Dreams are cognitions that are typically dependent on sleep. However, not all forms of cognition occur during sleep. In spontaneously recalled dreams the visual sense predominates. It is rare to remember a smell or a taste from the dream. Reading and computations (arithmetic) do not frequently occur in dreams. Many dreams contain unusual amounts of emotion, and may provide greater access to older memories – -especially during late morning REM dreams. While impairment in critical self-reflective capacities may occur in dreams, it is not clear if all dreams are characterized by impairment in self-reflectiveness. The dreaming mind/brain spontaneously and automatically produces dreams in the form of narratives and likely uses cognitive operations like Freud’s dreamwork to do so.

The ultradian NREM-REM sleep cycle is embedded within the larger twenty-four- hour circadian cycle. The sleep cycle interacts with the circadian cycle, which in turn is controlled by the SCN master clock within the hypothalamus. The two-process model captures interactions between the circadian process and the sleep cycle. Disorders of biological rhythmicity such as delayed sleep phase syndrome and manic depression have significant but treatable effects on sleep.

REM's biobehavioral characteristics are paradoxical in that its physiologic correlates appear to be injurious to the health of the organism while its brain correlates suggest social-emotional functions. Unlike REM, NREM biobehavioral characteristics are slightly less paradoxical but still enigmatic. NREM’s physiologic functions may be related to immune system function while its electrophysiologic properties are clearly related to the restorative functions of sleep. Both REM and NREM sleep likely participate in memory processing but so does the waking state. The fact that NREM appears to be associated with the gradual deactivation of a select group of brain structures that are then reactivated during REM suggests that the two sleep states either work in harmony with one another to maintain optimal brain function or that NREM undoes something that REM instantiates.

Most dreams are filled with social interactions between the dreamer and familiar people in the dreamer’s life. Dream content changes significantly according to the stage in life of the dreamer but social interactions remain a constant in dream content across the lifespan. Much of the social interactions that occur in dreams can be characterized as attachment interactions; that is, interactions that reflect and help shape daytime attachment orientations (e.g., romantic attachments or familial attachments, etc.) of the dreamer. In old age and in death dreams continue to simulate social interactions, but new unfamiliar characters enter the dreams of the old and dying.

A theory of dreams must be able to explain why people think they have mutual dreams, precognitive dreams, and visitations of loved ones from beyond the grave. Simple dismissive explanations that these people are gullible won’t do as the gullibility account does not explain the similar phenomenologies and content features of these extraordinary dreams. The fact that sensorially limited individuals such as people with blindness, deaf-mute, and paraplegic conditions nevertheless have dreams where none of these impairments exist must also be explained in any decent theory of dreams.

REM dreams and NREM dreams differ in terms of content and phenomenologies, these two dream types do not exhaust dream phenomenology. Relative to REM dreams, NREM dreams tend to be less story-like, bizarre, and contain fewer aggressive social interactions and greater numbers of friendly interactions, at least where the dreamer-initiated interactions are concerned.

Theories of REM and NREM functions we have been assuming that the sleep state is doing something for the wake state; i.e., that NREM SWS restores energy for waking consciousness or that REM supports emotional memory consolidation for waking consciousness. But it is also possible that the functions of REM and NREM have more to do with the sleep states themselves rather than with waking consciousness. REM may be undoing something that NREM is doing since REM typically follows NREM in the sleep cycle. Or conversely, NREM SWS may be doing something important for the organism (e.g., immune system repair) but that function is costly, so REM functions to complete, complement, repair, or undo something that NREM had to do to accomplish its primary functions. In this scenario, SWS sleep repairs the immune system each night, but that is so onerous a job that NREM then requires REM to restore NREM’s functional capacity so that it can do its immune system repair again the following night.

A growing body of literature indicates that motivation can critically shape long-term memory formation in the service of adaptive behavior. In the present chapter, we review recent cognitive neuroscience evidence of motivational influences on memory, with a focus on anatomical pathways by which neuromodulatory networks support encoding-related activity in distinct subregions of the medial temporal lobe. We argue that engagement of distinct neural circuits as a function of motivational context at encoding leads to formation of different memory representations, supporting different patterns of adaptive behavior. We present a novel neurocognitive model, the Interrogative/Imperative model of information-seeking, to account for pursuit of learning goals. Interrogative or imperative modes of information-seeking are often, but not necessarily, associated with approach or avoidance motivation, respectively. We also discuss additional influences on motivated memory encoding, including intrinsic motivation, curiosity, choice, and cognitive control processes. Taken together, this body of research suggests that the nature of memory representations depends on an individual's neurophysiological response to, rather than extrinsic qualities of, a given motivational manipulation or context at the time of encoding. Finally, we discuss potential applications of these research findings to real-life educational settings and directions for future research.

In this chapter we examine measures and methods that have come to prominence over the last two decades exploring how they build on, and are shaped by, relevant theory. In addition, we identify how contemporary measures and methods have expanded as researchers investigate interactive influences of person and context. First, the importance of distinguishing levels of generality and specificity in definitions of motivation constructs is explored. Second, we examine attempts to define the type of relation between motivation constructs and learning, for example, mediation relations and reciprocal relations. As specific research is considered we direct attention to the types of analytic procedures that have been used to test hypotheses and assess models of the relations between motivation and learning. In particular we highlight the development of research methods that go beyond the range of insights into motivation and learning that can be achieved using only self-report questionnaires.

In this chapter, an overview of the concept of choice provision and a discussion of the benefits and detriments of providing choice for motivation and learning in educational contexts is discussed. A review of the theoretical perspectives explaining how and why choice may have benefits, and sometimes detriments, is provided. In reviewing the relevant theories and the corresponding empirical evidence, we highlight a diverse set of perspectives – motivational, cognitive, social, and neuroscientific – to provide a nuanced understanding of the role of choice in educational settings. We focus the second half of the chapter on areas of contention within choice theory and research, including a discussion of the conceptual confluence of choice and autonomy and the various characteristics of individuals, tasks, choices, classrooms, and cultures that predict divergent choice effects. In closing the chapter, we discuss the implications of this research for educational practice and make recommendations for future research.

While research on neuroscience posits that intrinsic and extrinsic incentives involve a single, common psychological process based on a reinforcement learning model (forming a “commonality view” on motivation), research in psychology has made a strong distinction between these two types of incentives (forming a “multifaceted view” on motivation), often even viewing them as competitive. Although they are not necessarily contradictory, I argue that these two meta-theoretical views have biased and prevented our comprehensive understanding of motivation and its relation to learning. I suggest ways that these different perspectives can inform each other, contributing to our broader understanding of human motivation and learning. These examples include the effects of reward on learning, the way people can transform one type of motivation to another, and a rewarding view for effort, challenge, and negative feedback. The arguments presented in this chapter underscore the vital importance of cross-disciplinary work on motivation and learning in future studies.

There is a long history of thought and research in the social sciences that views human beings as engaged in entirely instrumental activities in pursuit of goals that typically give them pleasure. This view makes a sharp distinction between “means” and “ends,” and treats the relation between means and ends as essentially arbitrary. Forty years of research on “intrinsic motivation” presents a different view, suggesting that some activities are themselves ends. In this chapter, we argue that distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation has been important, but that the current understanding of the distinction is not adequate to capture the most important dimensions of difference between these two types of motives. We suggest a modification of the distinction, between activities that are pursued for consequences that bear an intimate relation to the activities themselves, and those that are purely instrumental. We call the former class of activities “internally motivated,” and argue that while they are not necessarily pleasurable, they yield lasting effects on well-being that instrumental consequences typically do not. Further, we argue that internally motivated activities differ from intrinsically motivated ones, in which the sheer pleasure of the activity motivates its pursuit. We discuss evidence from both laboratory research and field studies, including a longitudinal study of West Point cadets, in support of our arguments.