The theory of local/global neocortical EEG dynamics responds to newly emerging conceptualizations in neuroscience. An extended application of the model to event-related EEG activity composed of distinctive global and local functional epochs with presumably different timing is proposed.

A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.

Given Van de Vliert's impressive dataset and prognoses, I will discuss three limitations. First, the evolutionary argument does not adequately take into account how political changes influence freedoms. Second, the operationalizations of needs and freedoms are limited and questionable. Third, a direct relationship between climate, monetary resources, and psychological variables is a simplification neglecting various intervening variables.

Second person social cognition cannot be restricted to dyadic interactions between two persons (the “I” and the “you”). Many instances of social communication are triadic, and involve a third person (the “him/her/it”), which is the object of the interaction. We discuss neuropsychological and brain imaging data showing that triadic interactions involve dedicated brain networks distinct from those of dyadic interactions.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation, EEG, and behavioral studies by our group implicate spurious activation of speech perception neurocircuitry in the genesis of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. The neurobiological basis of these abnormalities remains uncertain, however. We review our ongoing studies, which suggest that altered cortical coupling underlies speech processing in schizophrenia and is expressed via disrupted gamma resonances and impaired corollary discharge function of self-generated verbal thought.

Lane et al.'s proposal that psychotherapeutic change comes about through memory reconsolidation is compelling; however, the model would be strengthened by the inclusion of predictions regarding additional factors that might influence treatment response, predictions for improving outcomes for non-responsive patients, and a discussion of how the proposed model might explain individual differences in vulnerability for mental health problems.

Depue & Collins's (D&C's) work relies on extrapolation from data obtained through studies in experimental animals, and needs support from studies of the role of dopamine (DA) neurotransmission in human behaviour. Here we review evidence from two sources: (1) studies of patients with Parkinson's disease and (2) positron emission tomography (PET) studies of DA neurotransmission, which we believe lend support to Depue & Collins's theory, and which can potentially form the basis for a true neurochemistry of personality.

Müller misconstrues autonomy to mean strict locality of brain function, something quite different from the functional autonomy that linguists claim. Similarly, he misperceives the interaction of learned and innate components hypothesized in current generative models. Evidence from sign languages, Creole languages, and neurological studies of rare forms of aphasia also argues against his conclusions.

Arbib et al.'s comprehensive review of neural organization, over-relies on modernist concepts and restricts our understanding of brain and behavior. Reliance on terms like coding, transformation, and representation perpetuates a “black-box approach” to the study of the brain. Recognition is due to the authors for attempting to introduce postmodern concepts such as chaos and self-organization to the study of neural organization. However, confusion occurs in the implementation of “biologically rooted” schema theory in which schemas are viewed as computer programs. The inclusion of an additional functional level between structure and dynamics is unnecessary in a postmodernist perspective of brain and behavior.

Stanovich & West (S&W) distinguish between evolutionary rationality and normative rationality, and System 1 and System 2 mental processes. They hold that the main function of System 2 has to do with normative and not evolutionary rationality. We ask how System 2 could then be an adaptation, especially given S&W's own work on individual differences.

The main conclusion to draw from Mitchell et al's article is that it is difficult to disentangle cognitive and learning processes in contingency and causal experiments. More compelling evidence for human associate learning comes from research where, because of the type of events involved, participants are unable or unlikely to think about the relationships between the events.

Frameworks that facilitate interdisciplinary communication on the topic of teaching are certainly needed. However, these frameworks require a solid and widely accepted definition of teaching on which to build. As Kline states, the functional definition forms a good basis for productive comparative work. I briefly discuss the most contentious aspects of the functional definition, and suggest that these issues must be resolved before more detailed frameworks become useful.

Epstein et al.'s “full access to Universal Grammar” position is conceptually and empirically problematic. Its shortcomings are illustrated through a brief discussion of the following issues: (1) initial versus final states of grammatical knowledge in a second language, (2) knowledge of gradience of grainmaticality, (3) optionality and retention in non-native grammars, and (4) the empirical measurement of syntactic knowledge.