Susan Hurley's impressive article about the shared circuit model (SCM) raises two important issues. First, I suggest that the SCM presupposes relational coding rather than translational coding as neural code. Second, the SCM being the basis for self implies that the self may be characterized as format, relational, and embodied and embedded, rather than by specific and isolated higher-order cognitive contents.

The evaluation of magnitudes serves as a foundation not only for numerical and mathematical cognition, but also for decision making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies have linked numerical magnitude evaluation to a wide variety of core phenomena in decision making and challenge the idea that preferences are driven by an innate, universal, and stable sense of number or value.

Relational representation abilities are a crucial cognitive difference between human and nonhuman animals. We argue that relational reasoning and representation supports the development of culture that increases in complexity. Thus, these abilities are a force that magnifies the apparent difference in cognitive abilities between humans and nonhumans.

In distinguishing itself from other distributed approaches to cognition, Anderson's theory of neural reuse is susceptible to some of the same criticisms that have been leveled at modular approaches. Specifically, neural reuse theories state that: (1) the “working” of a given brain circuit is fixed, rather than shaped by its input, and (2) that high-level cognitive behaviors can be cleanly mapped onto a specific set of brain circuits in a non-contextualized manner.

Hulleman & Olivers' (H&O's) proposal is a refreshing addition to the visual search literature. Although we like their proposal that fixations, not individual items should be considered a fundamental unit in visual search, we point out some unresolved problems that their account will have to solve. Additionally, we consider predictions that can be made from the account, in particular in relation to priming of visual search, finding that the account generates interesting testable predictions.

To model the organization of levels' of cortical dynamics, at least some general scheme for hierarchy, functional diversity, and proper intrinsic control must be provided. Rhythmic control forces the system to iterate its state by short trajectories, which makes it much more stable and predictable without discarding the desirable ability of chaotic systems to make rapid phase transitions. Rhythmic control provides a fundamentally different systems dynamics, one not provided by models that allow the emergence of continuous trajectories in the systems state space.

We discuss how the psycho-historical framework can be profitably applied to artistic production, facilitating a synthesis of perception-based and knowledge-based perspectives on realistic observational drawing. We note that artists' technical knowledge itself constitutes a major component of an artwork's historical context, and that links between artistic practice and psychological theory may yet yield conclusions in line with universalist perspectives.

The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.

In this commentary, I raise several points. First, I argue that non-search tasks show that the A-not-B task is about object representation, even if perseveration can occur without objects. Second, I provide an alternative interpretation for the finding that changing body posture reduces A-not-B errors. Third, I provide an alternative interpretation for the finding of convergence in reaching behavior in two-target tasks. Fourth, I suggest attention deficits can explain the A-not-B error on their own with no necessity for motor memories.

Spatial visualization as a key variable in sex-related differences in mathematical problem solving and spatial aspects of geometry is traced to the 1960s. More recent relevant data are presented. The variability debate is traced to the latter part of the nineteenth century and an explanation for it is suggested. An idea is presented for further research to clarify sex-related brain laterality differences in solving spatial problems.

Aggleton & Brown suggest that whereas familiarity is computed in perirhinal cortex, the hippocampus contributes to recollection. This account raises issues about the definition of amnesia, clarifies confusion about dual-process models of recognition, and sits comfortably with accounts of hippocampal function from outside the amnesia literature. The model can – and should – be tested. Some preliminary data suggest that it may need changes.