THE MISSION OF 1ATF

Before an analysis of 1ATF's combat performance can be made, it is necessary to consider the balance of capabilities between the Task Force and the enemy forces it confronted. Combat capability is the product of a number of elements including strength, weapons, mobility, communications, experience, training and intelligence. Tying these elements together and providing an intellectual framework for them were the competing military doctrines of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare.

When it arrived in Phuoc Tuy province in June 1966, 1ATF aimed to substantially reduce VC/PAVN military capability and, in so doing, to provide a security shield behind which the Republic of Vietnam could continue with political, economic and social reforms and the improvement of living conditions for the provincial population. These reforms, it was expected, would undermine the appeal of the enemy's political manifesto. The combined pressures of these reforms, together with the military pressure applied by the Task Force, ARVN and other government and Free World forces would cause the enemy's military capability and political support to wane, and that segment of the province's population hostile to the government would begin to move to a neutral or pro-government position. To achieve its role of providing the security shield, the Task Force planned to dominate the enemy militarily and to cut it off from its principal source of support, food, intelligence and manpower: the local population. All this was classic counter-revolutionary war doctrine as defined and practised by the British Commonwealth and adopted by the Australian Army.

AUSTRALIAN COUNTER - REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE DOCTRINE

During the Second World War the Australian Army gained extensive experience in jungle warfare against the Japanese. In particular, the ‘mopping-up’ campaigns in Wewak, Bougainville and New Britain had been characterised by small-unit engagements that presaged the counter-revolutionary campaigns the Australian and New Zealand armies would fight twenty years later in Vietnam. The skills and techniques of jungle warfare were further refined during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and Confrontation (1963–66). But of more importance to later operations in Vietnam was that these campaigns familiarised the Australian and New Zealand armies with the requirements of counter-insurgency.

The previous chapters have explained and measured the combat performance of 1ATF against the VC/PAVN and various friendly forces, including the US Army's infantry. The analysis shows that 1ATF ranked highly in terms of its combat performance in the low-intensity campaign. But to what extent did these fighting skills allow the Task Force to fulfil the mission it had been given?

On 17March 1966, the Australian Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant- General John Wilton, signed a military working agreement with General William Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), which set out 1ATF's role. The general mission of the Australian Task Force was to ‘carry out operations in coordination with and in support of operations of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the United States forces’. Under the agreement, the Task Force remained under the command of the Australian officer nominated as Commander, Australian Task Force Vietnam who was to be ‘responsive to, and under, the operational control’ of COMUSMACV. Although the Australian Task Force was never under the command of US forces, it was under the operational control of the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV). ‘Operational control’ entitled the Commander IIFFV to assign combat tasks to 1ATF. Such tasks could include any of the following: ‘To secure and dominate the assigned … TAOR in … Phuoc Tuy province’; ‘To conduct operations related to the security of Highway 15, as required’; ‘To conduct other operations in Phuoc Tuy province, as required’; and ‘To conduct operations anywhere in the ARVN … [III CTZ] and subsequently in the area of the adjacent province of Binh Tuan in the ARVN II CTZ as agreed by COMAFV and COMUSMACV’.

1ATF's first priority was to establish and secure a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) around its main base at Nui Dat. Once the relatively small TAOR around the Nui Dat base had been secured, the Task Force gradually expanded its TAOR into the more remote, jungle-covered areas of the province. By December 1966 the TAOR had expanded to cover most of the north-west quadrant of the province, including the Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai features overlooking Route 15 and most of Route 2.

This study has analysed the tactical performance of 1ATF in the Vietnam War. It has shown how the Task Force dominated enemy forces in the low-intensity struggle. This was achieved not by the application of massive firepower but through superior tactical techniques, which gave Task Force units the tactical initiative and the opportunity to be the first to open fire. To an extent not matched in other forms of warfare, the smallest details matter in counter-insurgency. Training in the simplest, most detailed skills – bushcraft, silent movement, snap shooting, security at the halt and on the move, navigation and a host of other factors – gave 1ATF patrols the opportunity to fire first in the great majority of contacts. This conferred a significant advantage on Task Force patrols. The results confirmed the truth of the old Army aphorism ‘Sweat saves blood’. Training effort is repaid on the battlefield by improved combat effectiveness and reduced casualties. 1ATF's tactical dominance was strongest in patrol encounters and ambushes of the enemy. Together, these two combat types constituted more than 70 per cent of Task Force contacts with the enemy. Those combat types in which Task Force dominance was marginal or non-existent – such as bunker system attacks, enemy ambushes of Task Force patrols, and mine incidents – represented a small percentage of total contacts. The enemy was unable to conduct operations such that these latter combat types constituted a greater percentage of total contacts, or, to put it another way, they were unable to shift the combat onto those types least favourable to 1ATF. They lost the ability to control their casualties. This was despite the enemy's advantages including superior local knowledge, twenty years of combat experience and, arguably, a better suite of small arms. The Task Force tactical dominance in low-intensity warfare was indicated by loss ratios that heavily favoured 1ATF.