Savage et al. do an excellent job of making the case for social bonding in general, but do a less good job of distinguishing the manners by which dance and music achieve this. It is important to see dance and music as two parallel and interactive mechanisms that employ the “group body” and “group voice,” respectively, in engendering social cohesion.

Both Mehr et al.'s credible signaling hypothesis and Savage et al.'s music and social bonding hypothesis emphasize the role of multilevel social structures in the evolution of music. Although empirical evidence preferentially supports the social bonding hypothesis, rhythmic music may enable bonding in a way uniquely fitted to the normative and language-based character of multilevel human societies.

Evolutionary psychologists are personally liberal, just as social psychologists are. Yet their research has rarely been perceived as liberally biased – if anything, it has been erroneously perceived as motivated by conservative political agendas. Taking a closer look at evolutionary psychologists might offer the broader social psychology community guidance in neutralizing some of the biases Duarte et al. discuss.

We propose that abstraction is an interpersonal process and serves a social function. Research on shared reality shows that in communication, people raise their level of abstraction in order to create a common understanding with their communication partner, which can subsequently distort their mental representation of the object of communication. This work demonstrates that, beyond building accurate models, abstraction also functions to build socially shared models – to create a shared reality.

Data on toddler language acquisition and use support the idea of a cognitive “supermodule” that can resolve contradictory claims about human-animal similarities. Examples of imagination, aesthetic evaluation, theory of mind (ToM), and language learning reveal higher-order, relational, abstract capabilities early on. Although language itself may be a consequence of exercising this supermodule, it enables further cognitive operations on indirect experience to go far beyond animal accomplishments.

I suggest that the Stereotype Rationality Hypothesis (Jussim 2012) is only partially right. I agree it is rational to rely on stereotypes, but in the complexity of real world social interactions, most of our individuating information invokes additional stereotypes. Despite assumptions to the contrary, there is reason to think theory of mind is not accurate, and social psychology's denial of stereotype accuracy led us toward mindreading/theory of mind – a less accurate account of how we understand other people.

We disagree with Dixon et al. by maintaining that prejudice is primarily rooted in aversive reactions toward out-group members. However, these reactions are not indicative of negative attributes, such as trait bigotry, but rather normative homophily for peers with similar perceived attributes. Cognitive biases such as stereotype threat perpetuate perceptions of inequipotential and subsequent discrimination, irrespective of individuals' personality characteristics.

We contend that individual-level (“i-frame”) intervention strategies can be appropriately integrated with system-level (“s-frame”) strategies to optimize population-level behavior change. We outline instances of effective “i-frame” interventions, and how coordinated, integrated, well-resourced interventions that encompass components at both levels, and has organizational and user-group support, may optimize sustained behavior change intervention efforts, and allay practices that undermine “s-frame” components.

Mere facts about how the world is cannot determine how we ought to think or behave. Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that this “is-ought fallacy” undercuts the use of rational analysis in explaining how people reason, by ourselves and with others. But this presumed application of the “is-ought” fallacy is itself fallacious. Rational analysis seeks to explain how people do reason, for example in laboratory experiments, not how they ought to reason. Thus, no ought is derived from an is; and rational analysis is unchallenged by E&E's arguments.

In this commentary, we address the El Greco fallacy by reviewing some recent pupillary evidence supporting top-down modulation of perception. Furthermore, we give justification for including perceptual effects of attention in tests of cognitive penetrability. Together, these exhibits suggest that cognition can affect perception (i.e., they support cognitive penetrability).

My criticisms of parapsychology are neither based on its subject matter per se, nor simply on a charge of sloppy research, but rather on the whole pattern of theory and research in this domain. The lack of a positive definition of psi, the use of ad hoc principles such as psi-missing and the experimenter psi effect to account for failures to confirm hypotheses, and the failure to produce a single phenomenon that can be replicated by neutral investigators are among the major problems that keep parapsychology outside regular science. Glicksohn and I agree that anomalous experiences should be investigated.

Burkart et al.'s impressive synthesis will serve as a valuable resource for intelligence research. Despite its strengths, the target article falls short of offering compelling explanations for the evolution of intelligence. Here, we outline its shortcomings, illustrate how these can lead to misguided conclusions about the evolution of intelligence, and suggest ways to address the article's key questions.

We agree with Jones & Love (J&L) that much of Bayesian modeling has taken a fundamentalist approach to cognition; but we do not believe in the potential of Bayesianism to provide insights into psychological processes. We discuss the advantages of associative explanations over Bayesian approaches to causal induction, and argue that Bayesian models have added little to our understanding of human causal reasoning.

The emotional expression of laughter in opera scores and performance was evaluated by converting notation to temporal data and contrasting it with the conversational laughter it emulates. The potency of scored and sung laughter was assayed by its ability to trigger contagion in audiences.

Quantifying resilience allows for several testable hypotheses, such as that resilience is equal to the number of mental health problems given a known quantity of stressor load. The proposed model lends itself well to prospective studies with data collection pre- and post-adversity; however, prestressor assessments are not always available. Challenges remain for adapting quantifying resilience to animal research, even if the idea of its translation value is significant.

As a highly consequential biological trait, a memory “bottleneck” cannot escape selection pressures. It must therefore co-evolve with other cognitive mechanisms rather than act as an independent constraint. Recent theory and an implemented model of language acquisition suggest that a limit on working memory may evolve to help learning. Furthermore, it need not hamper the use of language for communication.

Two studies substantiating Blair's main postulates are summarized. The first study showed that fluid cognition, reasoning, and perceived competence about reasoning are separate and equipotent partners in g. The second study showed that reasoning, understanding of emotions, and perceived competence about reasoning and emotions partake in the formation of g, substantiating Blair's claim that cognition and emotion are linked in the brain.

We argue that social psychology has unique potential for advancing understanding of resilience. An exciting development that illustrates this is the emergence of social-psychological interventions – brief, stealthy, and psychologically precise interventions – that can yield broad and lasting benefits by targeting key resilience mechanisms. Such interventions provide a causal test of resilience mechanisms and bring about positive change in people's lives.

Culture among cetaeceans has important philosophical implications. Three receive attention here. First, these animals are more like humans than we had previously thought. Even so, we must affirm and respect their otherness. Second, only a fresh approach to research makes this kind of information available. Third, whales and dolphins should now be included with us in an extended moral community.

Semantic work on sign language iconicity suggests, as do Goldin-Meadow & Brentari (G-M&B) in their target article, that “sign should be compared with speech-plus-gesture, not speech alone” (sect. 7.1). One key question is whether speech-plus-gesture and sign-with-iconicity really display the same expressive resources. This need not be the case, because gestural enrichments are typically not at-issue, whereas iconic enrichments in sign language can often be at-issue. Future research should thus focus on the “projection” properties of different sorts of iconic enrichment in both modalities.