Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Browse subjects
  3. History
  4. Military history
  5. Content listing

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

15418 results in Military history

Page 310 of 771

  • 20 - Renegotiating the social contract

  • from Part III - The Moral Economy of War and Peace
  • Edited by Michael Geyer, University of Chicago, Adam Tooze, Yale University, Connecticut
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of the Second World War
    Published online:
    05 June 2015
    Print publication:
    23 April 2015, pp 552-574

  • Summary

    The chapter explores the battles for morale waged in Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Germany. Moving from country to country, the discussion becomes increasingly dense as it traces how war cultures became entangled, whether by drawing close to one another, as in the British-Soviet alliance, or by clashing, as in Germany's war against Britain and the Soviet Union. The comparison with Great Britain and Nazi Germany makes clear how totalizing the Soviet war effort was from the start, how much the regime expected of its population, and how exacting many Soviet citizens were toward themselves and others. A comparative study of total war cultures reveals two dimensions that elude accounts of individual nations at war. It establishes how the term total war masks different degrees and forms of mobilization and different understandings of war aims for which individuals and groups can or should fight.

  • 4 - German strategy, 1939–1945

  • from Part I - Grand Strategies
  • Edited by John Ferris, University of Calgary, Evan Mawdsley, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of the Second World War
    Published online:
    05 June 2015
    Print publication:
    23 April 2015, pp 107-131

  • Summary

    All German strategies before and during the Second World War were conditioned by the position of Germany, like its predecessor Prussia, in the middle of Europe. Over several months, Adolf Hitler sent the German navy and air force, both carrying troops, to occupy Denmark and Norway in April 1940. The new plan reduced emphasis on the Atlantic ports, probably in view of the occupation of Norway, and instead placed the emphasis on the left or southern thrust through the Ardennes to the channel, on the correct assumption that the British and French would send troops to assist the invaded countries. The defeat of the Soviet Union would encourage Japan to move in East Asia and keep the United States preoccupied there until Germany was ready to fight and defeat that country. Hitler personally promised Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka Yosuke, that Germany would declare war on the United States when Japan did, and the Japanese received similar assurances from Benito Mussolini.

  • 20 - Collaboration, resistance and accommodation in Northeast Asia

  • from Part III - Occupation, Collaboration, Resistance and Liberation
  • Edited by Richard Bosworth, Jesus College, Oxford, Joseph Maiolo, King's College London
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of the Second World War
    Published online:
    05 June 2015
    Print publication:
    23 April 2015, pp 509-532

  • Summary

    Japan invaded Southeast Asia primarily to acquire oil. Territorial control of the region was incidental, although it suited Japan's ambition to build an autarchic empire. The oilfields of Sumatra offered a possible source of petroleum, but authorities in the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) viewed Japan with suspicion, and the shipping lanes between Sumatra and East Asia were subject to interdiction from British Malaya, the Philippines and French Indochina. Japan's Greater East Asia propaganda invoked a pan-Asian identity and a corresponding Asian nationalism. Much of the population of Southeast Asia was at least nominally Buddhist, Muslim or Christian, but religious practice was often syncretic and animist beliefs remained powerful. The Greater East Asia concept called for an integrated Co-Prosperity Sphere based on the industrial capacity of Japan and Manchuria, the manpower and markets of China, and the natural resources of Southeast Asia. In December 1944, key Japanese and Filipino government personnel left Manila and took refuge in the mountains of northern Luzon.

  • 15 - The war in the Pacific, 1941–1945

  • from Part II - Campaigns
  • Edited by John Ferris, University of Calgary, Evan Mawdsley, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of the Second World War
    Published online:
    05 June 2015
    Print publication:
    23 April 2015, pp 420-454

  • Summary

    The outbreak of war in the Pacific between Japan, the United States and the British Commonwealth nations can be attributed to two primary causes, as fallout from the war in Europe and as a result of a clash in Japanese-American policies in China. American and Japanese interests also clashed as a result of the war in Europe and were tightly linked to events in China. The dividing line between the two Pacific theatres namely, Southwest Pacific Area and Nimitzthe Pacific theatre ran right along the line of the next axis for Japanese offensive operations. With the effective destruction of the Japanese Fleet and the fall of the Philippines imminent, America and her allies were now poised to begin the final destruction of Japan. The Navy thought a blockade would starve the Japanese into surrender. The Army Air Forces was just as convinced that the strategic bombing campaign would end the war.

  • 21 - Logistics by land and air

  • from Part III - Fighting Forces
  • Edited by John Ferris, University of Calgary, Evan Mawdsley, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of the Second World War
    Published online:
    05 June 2015
    Print publication:
    23 April 2015, pp 608-636

  • Summary

    The Second World War was a war of mobility, and within that nothing was more important than moving supplies to the armies, navies and air forces in the field. This movement of ammunition, food and new/replacement equipment is often described as logistics. The railway was the foundational means of supply for the great land war in Europe. No other transportation system was capable of efficiently hauling such enormous tonnages of supplies, or large numbers of men, over long distances. When compared to railways, trucks were less efficient, required considerably more manpower for the delivery of each ton of supplies, and needed greater support in terms of fuel and repair in order to fulfil their mission. Using air supply was usually a much more expensive option because of the relatively small amount of tonnage that could be carried by plane when compared to rail and road.

  • 16 - The Atlantic war, 1939–1945

  • from Part II - Campaigns
  • Edited by John Ferris, University of Calgary, Evan Mawdsley, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of the Second World War
    Published online:
    05 June 2015
    Print publication:
    23 April 2015, pp 455-484

  • Summary

    The 'Battle of the Atlantic' was the term coined by Winston Churchill in the spring of 1941 for a distinct phase of the war in the Atlantic. The initiative in the Atlantic war fell to the Germans, whose Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe were woefully unprepared for a major naval war. The essence of British trade defence was avoidance of the enemy. Although the British Commonwealth system of trade defence was not foolproof, it worked fine against large merchant raiders in the North Atlantic. Its greatest test would come, however, from an unconventional oceanic threat to convoys: the U-boat. The value of the U-boat as a commerce raider was understood from the Great War, during which Britain was brought to the brink of disaster by submarine attack in 1917. While a large group of U-boats patrolled unsuccessfully south of Iceland, a second concentration along the Sierra Leone convoy route gave the British serious trouble throughout the summer.

Page 310 of 771