Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as a novel law of qualitative structure to compete with Newell and Simon's (1976) physical symbol systems hypothesis. Unlike Newell and Simon's hypothesis, the dynamical hypothesis fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition. Furthermore, imprecision in the statement of the dynamical hypothesis renders it unfalsifiable.

No. Animals' primary problem is the shaping of movements, guided by and adapting to sensory signals. This requires a narrower class of biorobotic models than that spanned by Webb's dimensions and examples. We claim that all model variables and mechanisms must have real counterparts, input vectors must model known sensor fields, internal state vectors and transformations must model neurophysiological processes, and output vectors must model coordinated muscle signals.

Notwithstanding its overwhelming descriptive power for existing data, it is not clear whether the kinematic theory of Plamondon & Alimi could generate new insights into biomechanical constraints and psychological processes underlying the way organisms trade off speed for accuracy. The kinematic model should elaborate on the role of neuromotor noise and on biomechanical strategies for reducing endpoint variability related to such noise.

We agree with Borsboom et al. in challenging neurobiological reductionism, and underscore some specific strengths of a network approach. However, they do not acknowledge that a similar problem is present in current psychosocial frameworks. We discuss this challenge as well as describe valuable parallels between symptom and neurobiological network theories that will substantially augment psychopathological research when integrated.

Brains are information processing systems whose operational principles ultimately cannot be understood without resource to information theory. We suggest that understanding how external signals are represented in the brain is a necessary step towards employing further engineering tools (such as control theory) to understand the information processing performed by brain circuits during behaviour.

Clahsen's experimental data from generalization, frequency, and priming fail to support and even conflict with those aspects of his dual-route account that distinguish it from schema theories.

Machery's dismissive position on parsimony requires that we examine especially carefully the data he provides as evidence for his complex triple-system account. We use the prototype-exemplar debate as an example of empirical findings which may not, in fact, support a multiple-systems account. We discuss the importance of considering complexity in scientific theory.

Drawing lessons regarding the consequences of ultrasociality in ants and humans depends crucially on recognizing differences as well as similarities in the way that species are social. We focus on Gowdy & Krall's use of the concept of autonomy to explicate essential differences in the ways in which ants and humans are social.

For Knobe, observers evaluate mental states by comparing agents' statements with “defaults,” the attitudes they are expected to hold. In our analysis, Knobe's model relies primarily on what agents should think, and little on expectancies of what they would think. We show the importance and complexity of including descriptive and prescriptive norms if one is to take expectancies seriously.

The target article described the ubiquitous and often undefined idea of “basic tastes” as the basis for sensory coding in taste, and its attendant problems. The commentaries cover the full range of reaction to this argument, from full support, to qualification of the level of analysis to which “basic tastes” apply and the nature of empirical support, to full denial of either the characterization of the literature or that such characterization reveals any problem. Many commentators, and I, go on to propose other types and sources for taste analysis, which I relate to the “across-fiber pattern model.”

FOXP2 expression in the evolution of language derives from its role in allowing vocal articulation that is sensitive to its consequences. The discrete verbal discourse it allows must have evolved recently relative to affective features of vocal behavior such as tone of voice. Because all organ systems must have evolved in the service of behavior, attention is given to ways in which environments may have driven brain organization.

An emotional value for money is clearly demonstrable beyond its value for getting goods, but this value need not be ascribed to human preparedness for altruism or play. Emotion is a motivated process, and our temptation to “overgraze” positive emotions selects for emotional patterns that are paced by adequately rare occasions. As a much-competed-for tool, money makes an excellent occasion for emotional reward – a prize with value beyond its tool value – but this is true also of the other facts by which we pace our emotions.