What is an emotion?

Each of the previous chapters has provided us with reasons for approaching emotions from a teleonomic perspective and for analysing the control of emotions by biological methods. As I stated at the beginning of this book, I think the data show that biology provides a useful basis for the study of emotion. It enables us to ask the right sort of questions about emotion. I also stated at the outset that the book would not provide a new theory of the emotions. There are two reasons, in this case, why asking the right sort of question does not lead immediately to what could be thought of as the right sort of answer. First, a biological approach should be seen as providing only the foundation for the construction of theories of emotion. (The virtue of biology is that the foundation it provides is a stable one.) There are many aspects of emotion, particularly in humans, which require social/cultural analysis, in addition to biological analysis, for their elucidation.

From mouse to monkey to man

In the preceding chapters I have discussed emotional processes and behaviour as if statements about one species would be generally true of a variety of species. This was justifiable, in part because we can assume at least some degree of phylogenetic continuity; in part from the fact that the discussion was aimed at elucidating general principles rather than specific ones; and, in part from the fact that many of the conclusions arrived at were of the form ‘X can occur in some cases but does not in others’. The problems of making simple generalisations about emotional processes are considered further in the last chapter.

In Chapter 1, I specifically suggested that general principles would be most easily seen if we avoided the question of whether any specific emotion was in some sense identical in different species. However, this question cannot be avoided indefinitely. Not only does a biological view of emotion lead one to expect large differences between species in emotional behaviour (e.g. the species-specific defence reactions discussed in Chapter 9); but also, unfortunately, the question is politically ‘loaded’.

The impetus for this book came when I was delivering a series of undergraduate lectures on emotion to psychology students at the University of Oxford. I was unable to find what I considered a suitable basic text for the course. The available books consisted almost entirely of presentations of particular theories of emotion. It struck me as strange that any field of science should have such a multiplicity of theories – except for the fact that in many cases different theorists were addressing different data bases. What seemed to me to be lacking, therefore, was a general pretheoretical framework into which all of the relevant data could be fitted.

This book is an attempt to provide such a framework. It does not present a specific theory of emotion, although it might bias one in favour of some theories rather than others. The central idea of the book is that biology and particularly evolution provide the best starting point for the study of emotion. This idea is neither novel, since it is the basis for Darwin's work, nor is it unrepresented in current theorising (see particularly Plutchik's various works). However, I do not think its implications have ever been considered outside the bounds of specific theorising. In particular, I have tried to show that all of the conventional properties of emotion such as expression, feeling, and motivation can be considered in a scientific manner and useful conclusions drawn therefrom.

Why do emotions produce expressions?

Common experience suggests that emotional states are reflected in facial and bodily expressions, and that in some cases specific states may result in specific, identifiable, expressions. It would be parsimonious if we could assume that an emotion releases a facial expression (Chapter 2). However, unlike organised skeletal responses or internal physiological change, facial expression has neither a direct physical effect on the external environment nor any obvious function with respect to the internal environment. The main function of expressions can be presumed to be communication (see Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973, p.20). Particularly with human beings, therefore, it is possible that expressions would be deliberate rather than reflexive and that the form of an expression could be easily learned rather than being innate (cf. the different gestures used in the various sign languages). How closely particular expressions are linked to particular emotions, the extent to which they are learned, and the extent to which they do in fact convey information, are all important questions.

Teleonomy and procreation

In the previous chapters we have treated emotions as if their exact form were fixed genetically and only minor variations would occur as a result of differing experience in different individuals. We have also considered emotions for which teleonomy can be largely assessed in terms of the survival of the individual (which is then taken to imply an increased probability of reproductive success). The present chapter departs from both of these approaches. While individual survival is necessary it is not sufficient for positive selection pressure. As has been argued in a particularly elegant form by Dawkins (1978), what is really critical is the survival of the genes which code for any particular phylogenetic characteristic. Such survival is highly dependent in higher organisms on successful parent–infant interactions.

The major emotion associated with such interactions in most people's minds would be love (Note 8.1). However, in addition to this there must be an important contribution to the infant's well-being from the fact that parents will be the main, and usually sole, source of virtually all of its homeostatic needs. We might presume from this that the neonate would be supplied with a variety of innate responses which would tend to elicit appropriate behaviour or sustenance from the parents.