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Extended optima and equilibria for continuous games

II. A class of economic models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

D. J. Gates  and
M. Westcott
D. J. Gates
Affiliation:
C.S.I.R.O. Division of Mathematics and Statistics, P.O. Box 1965, Canberra, ACT 2601
M. Westcott
Affiliation:
C.S.I.R.O. Division of Mathematics and Statistics, P.O. Box 1965, Canberra, ACT 2601
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Abstract

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For the class of continuous games where σi and fi {σi, φ(σ1, …, σN)} are the strategy of and payoff to player i for i = 1, …, N, it is proved that the set of weak type I optima defined in Paper I conicide with the set of solution of a matrix condition. The latter condition restricts the equilibrium solutions of an adjustment process. Numerical results for N = 2 and N = 3 indicate that the set of all equilibrium solutions coincides with the above sets. The optima of types I to IV from Paper I are described fairly completely for the given class of games.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The ANZIAM Journal , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , October 1981 , pp. 187 - 209
Copyright
Copyright © Australian Mathematical Society 1981

References

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