Since the 1980s, the Tanzanian state has been undergoing a transformation involving both the relations of power among the central organs of the state and the social role that the state plays in Tanzanian society. The dominance of the ruling party (CCM), with its goals of rural-based socialist development has eroded. Administration has triumphed over politics, and the state is coming increasingly under the sway of an administrative ethos. There is little indication that opening up politics through multi-party elections will counter this trend.

Several factors contributed to this transformation. The economic crisis of the 1980s was a catalyst, weakening the capacity and legitimacy of the state and the party in particular. A second element was international actors, particularly the IMF, empowered to intervene in Tanzania by the economic crisis. These actors played a significant role in defining policy shifts away from rural-based socialist development through their advocacy of structural adjustment. The crisis of capacity and intervention of outside influences might have generated some policy shifts, but did not necessarily determine that a transformation of the state would ensue. Adam Przeworski (1986) has suggested that transitions from authoritarian rule are possible only when there is a viable alternative to the authoritarian regime. Likewise, it is only when a sufficiently coherent counter coalition exists within the state to represent an alternative ruling elite that state transformation is possible. In Tanzania, the crisis of state capacity and intervention of foreign actors generated such a transformation because administrators presented a potential counter coalition. Never adequately incorporated into the CCM-dominated state, administrators retained elitist norms, viewing themselves as a development vanguard, contrary to the role specified for administrators by the CCM. Although political authorities explicitly sought to render administrators subordinate and responsive to the party which would define the social role of the state, bureaucratic autonomy remained high.

I swore never to be silent whenever and wherever human beings endure suffering and humiliation. We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.

Elie Wiesel (1986)

The consequences of this state of affairs [the division of the world into competing blocks and an arms traffic which knows no borders] are to be seen in the festering of a wound which typifies and reveals the imbalances and conflicts of the modern world: the millions of refugees whom war, natural calamities, persecution and discrimination of every kind have deprived of home, employment, family and homeland.

Pope John Paul II (1987: para. 24)

Africa is sometimes called “a continent on the move.” But this is not a recent phenomenon. Africans have always been “on the move,” long before any regular contact with Europe. In a vast and sparsely populated continent, people and communities relocated to maintain ecological balance, to seek a more secure environment and to achieve better conditions of living. Almost every region of Africa at one time or another has been affected by various streams of population distribution and redistribution. It is neither possible nor important to define these movements precisely or to delineate their frontiers exactly (for an overview based on archeological and linguistic studies see Devise and Vansina, 1988: 750-93, and Cambridge Encyclopedia, 1981: 57-86).

Population displacements and human migrations are neither unique to Africa nor confined to the 20th century. They are the inevitable companions of war, civil conflict and prolonged economic deprivation.

Over the last few decades, an increasing number of developing countries have embarked upon the organization of nationwide literacy programs. Although the rationale behind those programs varies from country to country, it is generally expected that efforts to increase the literacy levels of adults will have positive consequences for both the learners and the nation as a whole.

It is worth noting, however, that until now empirical evidence which could support these expectations has remained extremely weak. By and large, adult literacy has been a neglected area in terms of data collection and research. In many countries it may even be difficult to find precise information about simple facts such as the number of adults enrolled in literacy classes, the number of instructors, or the number of literacy proficiency certificates which have been delivered. In most cases the illiteracy rate, which is an essential indicator for any plan of action in the field of literacy, is only a crude measure based on self reporting by household heads and on questionable assumptions about the equivalency between a given number of years of primary school attendance and a sufficient proficiency level in reading and writing. Only recently have certain governments started using literacy tests to assess, by direct measurement, the levels of literacy of their population, most often on the basis of a representative sample household survey (for example, Kenya, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe).

When it comes to the effects of literacy, the lack of appropriate information is even more disturbing. There are several studies which demonstrate the positive effects of a given number of years of primary schooling on farmers’ productivity (Jamison and Lau, 1982).

Modern African life has been profoundly affected by the brief period of European colonial domination during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the past is prologue for all states, the ramifications of Africa's colonial past have been felt with particular acuity in the current era due to the speed of Africa's transition from colonial status to that of independence. Many aspects of contemporary Africa reflect the residual effects of colonialism, but few do so with the clarity of the boundary situation. This study will focus on one particularly important aspect of that boundary situation—boundary conflict. In particular, it will define the explanations for boundary conflict offered most often in the traditional literature and test their validity using empirical methods.

The boundaries of modern Africa were the creation of European diplomats who partitioned Africa among themselves with little regard for, or knowledge of, the socio-cultural characteristics of the continent. As a result of the capriciousness of the European partition, a typical African boundary may group together many ethnic groups in one state, it may cut across many ethnic or national boundaries of the past, or it may create a state whose physical characteristics hinder political, social, or economic stability. Since the colonial boundaries were used, with few exceptions, as the basis for the devolution of sovereignty in Africa, the current leaders of the continent have had to deal with the effects of this boundary situation.

African international relations have also been influenced by the presence of externally defined, artificial boundaries. Political boundaries mark sharp discontinuities in political jurisdiction, but in Africa few of those discontinuities correspond to the patterns of the socio-cultural environment. It has, therefore, been frequently charged that the artificial boundaries of Africa form the basis for conflict between the African states (Emerson, 1963: 105). In order to make their boundaries more congruent with the ethnic landscape, some states might attempt to adjust their boundaries at the expense of a neighbor. If Africa's modern boundaries had been allowed to evolve in a more natural manner, or if the colonial powers had based their partition upon a more thorough appreciation of the ethnic contours of the continent, it is assumed that the states of Africa would be less prone to boundary conflict.

Democracy is one of the most contested words in the English language. In Africa, these complexities are compounded by the question of whether democracy is a colonial imposition. Cheeseman and Sishuwa provide a historiography of debates around democracy, track how these narratives have developed over time, and argue that there is widespread public support for a form of what they call “consensual democracy.” This is not to say that democracy is universally loved, but despite the controversy it remains one of the most compelling ideals in political life, even in countries in which it is has yet to be realized.

It hardly came as a surprise that Ghana's Supreme Military Council obtained, or at least claimed that it had received, the result it wanted at the 30 March 1978 referendum: endorsement of its proposal for Union Government (see Appendix B). In Ghana's unpredictable political climate, the SMC had spared no effort to make the outcome of the referendum as predictable as possible.

The July 1977 decision to call a national referendum was the result of pressures brought to bear on the SMC during the fall of 1976 and the spring of 1977. Widespread dissatisfaction with the management of the economy, coupled with indications that the military intended to remain in power for an indeterminate period led to student strikes which culminated in the 23 June 1977 demand by the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB) that the government resign immediately (Resolution …). The ARPB's ultimatum was rejected out of hand by General Acheampong in his dawn broadcast of 1 July 1977. The ensuing general strike of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professionals almost paralyzed the country, and the SMC was virtually forced to announce a schedule for the return to civilian rule (see Appendix B). The first phase of the process was to culminate in the March 1978 referendum.

Undoubtedly, the SMC would have preferred a quiet, carefully controlled plebiscite, or more simply, a constitution octroyee which outlawed political parties and permitted, if the SMC thought it necessary, a reversion to full military control. As previous Ghanaian regimes have discovered to their peril, however, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent Ghanaians from openly and forcefully expressing themselves on important political issues. Thus, it was also not surprising that the decision to conduct a referendum released forces pent-up since the NRC took power in 1972.

The decade from 1990 to 2000 saw a total of seventy-eight top leadership elections involving forty-three of the forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries. Of these, only twenty-one elections led to power transition from an incumbent to an opposition political party in nineteen countries. Paradoxically, even where there was such transition, authoritarian tendencies persisted. Focusing on Kenya and Zambia, this article argues and seeks to demonstrate that the limited number of transitions from an incumbent regime to an opposition party and the persistence of authoritarianism are a function of political liberalization without democratization of political institutions and rules of the political game.

One cannot comprehend the demographic and political maps of contemporary Southern Africa, as well as the cultural-historical dynamics of the region during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, without first studying the changes caused by the Zulu revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and by the accompanying Nguni-Sotho migrations into Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and even Tanzania. Among the Nguni who occupied the present Natal province of South Africa, the revolution essentially was a violent counter-elite overthrow of the traditional political system and a transformation of the social order. The revolution was conducted throughout the reigns of five monarchical leaders: Dingiswayo (c. 1800-1818) who laid the foundations; Shaka (1816-1828) who established the Zulu kingdom and ruled at the peak of the revolution; Dingane (1828-1840) who was the first to encounter European encroachment upon Zululand; Mpande (1840-1872) who became a vassal of the Boers and the British; and Cetshwayo (1872-1884) who died in an armed resistance against British colonialism. The prolonged period of revolutionary warfare and the accompanying deprivations, known as the Mfecane among the Nguni and the Difaqane among the Sotho-Tswana, resulted in widespread migrations of peoples in different directions and destinations.

Regionally, the Nguni-Sotho migrations led to militarization, conquest and nation-building, and to the absorption of alien peoples. The whole process resulted in the intermixing, intermarriage and assimilation of peoples of diverse origins, languages, and cultures and gave them an enduring sense of corporate identity.

Thirty-five years ago, Présence Africaine, along with many other institutions, embarked on a path to correct colonialism. In its role as an agent of change, the journal has continued over the years to reflect and inform the values of Black nations. Yet today, when former colonialist oppression has not infrequently given way to control by multinational businesses or inter-governmental consortia, the very term “neo-colonialism” addresses a new problematic for Présence Africaine. It is a problematic whose complexities lead to the following question. Simply stated, who is the oppressor now? This essay will examine that question in light of the journal's own history. How has its editorial policy changed? What writers are represented? What shifts in subject matter and author have captured the readers' attention and imagination? Indeed, has the reading public itself changed, representing new constituencies, both geographically and politically? What, finally, are the implications of its history in an age of neo-colonalism?

The definition of colonialism underlying this study is the following: “Colonialism denotes a relationship of domination and, like other forms of oppression, it is a structural system of hierarchically ordered and ranked relationships between at least two parties (Martin and Cohen, 1980: 21-60). An instance of oppression at work in francophone literature is found in the Pléiade edition of Histoire des littératures (Gallimard, 1958). The sanction of the Pléiade, most will agree, is one of the standards of admission into the privileged canon of French letters.

Sierra Leone's transfer election of 1996 was instigated by a resurgent civil society that came alive after thirty years of dictatorship. This electoral democratic renewal did not, however, alter the spoils logic that has defined the organization and exercise of political power in Sierra Leone since the late 1960s. Because performance by a popularly elected government is critical to the consolidation of public support for democracy, the SLPP's inability to distance itself from its discredited precursors endangered the country's fragile democracy.

Une tragédie n'exclut pas l'autre

et il n'existe aucune hiérarchie dans la souffrance.

(One tragedy does not cancel out the other,

and there is no hierarchy in suffering.)

Calixthe Beyala (2005)

There can be no reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi without

justice, and no justice without truth. This proposition holds true

for all three states of former Belgian Africa.

René Lemarchand (1998)

The title of Marie Béatrice Umutesi's book, Fuir ou mourir au Zaïre: Le vécu d'une Réfugiée Rwandaise—or in its English version, Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaïre—might prove confusing for some readers on at least two counts. Because the name Rwanda will forever be associated in our memory with the horror of the 1994 genocide, one might surmise that this is the story of a Tutsi survivor taking refuge in neighboring Zaire, as in previous massacres in 1959, 1963, and 1973. But then again, considering the disastrous wars that have raged in that country for the last decade, one might conclude that Umutesi's book tells the story of a Rwandan refugee caught in the crossfire between competing forces, Rwanda versus Uganda and their proxies within the former Zaire. Both assumptions would be only half true. The missing half in both inferences is that the ordeal of this refugee and her cohort originated in the Rwandan conflict that began in 1990 and culminated in the genocide four years later. Shrewdly orchestrated and largely perpetrated by the Tutsi-dominated regime that took power in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, the slaughter of these Hutu refugees has been concealed behind a curtain of silence on the part of the international community. In the drama that unfolds in Umutesi's book, Zairian territory is the unwitting, albeit highly significant, theater of the cynically suppressed story of the disappearance of nearly a quarter million Hutu refugees from Rwanda at the hands of shadowy “rebels.”

This paper advances a resource mobilization perspective on the 2011–12 electoral protests in Senegal based on social movement theory. Motivational explanations, in the form of grievance accounts, have already been used to explain successful protest mobilization in this case. Here the emphasis is placed on organizational efforts and the financial and human resources behind social movements. Using this approach to analyze the rise and fall of the social movement created to protest against President Abdoulaye Wade reveals its strategic role for opposition parties and their leaders. These findings add nuance to the perception of a democratic revolution in Senegal.

This article reports findings of a qualitative inquiry on representations of unsafe sexual conduct among female sex workers in Aba, Nigeria. Participating sex workers viewed their work as a form of business, a survival imperative in the face of poverty, and they generally considered it both risky and disgraceful. However, they frequently framed unsafe sexual behavior in terms of poorly remunerated unprotected sex with clients. Sex workers in the study were not only generally willing to grant, but also confirmed regularly granting, unprotected sex to clients offering to pay a premium for it. Receiving “good money” for unprotected sex made higher degrees of risk acceptable to these women and was considered an effective way to avoid clients assumed to be carriers of infections. In their struggle for sexual health, sex workers in Nigeria are hindered by poverty, powerlessness, and marginality. Future programs must aim, inter alia, at supporting sex workers' willingness to insist on condoms no matter what clients offer them to do otherwise.

This study focuses on determinants of foreign news coverage different from those entertained by the debate about the New International Information Order (NIIO): national interests and media traditions. It is common knowledge that newspapers devote little space to foreign news; we know even less about what that small space contains. The NIIO discussions suggest that third world newspapers, dependent mostly upon western wire services, have little choice but to print what they get. A newspaper like the New York Times, by contrast, relies on its own foreign correspondents and much less on wire service copy; hence it can choose what it prints. Wire services do help determine published news since they constitute a finite basis from which editorial choices are made. It is far from clear, however, that these agencies are the only sources used by third world newspapers and, more important, that the way they structure the news is necessarily identical with that of the news as it is eventually published.

Although the NIIO debate has been going on for years, it is now reaching western audiences. Horton (1978), Rubin (1977), Sussman (1977), Rosenblum (1977, 1979), and Righter (1978, 1979), among others, have recently described the issues in some detail. Much of the criticism of the present “order” stresses that structural dependence upon western agencies results in imbalanced foreign coverage, at the expense of the third world. Righter (1979: 121) explains that “news is … heavily biased toward the industrialized countries.” Horton (1978: 49) agrees that “the news flow is too heavily weighted widi news about the industrialized countries.”

The historiographic question that this article asks is: How can historians uncover actual social and economic practices without imposing anachronistic standards and terminologies on the available evidence? The analysis focuses on the relationship between landlords and zégoch—a hitherto unrecognized and socially subservient class of peasants—in the context of social, economic, and cultural realities in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ethiopia. The thesis is that during this period the Ethiopian ruling classes gained their power and income primarily from ownership of rim land—a form of private property—and the labor of zégoch.

Contestations over indigene rights and political representation resulted in Christian-Muslim riots in the Nigerian city of Jos where, between 2001 and 2010, over 5,000 people were killed. This study complements existing literature on the spatial dimension of violence by focusing on how Jos’s neighborhoods were transformed from everyday residential areas to spaces of ethnic differentiation and violence. It employs an ethnographic study to map the emergence and development of ethnic strongholds and frontiers, two kinds of socio-spatial settings conceptualized to help explain the spread and patterns of violence across Jos’s neighborhoods.

Refugee resettlement is accomplished through the intersecting administration of state and non-state actors with competing claims and interests. These competing claims are caught between humanitarian imperatives to rescue the most vulnerable refugees on one hand and security demands to protect national borders from those deemed undesirable and undeserving on the other. Based on ethnographic research with Somali refugees in Nairobi from 2013 to 2015, Balakian examines the ways in which refugees maneuver through an unsynchronized assemblage of institutions to which they are subject; she brings this assemblage into relief through ethnographic accounts of Somali refugees as they attempt to navigate the resettlement system and are simultaneously caught in Kenya’s 2014 anti-refugee security operations. Based on this case, the research demonstrates that being subject to multiple, competing governing bodies is central to the condition of statelessness in twenty-first century Africa.

Kenya has served as a model of rural development, to be praised and lambasted, for three decades. As early as 1964 Clayton hailed it as an “agrarian revolution” (1964). As recently as 1989, Lofchie argued that it is an “agricultural ‘success story’” that has dramatically raised the real incomes of smallholder farmers while achieving one of the highest agricultural growth rates on the continent (1989, 15). Equally common are those condemning it as the archetypical example of capitalist development, impoverishing the rural poor to provide benefits to a small and internationally dependent bourgeoisie. Neither perspective is completely accurate; both need to be re-examined in light of Kenya's recent political unrest and shift to a multi-party political system. If a more open political system is sustained, rural political demands can only be understood and predicted if we understand the effects of Kenya's development model on the bulk of the population: Kenya's peasants.

The Kenyan agrarian debate has produced an unusually rich literature on the effects of capitalist development on an African peasantry. At its heart is the question of whether the emergence of a rural market economy preserves a relatively homogeneous peasantry or dissolves it into landed and landless classes. This article reappraises and contributes to the debate by arguing that directly examining the historical process of social transformation brought about by capitalist development, rather than deducing the process from cross-sectional data, suggests a single, uniform explanation of seemingly conflicting empirical material.

This article is driven by an empirical paradox over where Somalia came from (pre-colonial clan-states) and where it ended up (return to pre-colonial clano-territorial conflicts). Existing academic studies on contemporary Somalia, which were supposed to provide critical analysis, continue to applaud the creation of clan-states within the failed state of Somalia. Based on a variety of unique primary sources, this article offers a new perspective on the current state formation processes occurring in the purview of the Somali State. Somali clans are determined to come to terms with the state collapse by averting the return to political power of the detested military regime, which was led by one clan-based leadership that tended to terrorize other rival clans and denied any equal power- and resource-sharing framework. Conceptualizing the contemporary Somali state as similar to pre-colonial clan-sultanates, this article argues that contemporary Somalis are reverting to a pre-colonial realm where each clan had its clan sultan seeking for a clan-state of its own right. Where else do clan-states compete against each other in entering into “treaties” with external entities intent on exploiting war-torn Somalia as tabula rasa? It is towards the objective of answering this question and of providing a better understanding of the Somali conflict that this article is offered to add a comparative empirical understanding of the different trajectories of state formations in Somalia.