Moral judgment – even the type discussed by Knobe – necessarily relies on substantial information about an agent's mental states, especially regarding beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, the effects described by Knobe can be attributed to norm violations in general, rather than moral concerns in particular. Consequently, Knobe's account overstates the influence of moral judgment on assessments of mental states and causality.

It is a foundational prediction of evolutionary theory that human beliefs accurately approximate reality only insofar as accurate beliefs enhance fitness. Otherwise, adaptive misbeliefs will prevail. Unlike McKay & Dennett (M&D), we think that adaptive belief systems rely heavily upon misbeliefs. However, the case for positive illusions as an example of adaptive misbelief is weak.

Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.

I comment on Pessoa's (2013) idea that the interaction between emotion and cognition cannot be reduced to mutual interference. As an example that bolsters Pessoa's position, I discuss the effects of happy and sad moods on discourse and sentence comprehension. I distinguish between the effects of moods elicited without participants' knowledge (incidental) and moods elicited with participants' contribution (constructed).

Velmans (1991a; 1991b) proposed that consciousness plays a minor explanatory role in the information processing approach and that unconscious mechanisms process stimuli and responses and intervene between them. In contrast, the present commentary describes a thought experiment suggesting that, although input information is initially processed unconsciously, subsequent processing involves consciousness, and consciousness plays an important role in the explanation of behavior.

Priorities for movement reflect constraints deriving from the motor system, task goals, and physical environment. Atypical and typical populations alike set and reset priorities in response to constraints, and they do so at many processing loci and time scales. Efforts to understand what is atypical about a population should focus first on the constraints it encounters.

The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.

A prospective integration of evolutionary and other approaches to understanding rationality, as well as incorporation of individual difference concerns into the research agenda, are major contributions of Stanovich & West's analysis. This commentary focuses on issues of concern in detailing a dual-system or dual-process model of the sort they propose and using it as a basis for improving judgment.

Jablonka & Lamb's (J&L's) extended evolutionary theory is more amenable to being applied to human cultural change than standard neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, the authors are too quick to dismiss past evolutionary approaches to human culture. They also overlook a potential parallel between evolved genetic mechanisms that enhance evolvability and learned cognitive mechanisms that enhance learnability.

Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist “mereological fallacy.”

Wynn's model for the evolution of spatial cognition is well supported by fossil evidence from brain endocasts, and from neurological studies of the cerebellum and the posterior parietal region of the cerebral cortex. Wynn's intriguing hypothesis that the spatial skill reflected in artifacts is an index of navigational ability, could be further explored by an analysis of lithic transport patterns.

A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options.

Three- to six-year-olds were given Heyes's proposed task and theory of mind tasks. Although they correlated, Heyes's was harder; only 50% of participants with a theory of mind reached a criterion of 75% correct. Because of the complex series of inferences involved in Heyes's task, it is possible that one could have a theory of mind and fail Heyes's version.

Wilkins & Wakefield's identification of anatomical features in the Koobi Fora endocast, which may be thought to carry some functional significance in relation to organization for language, raises fundamental problems of method: attention is drawn to some limitations of the evidence, of endocasts and of the neuroanatomical map used to interpret them.

There are aspects of schizophrenia that pose challenges for Clark's model. These include: (1) evidence for excitatory activity underlying self-organizing neural ensembles that support coordinating functions, and their impairment in schizophrenia; (2) evidence regarding hallucinations that suggest they are not due to excessive prediction error; and (3) the critical role of emotional factors as setting conditions for delusion formation.