Social desirability can be conceived as a proxy for self-deception, as it involves a positive attribution side and a denial side. People with mental disorders have lower scores on measures of social desirability, which could depend on cognitive load caused by symptoms. This suggests that self-deception is an active strategy and not merely a faulty cognitive process.

Self-surveillance and self-experimentation are of concern to everyone interested in finding out the factors that increase one's risk of stroke from <8% to nearly 100%; one also thereby contributes to transdisciplinary science.

Grush's framework has epistemological implications and explains how it is possible to acquire offline empirical knowledge. It also complements the extended-mind thesis, which says that mind leaks into the world. Grush's framework suggests that the world leaks into the mind through the offline deployment of emulators that we usually deploy in our experience of the world.

Using representative data from 55 nations, I show that individual level wealth interacts with climate in predicting individual happiness but not postmaterialism values. I propose that more research is needed to identify (a) the specific mechanisms of how wealth buffers climatic demands at the individual level and (b) the neurocognitive and physiological reactions of individuals situated in different ecological niches.

The mechanism proposed by Del Giudice by which adult attachment style is adapted to the extrinsic risk in the local environment via attachment style during the early years does not fulfill important criteria of an adaptation. The proposed mechanism is neither specific, nor developmentally reliable, nor effective. Therefore, it should not be considered an adaptation.

We discuss whether the two systems approach can advance understanding of children's developing counterfactual thinking. We argue that types of counterfactual thinking that are acquired early in development could be handled by the temporal updating system, whereas those that emerge in middle childhood require thinking about specific events in time.

Glenberg's rethinking of memory theory seems limited in its ability to handle abstract symbolic thought, the selective character of cognition, and the self. Glenberg's framework can be elaborated by linking it with theoretical efforts concerned with cognitive development (Piaget) and ecological perception (Gibson). These elaborations point to the role of memory in specifying the self as an active agent.

The most frequent criticism of the target article is the lack of clear separability of human speech data relative to neuroethological data. A rationalization for this difference was sought in the tinkered nature of such new adaptations as human speech. Basic theoretical premises were defended, and new data were presented to support a claim that speakers maintain a low-noise relationship between F2 transition onset and offset frequencies for stops in pre-vocalic positions through articulatory choices. It remains a viable and testable hypothesis that the phenomenon described by the locus equation is a functional adaptation of production mechanisms to processing preferences of the auditory system.

Cognitive algebra strongly disproved the representativeness heuristic almost before it was published; and therewith it also disproved the base rate fallacy. Cognitive algebra provides a theoretical foundation for judgment-decision theory through its joint solution to the two fundamental problems – true measurement of subjective values, and cognitive rules for integration of multiple determinants.

We commend the argument that perception and action are tightly coupled. We claim that the argument is not new, that uniting stimulus and response codes is not a problem for a cognitive system, only for psychologists who assume them, and that the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s event-codes are arbitrary and ungrounded. Affordances and information offer the common basis for perception-action (and even for event-codes).