Machery emphasizes the centrality of explanation for theory-based approaches to concepts. I endorse Machery's emphasis on explanation and consider recent advances in psychology that point to the “heterogeneity” of explanation, with consequences for Machery's heterogeneity hypothesis about concepts.

We discuss a disconnect between the predictions of Whitehouse's model regarding the accumulative nature of fusion and real-world data regarding the age at which people generally engage in self-sacrifice. We argue that incorporating the link between age and identity development into Whitehouse's theoretical framework is central to understanding when and why people engage in self-sacrifice on behalf of the group.

Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “color” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a realist conception of “color.”

Leech et al.'s model proposes representing relations as primed transformations rather than as structured representations (explicit representations of relations and their roles dynamically bound to fillers). However, this renders the model unable to explain several developmental trends (including relational integration and all changes not attributable to growth in relational knowledge). We suggest looking to an alternative computational model that learns structured representations from examples.

The simultaneous possession of conflicting beliefs is both possible and logical within current models of human cognition. Specifically, evidence of lateral inhibition and state-dependent memory suggests a means by which conflicting beliefs can coexist without requiring “mental exotica.” We suggest that paradoxical self-deception enables the self-deceiver to store important information for use at a later time.

Within the same pathogen-stress framework as proposed by Fincher & Thornhill (F&T), we argue further that pathogen stress promotes matrilocal rather than patrilocal family ties which, in turn, slow down the process of modernity; and that pathogen stress promotes social learning or copying, including the adoption of foreign religions.

The intrinsic merit of Northoff's model lies primarily in the fact that it integrates data concerned with different levels of organization of the brain. This approach implicitly argues against reductionism, although, apparently, its rather simplistic assumption gives too many degrees of freedom. In considering that a symptom from two different syndromes indicates a common neural alteration, we grossly disregard neural plasticity.

All three critical points of the evolutionary explanation proposed by Maestripieri et al. may not withstand close scrutiny. Instead, there should be an alternative explanation that has nothing to do with genetic continuity, but stresses the rewarding property of attractiveness that results mainly from sociocultural value assignment and sexual experience pursuit.

Gain or omission/termination of loss produces approach; while loss or omission/termination of gain produces withdrawal. Control of approach/withdrawal motivation is distinct from valuation of gain/loss and does not entail learning – making “reward” and “punishment” ambiguous. Approach-withdrawal goal conflict engages a neurally distinct Behavioural Inhibition System, which controls “anxiety” (conflict/passive avoidance) but not “fear” (withdrawal/active avoidance).

Inherence is an important component of psychological essentialism. By drawing on vitalism as a way in which to explain this link, however, the authors appear to conflate causal explanations based on fixed features with those based on general causal forces. The disjuncture between these two types of explanatory principles highlights potential new avenues for the inherence heuristic.

Ballard et al. claim that fixations bind variables to cognitive pointers. I comment on three aspects of this claim: (1) its contribution to the interpretation of indexical language; (2) empirical support for the use of very few deictic pointers; (3) nonetheless, abstract pointers cannot be taken as prototypical cognitive representations.

We encourage Pickering & Garrod (P&G) to implement this promising theory in a computational model. The proposed theory crucially relies on having an efficient and reliable mechanism for early intention recognition. Furthermore, the generation of impoverished predictions is incompatible with a number of key phenomena that motivated P&G's theory. Explaining these phenomena requires fully specified perceptual predictions in both comprehension and production.

Much confusion exists within the robotics and the biology communities regarding the definition of biorobotics and the aims and strategies that characterize this approach. Not even the basic criteria for identifying biorobotic research are being applied consistently. Barbara Webb has taken a crucial step towards setting a common ground from which biorobotic systems can be described, analyzed, and compared.

Baumard et al. mischaracterize our model of individual and social choice behavior. We model individuals who maximize preferences given their beliefs, and subject to their informational and material constraints (Fehr & Gintis 2007). Individuals thus must make trade-offs among self-regarding, other-regarding, and character virtue goals. Two genetic predispositions are particularly crucial. The first is strong reciprocity. The second is the capacity to internalize norms through the socialization process. Our model includes the authors' model as a subset.