Clark and Fischer argue that people see social robots as depictions of social agents. However, people's interactions with virtual assistants may change their beliefs about social robots. Children and adults with exposure to virtual assistants may view social robots not as depictions of social agents, but as social agents belonging to a unique ontological category.

The cholinergic system is a good candidate for the role of determining the relative weight given in cortical information processing to new sensory information versus prior knowledge. We discuss the physiological data supporting this, and suggest that this Bayesian perspective can easily be reconciled with the dynamical framework proposed by Behrendt & Young (B&Y).

Our target article proposes that a new concept – incentive hope – is necessary in the behavioral sciences to explain animal foraging under harsh environmental conditions. Incentive hope refers to a specific motivational mechanism in the brain – considered only in mammals and birds. But it can also be understood at a functional level, as an adaptive behavioral strategy that contributes to improve survival. Thus, this concept is an attempt to bridge across different research fields such as behavioral psychology, reward neuroscience, and behavioral ecology. Many commentaries suggest that incentive hope even could help understand phenomena beyond these research fields, including food wasting and food sharing, mental energy conservation, diverse psychopathologies, irrational decisions in invertebrates, and some aspects of evolution by means of sexual selection. We are favorable to such extensions because incentive hope denotes an unconscious process capable of working against many forms of adversity; organisms do not need to hope as a subjective feeling, but to behave as if they had this feeling. In our response, we carefully discuss each suggestion and criticism and reiterate the importance of having a theory accounting for motivation under reward uncertainty.

Mesoudi et al. argue that the current inability to identify the means by which cultural traits are acquired does not debilitate their project to draw clear parallels between cultural and biological evolution. However, I suggest that cultural phenomena may be accounted for by biological processes, unless we can identify a cultural “genotype” that carries information from person to person independently of genes.

Lankford's book makes the important point that analyses of suicide terrorists often commit the error of overestimating the importance of situational causes of behavior and underestimating dispositional causes, such as underlying pathology. Personality and individual differences are important; suicide terrorists are not ordinary people driven by situational pressures. However, citation of empirical evidence is haphazard; the scholarly argument is not well-developed.

Evidence that central sensitization needs to be maintained in an ongoing manner by nociceptive input from the periphery makes the peripheral drive, rather than the central amplification process, the highest priority target for understanding and control. To stop the peripheral drives to kill two birds with one stone. Moreover, the amplification that central sensitization does provide is selective and not necessarily striking in intensity. A “magic bullet” that neutralized central sensitization would probably be less effective in controlling persistent pain than many investigators would like to believe. [berkley; blumberg et al.; coderre & katz; dickenson; mcmahon; weisenfeld-hallin et al.]

Many of the commentaries cohere around two major points of criticism. The first is that we have omitted discussion of the mechanisms that are assumed to operate at levels 2, 3, and 4. Campbell, Cloak, Dewsbury, Eckberg, Mundinger, Pulliam, Richerson & Boyd, Slobodkin, Simon, Williams, and Wahlsten all make comments that bear on this point. The second point is that we have omitted discussion of the fact that "organisms change the environment by their activities" (Lewontin) and thereby modify the selection pressures that act on them. Apart from Lewontin, this point has been raised in different forms by Barkow, Chase, Hull, Perzigian, Ruyle, and less directly by Slobodkin. Stemming from these two basic omissions there is a third general criticism. Numerous commentators have pointed out that we have failed to discuss sufficiently either the extent or nature of the constraints that may or may not be operating on supraordinate evolutionary processes as a function of their nested relationships to subordinate evolutionary processes within our scheme (Barkow, Campbell, Cloak, Chase, Lenington, Lewontin, Perzigian, Peterson, Pulliam, Richerson & Boyd, Simon, Slobodkin, and Williams). We start by acknowledging these three basic omissions. We agree that they exist and that they are serious.

This commentary focuses on Hommel et al.'s inferences on action planning. It discusses the relevance of anticipated extrinsic movement effects for action control, the problems of a feature-based representation of actions, and the necessity of the acquisition of conditional movement-effect associations.

The limited capacity for unrelated things is a fact that needs to be explained by a general theory of memory, rather than being itself used as a means of explaining data. A pure storage capacity is therefore not the right assumption for memory research. Instead an explanation is needed of how capacity limitations arise from the interaction between the environment and the cognitive system. The ACT-R architecture, a theory without working memory but a long-term memory based on activation, may provide such an explanation.

Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) call to study language processing in dialogue context is an appealing one. Their interactive alignment model is ambitious, aiming to explain the converging behavior of dialogue partners via both intra- and interpersonal priming. However, they ignore the flexible, partner-specific processing demonstrated by some recent dialogue studies. We discuss implications of these data.

In this commentary, we discuss how the “incentive hope” hypothesis explains differences in food-wasting behaviors among humans. We stress that the role of relevant ecological characteristics should be taken into consideration together with the incentive hope hypothesis: population mobility, animal domestication, and food-wasting visibility.

Kline does an admirable job of extending the functionalist framework developed by comparative researchers to help understand the function and form of human teaching. Functionalist approaches consider the adaptive value and underlying mechanisms of behaviour as separate but complementary questions, avoiding the conflation of ultimate and proximate explanations that has long hindered research on teaching and other forms of cooperation.

In most cases, rule-governed relations and similarity relations can indeed be distinguished by the number of relevant features they require. This criterion is not sufficient, however, to explain other properties of the relations that have a more dichotomous character. I focus on the differential drive for consistency by inferential processes that draw on the two types of relations.