Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories. Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more parsimonious evolutionary accounts.

We suggest that the linguistic characteristics of letters also need to be considered to fully understand how a reader processes printed words. For example, studies in Korean showed that unambiguity in the assignment of letters to their appropriate onset, vowel, or coda slot is one of the main sources of the letter-transposition effect. Indeed, the cognitive system that processes Korean is tuned to the structure of the Korean writing system.

Brette criticizes the notion of neural coding because it seems to entail that neural signals need to “decoded” by or for some receiver in the head. If that were so, then neural coding would indeed be homuncular (Brette calls it “dualistic”), requiring an entity to decipher the code. But I think Brette's plea to think instead in terms of complex, interactive causal throughput is preaching to the converted. Turing (not Shannon) has already shown the way. In any case, the metaphor of neural coding has little to do with the symbol grounding problem.

Recent investigations indicate that, around 7-months-of-age, infants begin to show some ability to recognize words in fluent speech. In segmenting and recognizing words, infants rely on information available in the speech signal. We consider what implications these findings have for adult word recognition models in general, and for Merge, in particular.

Krueger & Funder (K&F) could have gone further to sketch out a more comprehensive vision of “balanced” psychology. The triumphs and travails of other sciences (e.g., economics) provide clues about the advantages and pitfalls of pursuing such an approach. Perhaps introducing more positivity into psychology may involve asking how people can do better, not how well they do already.

Latash & Anson argue that changed motor patterns should not be viewed as pathological. Instead, they should be viewed as adaptations to a primary deficit. We argue that the evidence shows: (1) bradykinesia is not an adaptation to a different primary deficit, and (2) bradykinetic movements are not “normal” slowed movements but, to the contrary, bradykinesia is part of the pathophysiology of Parkinson's disease.

Suddendorf & Corballis (S&C) claim that mental time travel has significantly affected human cultural change. This echoes a common criticism of theories of Darwinian cultural evolution: that, whereas evolution is blind, culture is directed by people who can foresee and plan for future events. Here I argue that such a claim is premature, and more rigorous tests of S&C's claim are needed.

We counter Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) metaphoric description of the unconscious, selfish goal on three points. First, we argue, unconscious goals are rooted in conscious choices related to well-being. Second, unconscious goal pursuit occurs through early-stage orienting mechanisms that promote individuals' well-being. Third, unconscious goals work selflessly, resulting in their own demise.

Another objection to the dynamical hypothesis is explored. To resolve it completely, one must focus more directly on an area not emphasized in van Gelder's discussion: the contributions of dynamical systems theory to understanding how cognition is neutrally implemented.

Tongue protrusion-retraction is critical to early nutrition but is also a gustatory-olfactory aspect of early infant social behaviour that is, in part, reliant on pre-natal exposure and learning. Most early development is necessarily dyadic and intrinsically associated with other aspects of social functioning.