and with greater emotional intensity than men. The results suggest that women legislators are more emotionally invested in women-related issues than men.

This paper defends strong emissions sufficientarianism as an approach to assigning moral rights to generate greenhouse gas emissions. Strong emissions sufficientarianism holds that only subsistence emitting is morally permissible. This paper argues that, since it is uncertain how many subsistence emissions there will be, the present generation owes it to future generations to refrain from generating non-subsistence emissions, not to risk imposing on them a tragic choice between sacrificing themselves and contributing to very dangerous climate change. The paper also addresses the charge that emissions sufficientarianism, in general, is too permissive since it entails a right to contribute to very dangerous climate change. The overall message is that, given the moral urgency posed by climate change, there is little room for distributive principles besides emissions sufficientarianism. This casts doubt on the appropriateness of relying on carbon budgets in assigning rights to emit.

The history of the Supreme Court tends to be divided into historical slices coterminous with individual Chief Justiceships. One speaks of the Taft Court, the Hughes Court, the Stone Court, the Vinson Court, and the Warren Court. Behind these titles lies the implication that they can be differentiated in terms of something more than merely temporal variation; the Chief Justice himself must be the catalyst which is supposed to make each era special. But, in what senses can a period of Supreme Court history be thought of as specifically associated with its current Chief Justice?

The study of urban politics has undergone considerable change over the last ten to fifteen years. During the 1950s and 1960s the ‘community power’ approach became well-established in American political science as the dominant form of analysis of local politics, although it was less marked in Britain. In contrast, and in part as reaction, to the ecological determinism and naturalistic explanation of the Chicago school in urban sociology that preceded it, power and decision making were seen as key features in explaining urban processes. Intentionality and human action were afforded explanatory dominance. In turn, however, this approach came under sustained critique as part of the ‘anti-behaviouralist’ or structuralist resurgence in Western social science in the 1970s which attributed causal primacy to structural determination and system contradictions, not actors or voluntarism. Yet structural approaches face methodological problems of functionalism and circularity, and in constructing tests of empirical adequacy and falsifiability. Some of the more interesting, recently-published work in urban politics seeks to maintain a non-behaviouralist, more structuralist interpretation of local policy outcomes within empirically-grounded analyses that allow space for politics and power. Dunleavy, Friedland and Saunders provided three of the best examples of such an approach, and have each sought to understand either a particular policy, or a set of policies in a particular locality, through frameworks which in varying degrees incorporate structuralist assumptions. They seek to apply objective cost-benefit analyses of public policies as empirically refutable hypotheses and accept the necessity of objective criteria for assessing whether or not interests have been met in any given situation. This article examines the extent to which these selected ‘non-behaviouralist’ interpretations of urban politics have successfully been applied to empirical contexts. A central element in this examination is a consideration of the way in which business is seen as a major influence in local politics.

Local Conservative associations have traditionally run their affairs independently and have successfully resisted interference from Central Office. Far from constituting a ‘centralized machine’ (as authors such as McKenzie, Beer and Crossman have maintained) the main feature of Conservative organization has been its decentralized, voluntary character. Nowhere has resistance to control by the party headquarters been more determined than in the major provincial cities. Here, confederations of city constituency associations, financed mainly by local business interests, have virtually excluded the Central Office area agents from participating in constituency organization. Attempts by successive national party chairmen to bring the city associations into the Central Office orbit have regularly been rebuffed. Consequently, Central Office's recent success in integrating the city associations into its area office organization marks the end of an era. It raises the question of whether the Conservative organization is at last becoming as centralized as many commentators have long supposed it to be. This note describes recent developments and assesses their significance.