Spatial activities form such an integral part of everyday life that they are rarely noticed as phenomena unto themselves. However, we are reminded of the critical roles that spatial thought and behavior play in the quality of life when problems occur in the course of these activities, as, for example, when we search for but cannot find a desired object or when we become disoriented in an unfamiliar part of town. Relatively little is known about the effects of aging on human spatial abilities, especially those cognitive skills involved in spatial activities. Consequently, we can make only the most general of inferences regarding the impact of spatial cognition and behavior on the quality of life for elderly adults.

Clearly, additional research is needed in this area, but in order to be of optimal value, this research should be guided by a general conceptual framework that can be used to evaluate previous empirical work and point to promising avenues for future inquiry. The purpose of this chapter is to delineate a potentially valuable approach to the scientific study of spatial cognition and behavior in elderly adults, with particular emphasis on the spatial tasks that confront them in the course of their daily lives. Fundamental to this approach is the proposition that meaningful research in this area should be based on an understanding of real-world situations, that is, psychological events in their ecological context.

This literature review will examine the effects of motivation on mental activity in the aged. It will show that motivation significantly affects performance on a variety of tasks, but does not eliminate age-related cognitive deficits. The findings demonstrate that failure to consider the influence of motivation on performance in the aged can lead to an exaggeration of the magnitude of the deleterious effects of aging on cognitive functioning, and an increase in motivation can improve memory functioning in aged individuals, including those who are experiencing memory problems.

Statement of the problem

Historically, one of the major foci of experimental psychology was on variables associated with the phenomenon of learning. Because learning was differentiated from performance, an attempt was made to identify variables that affected performance versus those that affected learning. Specifically, it was recognized (Hull, 1943) that learning, defined as a relatively permanent change in behavioral potential, needed to be distinguished from performance, defined as the measurable expression of that which an organism had learned. Moreover, performance was not considered to be isomorphic with learning; rather, learning set an upper bound on performance. An organism could not display (perform) more than it had learned. On the other hand, an organism could and in most cases did perform at a lower level than that attained by learning.

The title of this chapter is so commodious that it may be useful to begin by tidying up the domain of interest. First, there are two chapters in this section devoted to metamemory and aging; the other is Chapter 23 by John Cavanaugh. The field has been divided in a convenient way, and perhaps a theoretically and methodologically meaningful way. Specifically, Cavanaugh presents a discussion of the literature on metamemory and aging, where “metamemory” is operationally defined with any of multiple experimental (often on-line laboratory) tasks. I, on the other hand, have been charged with introducing the topic in a general (and certainly all too brief) manner and focusing attention on the metamemory and aging literature, where “metamemory” is indicated by verbal-report data (especially questionnaire data).

There is one further delineation in my topic I should note. Within the realm of verbal-report memory data, there are several domains, each of which is at least indirectly relevant to the issue at hand, but only one of which is immediately pertinent. These topics are summarized in Table 22.1. With the additional criterion of the consideration of developmental (especially aging) questions, this delineation follows closely that of Herrmann (1984). For the most part, I shall not address topic 1 (semantic-memory questionnaires), even those in which developmental (or aging) issues are paramount (Botwinick & Storandt, 1980; Erber, 1981; Perlmutter, Metzger, Miller, & Nezworski, 1980; Poon, Fozard, Paulshock, & Thomas, 1979; Riegel, 1973), and even though there is clear evidence that these techniques, which are verifiable against established facts, can represent valid ways of investigating memory (Herrmann, 1984).

During the last five years, a substantial increase has occurred in the number of studies investigating aging effects in processing prose. As noted by Hartley in Chapter 11, many recent studies have reported age-related differences in quantity and quality of recall, whereas others have found no differences. In attempts to understand these discrepancies, analyses of this literature (Hultsch & Dixon, 1984; Meyer & Rice, 1983a) have been cast in terms of an interactional scheme among text, learner, and task variables (Figure 12.1). Because these variables interact in the comprehension process, it is impossible to discuss them adequately in isolation. However, this chapter emphasizes text variables, whereas Chapter 11 emphasized learner variables. Before examining text variables, we shall discuss learner and task variables, because their consideration is critical in understanding discrepancies in the literature on aging and prose learning.

Learner variables

Education and vocabulary

In considering the learner variables of education and vocabulary as partially responsible for the contradictory aging effects in prose learning, we are considering the long-standing problem in aging research of how to make old and younger age groups equivalent on cultural variables in cross-sectional studies (Birren & Morrison, 1961; Botwinick, 1978; Krauss, 1980). If studies examine only old adults with college degrees, their findings may not hold for the majority of old adults, who lack these degrees. In addition, degrees from various institutions and generations differ in educational value.

Increasing numbers of cognitive psychologists and neuropsychologists are moving beyond the laboratory and attempting to understand human cognitive abilities as they are manifest in natural contexts. This volume offers a comprehensive overview of research on “everyday” cognition in the adult phases of the life course by integrating theoretical and methodological issues in everydaycognition research with findings in real-life situations. In this manner, this book will outline for the reader theoretical and methodological trade-offs and dilemmas along the continuum between laboratory research and naturalistic or real-world research.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I addresses fundamental conceptual issues in everyday-cognition research. The first five chapters outline competing theoretical reasons for choosing different approaches in cognitive studies. The next four chapters provide examples of research combining laboratory and realworld strategies.

Part II reviews findings on everyday cognitive behaviors. These chapters concentrate on the everyday cognitive behaviors of adults from early to late adulthood. The first eleven chapters in Part II review and summarize findings from a wide assortment of everyday cognitive activities, and the last six chapters examine the major concomitant factors that could influence the observed outcomes. Whenever possible, generalizations between classic experimental and real-world stimuli and techniques are contrasted.

Part III concentrates on applications of findings in everyday cognition to cognitive-enhancement procedures in everyday and clinical situations. The first two chapters after the introduction review models and theories associated with compensation and remediation.

The explosion of interest in everyday memory over the past few years has enormously enriched the field. Entire areas of investigation that were unknown a few years ago – prospective memory, for instance – are boiling with ideas and findings. The excitement of new horizons has been a large part of what has made this conference a delightful intellectual experience.

The new wave of real-world research in memory is, of course, part of a more general trend toward application and social relevance in psychology. Bahrick (Chapter 6, this volume) discusses the history of this trend as a reflection of social forces that affected the scientific enterprise across the board. Specifically within psychology, it is tempting to see it also as a continuation of our progressive liberation from the “snaffles and curbs” of orthodoxy – first structuralism, then behaviorism, then laboratory rigorism (Baddeley, Chapter 8, this volume). Cognitive scientists breathed a sigh of relief when they were given permission to study the mind. We are breathing another sigh of relief as we find that we are allowed, even encouraged (Neisser, 1976), to study interesting things about the mind. We have been turned loose to seek the bloody horse, and we love it.

What is worrisome about this development, however, is that it appears to be hardening into an orthodoxy of its own. Experimenters are being told that their research ought to have real-world relevance, that it must be generalizable to real life, and that a measure of its value is the variance accounted for by its manipulations and measures.

In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to pharmacologic treatments for senile dementias (Reisberg, Ferris, & Gershon, 1979). Many researchers have also studied memory complaints as a sign of depression in the elderly and have attempted to differentiate them from dementia (Kahn et al., 1975; Kiloh, 1961; Wells, 1979). Little work, however, has been done toward developing practical strategies to help nondepressed elderly people experiencing age-related cognitive decline.

Researchers have documented that nondepressed elderly people may score in the “normal” range on screening tests for senile dementia, though still experiencing age-related cognitive declines, a phenomenon recently described in a series of meetings of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) as “minimal memory impairment” (MMI) (Annapolis and Key West, November 1985). Craik's classic review of memory and aging (1977) and Poon's extensive recent review (1985) list a wide variety of significant and substantial declines in memory function in old versus young “normals.” Elders who want to continue to work as long as possible may be appropriately concerned if these “normal” losses lead to reduced ability to function professionally or lead to social embarrassment. The purpose of this chapter is to review the cognitive changes that occur with normal aging, critically discuss prior attempts to reduce these losses, present some recent modifications to these attempts, and then finally focus on the limitations of current studies with implications for future research.

Discussions of perception or memory seldom begin by defining a percept or a memory. Discussions of problem solving, however, almost always begin by attempting to define a problem. Yet the term “problem” is in the everyday vocabulary of virtually every adult. When a term that is commonly used must be explicitly defined, usually it is because the meaning that is intended differs from the common usage. The difference may be connotative. For example, the term “relativity” has almost completely different connotations for the theoretical physicist and for the layperson. The difference may also be denotative. For example, the term “flu” denotes different sets of disorders for the epidemiologist and for the layperson. It seems unlikely that two concepts would denote the same things but have different connotations. It is likely, then, but not assured, that the scientific and the lay concepts of a problem denote different things. It is an open question whether or not the two concepts have similar connotations. If the connotations are similar, then we must ask if the problems we, as scientists, study are sufficiently similar to the problems people experience that we can generalize what we learn about how problems are solved and how to assist the process. If the connotations are not similar, the questions are more serious: If our problems are not like people's problems, to what aspect of human experience do they generalize? What fields of scientific inquiry do address problems that people experience?

Several themes appear and reappear in the work presented in this Part III: (1) the question of the types and characteristics of elderly subjects, (2) theoretical process questions, and (3) an emphasis on practical everyday memory.

Three themes

1. Types and characteristics of elderly subjects. Yesavage, Lapp, and Sheikh (Chapter 31, this volume) suggest that the elderly perform poorly when using visual imagery and often are anxious when using new techniques in testing situations. These authors emphasize the roles of affect, depression, mood-specific effects, and medications in learning and memory processes. Barbara Wilson (Chapter 32, this volume) emphasizes the selection of appropriate strategies for use by particular individuals. Nadina Lincoln (Chapter 33, this volume) discusses these problems as they appear in the general hospital setting. Nick Moffat (Chapter 34, this volume) discusses them at home, where cognitive rehabilitation interacts with the unmet needs of relatives caring for the confused elderly. Apparently it is sometimes necessary to supply external aids for such people. There is growing emphasis on the potential usefulness of well-designed external aids.

I am reminded of a man who suffered from senile dementia of the Alzheimer's type. His daughter-in-law noticed him pushing a silent vacuum cleaner back and forth on a rug. “No, Bill,” she said, as she plugged the vacuum cleaner in, so that it started working. How did he interpret her saying “No”? His immediate response, anyway, was to unplug the cord and resume pushing the vacuum cleaner back and forth.

It's seven o'clock. The incessant chirping of the alarm rudely jolts you out of blissful slumber. In a seemingly reflex reaction, you grope around and silence the offender. Lying in the comfort of your bed, dreading the shock of cold floors, you begin to think. Even in your semiconscious state, you start remembering what the new day has in store: three committee meetings, class, several errands to run, a paper to write, a dentist appointment, and a very special dinner date. With a solemn promise to yourself that you won't (meaning can't) forget any of them, you finally get up and charge into the safety of a nice hot shower. During the day, you check the clock from time to time, talk to yourself about when the next appointment is, look at your calendar, and so on.

Embedded in these typical, everyday activities is a very intriguing notion: that we are aware that we need to remember things, that we tell ourselves to remember, and that we periodically check to see how we are doing. That awareness and memory are inextricably linked (Tulving, 1985) is obvious in everyday life. Unfortunately, it seems that memory researchers have been reluctant to recognize that fact (Hilgard, 1980; Miller, 1980; Neisser, 1979; Tulving, 1985). The goal of this chapter is to address this lack of concern, because the role of awareness in memory provides insights into memory development across adulthood.

Neisser's critique (1978) of the functional significance of modern theories of memory played an important part in energizing both laboratory and real-world research. His paper renewed interest in and fueled discussions of the issues of generalizability, predictability, and validity of laboratory methods and findings.

The chapters in Part I of this book have outlined the rationale and arguments underlying the debate concerned with carrying out cognitive research in the laboratory and in the real world. These chapters have clarified the how, when, and why of studying real-world or everyday cognition. This clarification of the conceptual utility of representativeness, generalizations, ecological and external validity, and functional explanations paves the way for reviews of findings on everyday cognition in Part II of this book.

What do we know about cognitive abilities in everyday life along the adult life span? I believe that there is a two-part answer to the question. On the one hand, researchers have gained substantial knowledge about everyday cognition since the 1970s. The 1978 and 1987 conferences on practical aspects of memory (Gruneberg, Morris, & Sykes, 1978) testify to the depth of interest and research. From the perspective of the adult life span, researchers have begun to examine cognitive phenomena with greater precision (Smith, 1980). Although it has not been demonstrated empirically, it has been said that the magnitudes of age differences reported in the research literature over the last three decades have shrunk.

Something very complex and at the same time very common happened to all the authors of the chapters in this book. All of them managed to arrive at the Talland memorial conference. A number of things could have stood in the way of that arrival, and if they had, the participants would never have convened to produce these chapters. One of those things is a sort of memory. To get the flavor of this sort of memory, imagine that you are going on a trip. Think for a moment about some of the many memory-related things you need to do to accomplish that. You need to remember to plan your trip, or to get someone to do that. You need to prepare your house and spouse and children and cats and office for your departure. You need to remember to wash your socks and to bring those clean socks in a wellpacked suitcase. And you need to remember when and how to return home again.

As you scan, for a moment, what you would need to remember, you may notice that much of it falls into two categories: things you remember to do (“memory for planned action”), and things you remember because you need them in order to do the things you plan to do. An example of the former is “get on the plane”; an example of the latter is “remember the way to the airport.”

Why should we take research on cognition out of the laboratory into the real world? First, let me mention some reasons that I do not find compelling.

Some bad reasons

Laboratory studies produce erroneous results

“We do not need to move to the real world, because principles and facts that have been discovered in laboratory research on cognition do not apply to real life.” Although one hears assertions to this effect, I know of almost no instances in which real-life tests of well-established principles have been carried out in a sensible way and have failed. On the other hand, there have been many examples of tests and real-world applications of principles regarding human learning and cognition that were discovered in the laboratory and have proved entirely satisfactory. Moreover, Neisser's pessimism (1978) notwithstanding, some of the principles are highly nonobvious. My own favorite example concerns the spacing of practice. This demonstrably counterintuitive finding (Melton, 1970; Rothkopf, 1963; Rothkopf & Coke, 1963) initially emerged from a long and tortuous set of experiments in the most classic and abstract verbal learning tradition. By now, literally dozens of applications to instruction, the teaching of classroom materials, and the practice of motor skills have been reported in the literature. I estimate the success-to-failure ratio as at least 10:1. Often the benefits are quite dramatic.

It is a challenge to address the practical memory needs of older individuals, because psychologists know little about the daily memory demands faced by older adults or the strategies they use to cope with these demands. Recent efforts to investigate “ecological” memory performance have been driven by the desire to maintain experimental control and the desire to examine tasks similar to those studied in the laboratory. This research has rarely been guided by any theoretical or practical evaluation of the memory needs of older adults. Rather, each investigator has identified a task that has appeared to resemble some practical memory situation; that is, it has face validity as an ecological task. In light of this dearth of theorizing or data, I am faced with the dilemma of recommending a program of practical memory training without knowing precisely what the practical memory needs of older persons might be. This review begins, therefore, with an effort to characterize the everyday memory concerns of older adults and to define strategies and tasks that appear to be good candidates for intervention. The chapter concludes with some general recommendations to guide the development of memory-training programs. These recommendations derive from the first part of the chapter, which considers what should be trained, as well as from the memorytraining literature that considers how interventions should be designed.

For approximately 100 years, psychologists have been conducting scientific research on memory. Such research has been propelled largely by laboratory procedures and data and by theories about laboratory findings. Lately, sentiment has been growing that memory scientists should be more concerned about memory as it operates in natural settings, in other words, about the ecology of memory. A strong advocate of the ecological movement is Ulric Neisser. He has been harshly critical of traditional memory research because it has contributed so little to our understanding of everyday memory (Neisser, 1878). It is not difficult to sympathize with this complaint, but the dilemma is what to do about it. Although most ecologists of memory are rather vague on how to proceed, it is evident that they would like to see more attention to memory problems of the real world and less to procedures and theories resulting from laboratory work (Hirst & Levine, 1985; Neisser, 1978, 1982a). Clearer guidelines are possible, however, if we specify the fundamental questions that memory researchers have asked in the past and show how these could be changed (and indeed already are changing) to yield a broader understanding of memory. In this chapter, I shall describe an ecological orientation that has its roots in Charles Darwin, evolutionary biology, ethology, and the functional psychology of William James. Its objective is to encourage functional explanations of memory. The approach will be illustrated with examples drawn from the current memory literature.