Sui generis hybrid international criminal tribunals must conduct business without institutional memory and are only as effective or fair as their constitutive documents allow. The sparse guidance provided for the international crimes court in Cambodia creates uncertainty and arguably ambiguous standards that infringe upon the legality principle and undermine efforts for nulla poena sine lege.

Sri Lanka is the first country against which a foreign investor has had recourse to international arbitration based on the dispute settlement clause in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This was the case of AAPL v. Sri Lanka. Since then, the country has been challenged twice before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), while its latest encounter was in the case of Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka. In the intervening years between these two cases, Sri Lanka maintained silence and failed to alter its BITs in a global context where the conventional attitude on international investment agreements (IIAs) is being increasingly reconsidered. This paper provides an overview of Sri Lanka’s BITs, which highlights the urgency of reconsidering the country’s investment treaty-making practice. It suggests some modifications to align the country’s investment treaty-making practice with international investment law (IIL) developments.

Asian governments tend to be more sensitive about their sovereignty than governments in the contemporary West. Therefore, when differences occur and disputes arise, Asian governments tend to insist that they be resolved through bilateral consultations and negotiations. The reality is that, very often, the differences and disputes remain unresolved after years and even decades of negotiations. When left unresolved, some of these disputes have a tendency to contaminate the bilateral relationship as a whole. This is a great pity, because the disputes may revolve around relatively minor issues compared to the many other areas in which the two countries have convergent interests. Asian governments should therefore consider resolving such disputes by other peaceful means.

What are other modalities for the peaceful resolution of disputes? They are: (i) conciliation; (ii) mediation; (iii) fact-finding; (iv) arbitration; and (v) adjudication.

This paper brings forward Justice Pal's dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Tribunal to add to Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) literature on international criminal law and the rules of evidence and procedure. It is part of a TWAIL effort to scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through procedural and evidentiary rules. By locating and situating Justice Pal's reasoning within the broader academic literature on dissents in international criminal law, it is possible to illustrate how and why Justice Pal's views were obscured as a relevant dissent. From this vantage point, this paper pursues Justice Pal's legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and procedure in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It traces the evolution of the judicial power to draft and amend these rules, and examines the impact of these decisions on the everyday functions of the tribunals and how truth is determined.

This article explores the terms “BRI dispute” and “BRI jurisprudence”. It undertakes a practical and theoretical analysis that considers whether “BRI disputes” have distinct and visible characteristics and are capable of being identified in a legal sense. This is important since practitioners – arbitration centres and law firms – use the term broadly and without specific criteria. By exploring the customary usage and the approach of legal scholars to the term, presenting examples of “BRI disputes” and examining their unique features, and constructing a theoretical approach (utilizing the concepts of ratione materiae, ratione loci, ratione temporis, and ratione personae; and considering the jurisprudence of the ICSID), this article moves from a broad to a narrow analysis to develop both a definition and a system of registration of “BRI disputes” for use by academics, practitioners, and policymakers.

This paper examines the use of a specific international legal fiction. It is claimed that a legal fiction was confirmed by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration (2016). The paper asks whether this is an effective legal fiction. The paper will argue that this is not so, pointing to the difficulties that the fiction necessarily creates. From this example, lessons may be learned of the phenomenon of legal fictions of international law generally, and, crucially, of their effectiveness.

This article proposes re-thinking the history of refugee protection in the Southeast Asia region, focusing on the post-World War Two period (1945–1979). It fills a gap in the literature on this period, drawing on archival material. It disrupts a narrative of “human rights exceptionalism” in Southeast Asia. First, it examines the small but powerful role of Southeast Asian states during the drafting of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. These states challenged colonial powers and asserted human rights. Second, it considers the role of key refugee-hosting states in Southeast Asia in developing—with other post-colonial states—regional standards to protect refugees under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, the Aliens Principles of 1961 and Bangkok Principles of 1966. Third, it places international and regional action in the domestic context by drawing on the example of Thailand's protection of Vietnamese refugees. It concludes that the approach in the post-WWII years points to an extended history of protecting refugees in Southeast Asia, and valuable lessons from the Global South for the region and beyond.

This paper explores the legality of the land closure imposed upon the Gaza Strip by Israel. After having considered the area under occupation, the paper argues that the legality of the closure must be determined under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. In the light of these rules, the arbitrary closure of the Gaza Strip should be considered illegal because it breaches the unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and because it violates the freedom of movement of the local population. Moreover, the closure breaches the relevant rules pertaining to the transit of goods in occupied territory. The paper concludes that most of the violations caused by the closure affect peremptory rules which produce obligations erga omnes, so that any state in the international community is entitled to react under the law of state responsibility.

This article examines the approaches taken by the Asian Development Bank Administrative Tribunal and the Administrative Tribunal of the Inter-American Development Bank Group in deciding discrimination claims. The article reviews the basic features of each tribunal before examining their jurisprudence on equality of treatment and issues of information disclosure in discrimination cases. Decisions to date have addressed claims of disparate treatment relating to various aspects of remuneration and benefits as well as allegations of arbitrary treatment vis-à-vis others similarly situated. A few cases have involved allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex/gender, one of several protected grounds in equality law. The number of judicial dissents in discrimination cases suggests that the tribunals have encountered some difficulty in handling them. The article points to a gradual but still incomplete approximation of the decisions of such tribunals to contemporary developments in discrimination law, and suggests a possible way forward.

The distinction between disputes of sea boundary delimitation and disputes over the existence of maritime entitlements was one key element of the legal argument that the Philippines brought forward against China in the Philippines v. China Arbitration. On the one hand, the distinction between delimitation and entitlement allowed the Tribunal to establish its jurisdiction on several Philippine submissions despite the jurisdictional exclusions of China's declaration under Article 298(1)(a)(i) of the Law of the Sea Convention. On the other hand, the Tribunal's finding about the lack of China's entitlements has important consequences. China and a number of lawyers objected to the jurisdictional separability of entitlement and delimitation. The aim of this paper is to discuss the question of whether a tribunal can establish jurisdiction on the existence of maritime entitlements in a context where jurisdiction on boundary delimitation is excluded and where a determination of entitlements has consequences for boundary delimitation.