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This chapter sets out the scope and principal claims of the book. It also introduces the major competing conceptions of assignment as are applied outside of Engand and Wales, briefly noting the differences in approach taken in Scotland, some major European jurisdictions, and also in the United States.
This chapter sets out a number of practical implications from the analysis in the preceding chapters. It explains how, on the model of equitable and statutory assignment set out in this book, anti-assignment clauses may have a limited effect even in connection with equitable assignments. It also explains how the ‘rule’ in Dearle v. Hall may still berelevant when a chose in action has been assigned in accordance with the requirements of Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1). Third, it shows that the English position that it is still possible to make a parol gift of a presently existing legal chose in action is dictated by the limited operation of the Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1). Fourth, it explains how it is possible to assign parts of a chose in action, whether such chose be one arising at common law, or even in equity. Fifth, this chapter explains how equitable defences such as laches and ‘clean hands’ may have a wider role to play in connection with equtiable assignments than is usually assumed. Finally, this chapter points out that payments to an assignor of the benefit of a common law debt will not attract restitutionary liability.
This chapter deals with the effect of an obligor's knowledge that the chose in action to which his obligation pertains has been equitably assigned. It shows that such knowledge is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient to generate a form of equitable liability as between the obligor and the assignee should the obligor breach his equitable duty to the assignee not to dishonestly assist the assignor ib breach her duties to her assignee.
This chapter draws on the analysis in the preceding two chapters, and puts forward the hypothesis that the important case of William Brands’ Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co is a decision of the House of Lords within its equitable jurisdiction, and not its common law jurisdiction, as is usually assumed to be the case.
This chapter explains how, by combining the trust with the ‘agency’ effects described in the previous chapters, the difficulties of each doctrine, operating in isolation, are overcome, In particular, this chapter explains how, through combination, the agency aspect of equtiable assignment becomes irrevocable; how the usual rule of agency that an agent may not sub-delegate is reversed; how substantial damages may be recovered by the assignee in right of the assignor;and how double liability of the assignor may be avoided, in part, through legislative intervention in the form of Common Law Procedure Act 1854, section 83.;
This chapter explores a number of misconceptions which have obscured understanding of the law on equitable assignment. In particular, it shows that the perception that an equitable assignment of an equtiable chose in action leads to the ‘dropping out’ of the equitable assignor because such assignor retains ‘no interest whatsoever’ following the assignment misundestands the caselaw.
This chapter examines how certain other forms of intangible assets, namely: patents, copyright, registered trade marks; and the benefit arising under a policy of life assurance, or a marine policy, may be dealt with by means of statutes specifically tailored for such assets. It compares the operation of such statutes to the operation of Law of Property Agt 1925, section 136(1).
The practical importance of intangible personalty such as debt, bonds, equities, futures, derivatives and other financial instruments has never been greater than it is today. The same may be said of interests in intellectual property. Yet the assignment of these intangible assets from one to another remains difficult to understand. Assignments are often taken to operate as a form of transfer akin to conveyances of legal titles to tangible personalty. However, this conception does not accurately reflect the law of assignment as it has developed in the caselaw in England and Wales. This book sets out a different model of the workings of assignments as a matter of English law, one that provides an analytical, yet historically sensitive, framework which allows us to better understand how, and why, assignments work in the way the cases tell us they do.