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The year 1992 was the beginning of a fourteen-year period that seemed to transition Thailand towards democracy and civilian control over the military. During the first part of this period (1992–2001), three principals (the palace, the king's Privy Council and key retired generals) dominated the country, given that Thailand possessed a defective democracy (defective because most power was centred upon the aforementioned principals). The only “civilian” who really could control the country was King Bhumipol, lording over the people and the armed forces. Thailand after 1992 thus became what Thongchai Winichakul calls a “royalist democracy”:
Royalist democracy is a form of “guided democracy”—an ostensibly democratic polity but one in which the electorate and elected authority do not have substantive power or have little impact on public policy because true power remains in the hands of the oligarchy or autocracy. Its formal name, “the Democratic Regime with the Monarchy as the Head of the State,” is quite a revealing euphemism for a political system in which the formal parliamentary system is under the domination of the unelected, undemocratic power of the monarchy.
A “guided democracy or ‘managed democracy’ is a formally democratic government that functions as a de facto authoritarian government.… Such governments are legitimized by elections that are free and fair, but do not change the state's policies, motives, and goals.” Merkel (2004) refers to this “guided” or “managed”, defective variant of democracy as “tutelary democracy” because unelected entities exert veto power over democratically elected civilian governments. Thailand has experienced such democracies.
But at the post–Black May inception of this “royalist democracy”, the 13 September 1992 election resulted in the centrist Democrats taking 79 seats, while the conservative Chart Thai received 77, indicating that a political divide was alive and well in Thailand's lower house. A Democrat-led ruling coalition formed on 29 September with General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's New Aspiration Party and General Chamlong Srimuang's Palang Dharma.
The actual landing was a particularly spectacular, dramatic episode, near to ‘our artist’ conception of war than anything I had seen.
Brigadier Chilton1
Balikpapan would be the last major amphibious operation of World War II. The after-action report for the amphibious operation named Oboe II repeatedly refers to the 18th Infantry Brigade – with some pride – as the ‘assault brigade’. The amphibious assault of Balikpapan would represent the pinnacle of evolution in the Australian infantry brigade from a line infantry formation to an amphibious Infantry Brigade Group (Jungle). The combination of combat experience, administrative efficiency, combined arms capability and leadership would make the 18th Brigade one of the most effective formations the Australian Army fielded in World War II.
After close examination of the Allied campaigns of the SWPA, the importance of the Australian infantry brigade as a key combat formation is without question. An examination of the infantry brigade group (jungle) as an intermediate formation commanding infantry battalions and numerous attached units demonstrates the role of an infantry brigade as crucial to the victories in New Guinea and Borneo. The complex terrain of the SWPA islands, which sometimes constrained and at times isolated the brigades, offered these formations the opportunity to evolve.
The 18th Australian Infantry Brigade returned from the Buna and Sanananda campaigns a victorious but physically broken force. It had suffered more than 96 per cent casualties owing to a combination of weather, terrain, disease and the enemy, and would have to reconstruct the foundations of the brigade, built around a core of experienced veterans and the assimilation of motorised troops and replacement soldiers.1 The 18th Brigade would have to start building basic soldiering skills, the integration of jungle warfare lessons learnt, and the introduction of formal brigade leadership schools. This is also the period when the brigade undergoes a dramatic reorganisation under 7th Division’s establishment as a jungle division, which was outlined in chapter 1.
For almost three years, the Seventh Amphibious Force trained its personnel, fought a determined enemy, and carried Allied troops forward with accelerating pace and swelling power.
Daniel Barbey1
Amphibious warfare, throughout military history, can be summarised in two steps: the movement of a military force by sea, and the landing of that force on the beach to seize an objective. These two steps are generally considered the most difficult and dangerous form of warfare. During World War II, US forces carried out 66 major amphibious landings.2 A major amphibious operation is defined by two factors. In US military history, it is often noted that of the 66 amphibious landings, ten were conducted by the US Marine Corps, six were conducted by both the US Marine Corps and US Army, and 50 were conducted by the US Army.3 Less acknowledged are the Australian Army’s five major landings: Lae, Finschhafen, Tarakan, Brunei Bay and finally Balikpapan.4
The key battles at Buna and Sanananda fought by the 18th Infantry Brigade Group as part of Warren Force would result in its most disastrous casualties of the war. The 18th Brigade would suffer more casualties in one month than all three Australian Infantry brigades suffered in the three-month battle with the Japanese along the Kokoda Track.1 Owen Curtis, a soldier in 2/12th Battalion, noted in five weeks of fighting in the Buna and Sanananda regions of New Guinea that the brigade would suffer a staggering 96 per cent casualty rate.2 However, these same battles would pioneer brigade-level combined arms tactics in the jungle.
In order to take on the Japanese Army, with any hope of success, forces must be trained up to high standards of toughness, fighting efficiency, adaptability, discipline and morale.
18th Australian Infantry Brigade, Intelligence Summary1
Throughout the course of the Pacific War, Australian infantry brigades faced monumental challenges in the SWPA, not only from the terrain and from the enemy but also owing to a rapid evolution of tactics and technologies within these intermediate formations. With time and experience, brigades evolved from rudimentary beginnings into expeditionary forces, incorporating hitherto unfamiliar attached elements, support arms and modes of transportation, all while fighting their way across the SWPA. The Australian infantry brigades adapted from formations established on World War I doctrinal, operational and tactical principles into those using more ‘modern’ organisational techniques and structures. Such an analysis must include a brief examination of the state of these formations at the onset of the war in terms of historical legacies, ‘orders of battle’ and to a limited degree the raw material in terms of manpower represented by Australian brigades at this early stage. One particularly important aspect of this analysis is the key transition of several formations between 1942 and 1945 from ‘standard’ Australian infantry brigades to ‘Infantry Brigade Groups (Jungle)’ and finally to ‘Infantry Brigade Groups (Jungle)’ designated as amphibious ‘Assault Brigades’.2