This chapter discusses one of the most basic putative cognitive kinds, concept, arguing that it should be considered a real kind based on our current state of knowledge, contrary to what some philosophers have urged. After surveying empirical work on concepts in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology, the chapter tries to show that this work is pitched at different levels of explanation. Much recent work on concepts using neuroimaging techniques should not be expected to reveal the neural correlates of concepts because the research has different explananda and is investigating different causal processes. Other work on concepts in cognitive science reveals psychological structures (prototypes) associated mainly with automatic processing rather than deliberative reasoning. By contrast, concepts proper can be understood as functional kinds, which are individuated partly etiologically and partly with reference to the thinker’s discriminatory and inferential abilities. Many research programs in cognitive science individuate concepts in this way, combining diachronic and synchronic factors.

This chapter discusses the categories of cognitive heuristic and cognitive bias. These categories have come to define a burgeoning research program in cognitive science (the “heuristics and biases” program) and are widely considered to be universal features of human thought. On closer inspection, both categories are found to be too heterogeneous to identify real cognitive kinds, though some of their sub-categories may. In particular, the chapter examines the construct myside heuristic (closely related to the phenomenon often known as “confirmation bias”). This is found to be a better candidate for being a cognitive kind, since it seems to pertain to a specific feature of human cognitive architecture. Moreover, the myside heuristic, which (roughly speaking) attaches more weight to one’s own opinions than to contrary opinions, can be rational in certain contexts. Thus, distinguishing the heuristic from a corresponding bias can only be done against the background of a cognitive task or problem. This constitutes another instance of contextual or environmental individuation of a cognitive construct, making it unlikely that it will correspond to a neural kind.

This chapter brings together some of the main themes that run through the previous chapters, namely: the etiological-environmental individuation of cognitive kinds; the advantages of a real-kind approach to cognitive ontology; and the purview of cognitive neuroscience. On the first score, I distinguish the variety of externalism defended in this book from the familiar varieties in the philosophical literature. On the second, I show how taxonomic practices in cognitive science can benefit from reflecting on the overarching ontological categories in the cognitive domain and from greater clarity in distinguishing relationships among different kinds of kinds (for example, subordinate and superordinate kinds). On the third point, I argue that the scientific discipline of cognitive neuroscience, which aims to build bridges between neural and cognitive taxonomies, need not revolve around the search for neural correlates of cognitive kinds.

This chapter considers an unusual cognitive category, which pertains to a kind of process rather than a kind of entity, state, or capacity, namely language-thought processes. The kind of process in question is often discussed in the cognitive science literature under the headings of “linguistic relativity” and “linguistic determinism.” These labels aim to identify a distinctive type of cognitive process, all of whose instances share something important in common, namely a fundamental or deep-seated influence of language on thought. By looking at some paradigmatic cases, I argue that there is nothing to distinguish this type of process from a broader cognitive phenomenon, namely concept acquisition or conceptual change. Moreover, within this broader category, there are two distinct kinds of process that are usually lumped together but that do not seem to have anything significant in common. There is an important difference between those processes that involve simultaneous recruitment of linguistic capacities and those that do not. These two types of process may constitute distinct cognitive kinds within the broader cognitive kind of concept acquisition or conceptual change.

This chapter considers the cognitive construct, domain specificity, which is invoked in a number of different research programs in cognitive science, to indicate cognitive capacities that are limited in certain ways. Some cognitive capacities are restricted in their application to a certain domain, whereas others range freely beyond that domain. The challenge arises in saying what constitutes the domain of a capacity, especially since areas of knowledge do not come neatly compartmentalized. Building on the work of some cognitive scientists, I argue that the best way to understand the proper domain of a cognitive capacity is by invoking evolutionary considerations. This means that domain-specific capacities are individuated etiologically (at least in part), based on their evolutionary history. They are also identified on the basis of their synchronic causal powers, what they can and cannot do, since domain-specific cognitive capacities cannot range beyond their proper domains (whereas domain-general ones can). Given this cluster of causal features, I argue that there is a prima facie case to be made for considering domain specificity to be a cognitive kind.

Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality-space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal’s work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.

Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality-space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal’s work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.

Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality-space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal’s work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.