The impulse toward violence and cruelty is endemic to the human species. But so, likewise, is the impulse toward compassionate behavior. Victor Nell acknowledges this, but he does not explore the matter any further. I supplement his account by discussing how compassion, specifically in the moral education of children, can help remedy the problem of violence and cruelty in society.

Hulleman & Olivers' (H&O's) conceptual framework does not consider variation of fixation duration and its interaction with the size of the functional viewing field (FVF). Here we provide empirical evidence of a dynamic interaction between the two parameters, suggesting that fixations, as the central unit in H&O's framework, should be studied on both the spatial and temporal dimensions.

We agree with the authors' arguments to make replication mainstream but contend that the poor replication record is symptomatic of a pre-paradigmatic science. Reliable replication in psychology requires abandoning group-level p-value testing in favor of real-time predictions of behaviors, mental and brain events. We argue for an approach based on analysis of boundary conditions where measurement is closely motivated by theory.

We consider four mechanisms by which apparent discontinuities in the distribution of antisociality could arise: (1) executive genes or hormonal systems, (2) multiplicative interactions of predisposing factors, (3) environmental tracking into a limited number of social roles, and (4) cross-generational gene—environment interactions. A more explicit consideration of complex self-organizing dynamic systems may help us understand the maintenance of antisocial subpopulations.

Although there is empirical evidence of neural filling-in, this does not necessarily entail “isomorphic” theory. Most cortical neurons do not respond to a uniform surface and are instead sensitive to surface size and quality. I propose that a population of such neurons encodes the presence of a surface. This scheme is different from either the “cognitive” or “isomorphic” theories.

Replacements for the self-interest axiom may posit weak to strong theories of sociality. Strong sociality may be useful for positing social cognitive mechanisms and their evolution, but weak sociality may work better for identifying interesting group-level outcomes by focusing on deviations from self-interested psychological assumptions. Such theoretical differences are likely to be based on disciplinary expertise, and the challenge for Darwinian integration is to keep the conversation flowing.

Unilateral neglect stems from a relatively selective impairment of exogenous, or stimulus-related, orienting of attention. This neuropsychological evidence parallels “change blindness” experiments, in which normal individuals lack awareness of salient details in the visual scene as a consequence of their attention being exogenously attracted by a competing event, suggesting that visual consciousness requires the integrity of exogenous orienting of attention.

The strategic pluralism model depends upon pathogen prevalence and environmental hardship being independent. Evidence is presented that they are positively correlated. The rise in short-term mating strategy in the United States is better explained by changes in the operational sex ratio than by increases in pathogen prevalence. Nonetheless, in highlighting the advantages of a high-investment strategy to less attractive males, Gangestad & Simpson's model helps to clarify the dynamics of frequency-dependent selection.

Atran conjectures that a triggering algorithm for a living- kind module could involve inputs from other modules that detect animacy and intentionality. Here we further speculate about how algorithms for detecting specific intentions could be used to trigger between- or within-species categorization. Such categorization may be adaptively important in Eldredge's energy and information realms.

The correspondence view of memory is not a metaphor. However, correspondence is the essential feature of the archaeology metaphor, which harks back to Freud and Neisser. A modern version of this metaphor and some of its implications are briefly described. The archaeology metaphor integrates the idea of stored traces in a nonmechanistic framework.

The analogy between biological and cultural evolution is not perfect. Yet, as Mesoudi et al. show, many of the vaunted differences between cultural and genetic evolution (for example, an absence of discrete particles of cultural inheritance, and the blurred distinction between cultural replicators and cultural phenotypes) are, on closer inspection, either illusory or peripheral to the validity of the analogy. But what about horizontal transmission? We strongly agree with the authors that the potential for horizontal transmission of cultural traits does not invalidate an evolutionary approach to culture. We suggest, however, that it does require a different evolutionary treatment.

Women typically report more pain than men, as well as exhibit specific sex differences in the perception and emotional expression of pain. We present evidence that sex is a significant variable in the evolution of facial expression of pain.

Halford et al. are not redefining capacity in the sense of limit on resources but in the sense of limits on what resources can do. Furthermore, the necessity of using resource theory as a theoretical frame is questionable.