The women of naval and military families were a unique group within eighteenth- century Britain. Like their male counterparts who enjoyed a fraternal relationship with their fellow officers, women were brought together in a sister-like way through their shared experience and membership of the naval and military communities. Although friendship was not inevitable, these communities often became something of an extended family for women, and indeed family connections within the army and navy were plentiful. The daughters and sisters of sailors, soldiers and officers often married into these communities. The cycle was further perpetuated; naval wives often became naval mothers and, as we saw in Chapter 3, many boys followed their fathers into the armed forces.2 Often separated from their husbands and/or families due to service at sea or abroad, naval wives in particular drew on the support of other naval and military men and women. They looked to other wives for solace, friendship and understanding. Women also relied on information and support from naval officers. Whilst correspondence played a key role in most elite and middle-class women's lives during this period, naval and military women were particularly dependent on it.

Whilst relatively few accounts from ordinary seamen survive, they do reward our close attention. Ordinary seamen did not have or need, on the whole, the same degree of patronage required by officers. The navy's demand for men throughout the century, and particularly during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, meant that men who sought active employment (and indeed even those who did not) were able to find it. Whilst many men embraced naval life and fulfilled their duties, life at sea was rarely an easy or a comfortable one. A tyrannical captain and an inactive situation could easily lead to discontent, bad conduct and eventually desertion. Although ordinary sailors had few means at their disposal to extract themselves from a bad ship or situation, an unhappy seaman was willing to try. Writing in 1812, Benjamin Stevenson hoped to ‘get clear’ of HM Sloop Halcyon, writing to his sister:

The men of the lower deck had varied experiences of life at sea. Whilst some thrived in the discipline of shipboard life and the heat of battle, others struggled to forge themselves a place within this wooden world.

In describing events during the Wars of Independence, both Scottish and English chroniclers often lauded the actions of their heroes in the fight against English domination or Scottish rebellion. At the same time, these chroniclers were forced to concede that the type of war fought in Scotland and northern England was one in which violence and destruction were to the fore. Similarly, medieval knightly warriors could perceive of themselves as figures of chivalric virtue, while at the same time undertaking violent acts of spoliation and devastation in enemy territory. This dichotomy of views, in which the medieval ‘ideal’ of the soldier sat somewhat uncomfortably alongside the contemporary reality, is investigated further in chapter 5. In this section, the idealised view of warfare is temporarily disregarded in place of an investigation of the realities of fourteenth-century conduct during the Anglo-Scottish conflict. How did contemporary soldiers behave when on campaign in the countryside, when attacking an urban community, when dealing with religious institutions and when faced by their fellow combatants? What was the nature of wartime damage, and what was the rationale behind this devastation? And how did these actions compare with those of ‘the enemy’?

War in the Countryside

Hewitt has argued that ‘devastation called for neither skill nor courage nor strength. It afforded no opportunity for personal distinction. Much of it was no more than arson.’ Devastation was, however, the principal and most effective weapon of Scottish troops during the Wars of Independence. Robert I ruthlessly devastated large areas of Scotland to enforce his kingship on Balliol and Comyn supporters, before later expanding the geographical scope of such devastation to northern England and Ireland. Bruce Scots attempted to win regions back from Balliol allegiance by means of intimidation, burning the lands of those who supported the alternative regime. Bruce armies targeted Galloway in particular, and Fife to a lesser extent, as areas of Balliol support. Lothian and the Borders were attacked as areas of English control that had to be reconquered. Andrew Murray, praised by Scottish chroniclers as one of the principal war leaders of the Bruce cause, was at the forefront of these destructive attacks. Walter Bower's eulogy for the Bruce Scottish leader provides tales of Murray's fight for Scottish freedom.

Two Kings in One Kingdom: A Scottish Military Collapse? (1332–34)

Peace between England and Scotland was agreed in 1328, bringing to a close thirty-two years of conflict. Ratified at Edinburgh and Northampton, the peace treaty did not last. The fragile peace was undermined by the unresolved issue of territorial claims held by a group of English and Anglo-Scottish nobles known as the Disinherited. Their desire to gain or regain Scottish territories provided Edward III with a means to recommence the war with Scotland. Led by Edward Balliol, son of the deposed King John, the Disinherited plotted the forcible seizure of the lands they claimed. This was undertaken at first with the complicity of Edward III, but soon after with the English king's active personal involvement. The death of Thomas Randolph, Scottish Guardian and loyal lieutenant of Robert I, provided the opportunity for the Disinherited to attack Scotland while the kingdom lacked obvious leadership. Aware of Balliol's imminent invasion, the Scots met in council at Perth around 2 August 1332 to elect Randolph's replacement. A new Guardian was chosen but only ‘efftyr gret and lang dyssentyown’. The choice of Earl Donald of Mar fell upon a Scottish noble whose allegiance to the Bruce cause in the face of a Balliol alternative was far from guaranteed.

Following his election as Guardian, Mar ordered the gathering of two armies, one on each side of the Firth of Forth, to guard the coast in anticipation of Balliol's seaborne attack. Mar himself led the northern levies while Earl Patrick of March commanded the southern forces. Not knowing where the Disinherited would land, the Bruce Scots could do little more, but their wait was brief. On 6 August 1332 Balliol and his forces landed at the Fife port of Kinghorn. The only immediate opposition to the invaders came from local levies led by the earl of Fife, but the earl's forces were driven off by the Disinherited archers who were the first ashore ahead of the menat-arms. With this early success achieved Balliol and his army marched inland to Dunfermline. The town held important political and religious significance and from here Balliol could begin to propagate his claims to legitimacy. Encamped at the long-established burial place of Scottish kings, Balliol could claim locally that he was in the ascendant and the true king of Scotland.

The richness of English sources has enabled scholars to explore English military organisation in great detail. Historians of Scottish military history are less fortunate. Administrative records relating to the organisation of war in fourteenth-century Scotland are practically non-existent, and this lack of evidence makes the discussion of Scottish military affairs difficult. Still, it remains a subject worthy of attention if Scottish military behaviour is to be properly understood. The means by which Scottish armies were assembled, the form these forces took, the types of soldier recruited, and the means by which they made war, are all relevant subjects of study. Likewise an understanding of warriors’ reasons for fighting, their suitability for that purpose and their abilities in combat, provide the basis upon which further discussion of chivalric behaviour and conduct can be built.

Scottish Military Organisation

The system by which Scottish armies were summoned to fight has been the subject of considerable analysis, although the absence of summonses, musters and pay rolls makes it a difficult area of study. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Scottish armies from at least the reign of David I onwards were summoned according to two distinct forms of service. The first was performed as an obligation defined by charters, and determined when individuals were awarded territories by the crown. This service is most easily described as ‘feudal’. The system concerned the elite of the Scottish army, the well-armed and mounted knights and men-at-arms. In Scotland this only amounted to a small core of troops but they remained of importance on campaigns as well as for garrison duty. The second form of military summons was based upon those who performed military service in response to a muster of the ‘army of Scotland’. Originating before the ‘feudalisation’ of Scotland, and continuing as a means of service for those below knightly status, a summons of the ‘exercitus Scoticanus’ involved the array, in theory, of all men aged between sixteen and sixty who might serve for up to forty days. This force provided the bulk of the infantry for large Scottish armies involved in either external warfare or, more usually, to face invasion or internal unrest. The infantry possessed only basic equipment and received little training but they provided sheer weight of numbers to reinforce the smaller, better armed contingents.

Research into medieval military history in recent years has focused increasingly on the careers of individual soldiers. The creation of the database, ‘The Soldier in Later Medieval England’, has enabled detailed analysis of warriors of various types, and of different nationalities, who fought in English service in France during the fifteenth century. This focus has allowed detailed consideration of the extent to which the Hundred Years War witnessed the increasing professionalisation of the medieval warrior, as he took what had been an obligation and transformed it into an occupation. A lack of record evidence similar to that which has survived for medieval English armies means that similar work on the careers of Scottish soldiers has been largely absent. Although analysis has been undertaken on the political careers of important figures and families in contemporary Scottish history, their military careers have not been considered in detail. Chronicle sources provide a useful alternative to record evidence with their often detailed depictions of battles, sieges and raids, and the participants therein. Scottish literary sources, although written after the events described, are based in part on earlier works and therefore provide useful detail on the military careers of prominent men. As already suggested, these sources are not without their problems. Scottish chronicles at times give prominent place in their accounts to the ancestors of families prominent at the time their authors were writing. They also sometimes rewrote historical events to better suit the political reality of their own time, illustrated by the differing depictions of Robert the Steward following the succession of the Stewart dynasty to the throne. English chroniclers too provide essential detail of military activity, often reproducing official correspondence regarding battlefield casualties, captured enemies, and the leaders of invading forces. Chronicles were also the means by which many warriors’ deeds were remembered, and it is probable that medieval soldiers themselves recognised this fact. This and other evidence will provide the basis for exploration of Scottish military careers in this period.

Only four years after the end of the First Scottish War of Independence in 1328, Anglo-Scottish conflict began anew in 1332. The war continued sporadically until a peace deal was agreed in 1357 as part of the negotiations for the release of the captured King David II. This conflict has, until relatively recently, received little detailed analysis. Much of what has been produced has focussed on the war as a time of fragmentary military opposition to English and pro-Balliol forces by a group of self-interested individuals, fighting for personal territorial and political gain. For some historians of mid fourteenth-century Scotland, the Scottish war effort was barely an effort at all as many who purported to support the dynasty established by Robert I sided with the alternative Balliol regime or even with Edward III. This portrayal of the renewed conflict from 1332 onwards reflects the views of contemporary Scottish chroniclers. Although mostly writing in the years following the cessation of conflict in 1357 they continued to reminisce about earlier military successes under Robert I. In so doing they allowed the Bruce victories and the romance of the war fought between 1296 and 1328 to overshadow the history of the years that followed. The pervasive nature of this orthodoxy is demonstrated in modern accounts of the war of 1332–1357 which continue to depict a period of civil war and internal strife within Scotland; rival nobles advancing private interests ahead of the independence of the kingdom; a young and naïve David II residing in France, out of touch with the realities of the changing political situation back home; and the war with England only gradually turned towards slow and painstaking recovery against Disinherited and/or English forces.

This was the historical perspective of Bruce Webster in 1998 when he focussed on the perceived nadir of Scottish fortunes in the years without royal leadership. Still, Webster's article was important because it provided balance to a well established orthodoxy advanced by historians of the reign of Edward III. For some historians of fourteenth-century England the war in Scotland was little more than an inconvenient sideshow to the more significant and successful war in France.

When war in Scotland recommenced in 1332, it appeared rather quickly that the Bruce establishment of the kingdom was in danger of collapse. The twin threats of a return to Balliol kingship, and English conquest of southern Scotland, must have appeared likely outcomes in the aftermath of the crushing Bruce battlefield defeats at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. And yet the war continued. Edward Balliol, for all that he retained support in Scotland, and could count on the military assistance of English field armies, was unable to impose his will sufficiently on the Scottish people. Edward III, despite his military effort and personal involvement in the war with Scotland, could not ensure the stability of the Balliol regime, or conquer Scotland outright. Indeed he was unable even to conquer southern Scotland and retain it against Bruce counter-attacks. Why then, after all the setbacks that befell the Bruce Scottish war effort, were they ultimately successful in repulsing attempts at a Balliol/English takeover?

The Bruce Scottish war effort was a well organised and, more often than not, efficient operation. Leadership lay in the hands of either the king or, in his absence, the various men who were appointed Guardians to act in his stead. In the aftermath of catastrophic defeats, for example, immediately after Halidon Hill or Neville's Cross, war leadership suffered from a power vacuum effect. This was, however, almost always a short-term problem. With the return of leadership in the form of a newly-appointed Guardian, wartime endeavour was once more pushed forward effectively. Scotland's leading military figures were capable of fighting small-scale warfare in their localities, undertaking such activities most notably under Robert the Steward, when control of the war was devolved upon more military-minded individuals. Bruce Scottish success during the conflict as a whole came about, however, as a result of a national war effort. The victory over the forces of David Strathbogie at Culblean in 1335, for example, witnessed the combination of northern levies with the knightly retinues of southern Scotland. The first raid into England in 1340 involved the combined forces of the earls of March and Sutherland. In all three campaigns that led to pitched battles, the kingdom of Scotland was represented as an entity as men from all regions served in the armies involved.

Having observed the nature of Scottish conduct during the years of conflict between 1332 and 1357, I now examine the judgements that were formed concerning soldiers and warfare. Two types of sources will be examined. Firstly, contemporary chroniclers provided commentary on the events of their day including extensive discussion of warfare. Chronicles, to some extent, reveal the perceptions of the individual authors. They also set their comments within a local context. Yet by absorbing and regurgitating royal propaganda, and giving voice to ‘nationalistic’ feelings, they also – to some degree – rise above the personal and the parochial. Of course, chronicles were not unbiased. They are predominantly the product of religious men without battlefield experience. Their description of warfare was naturally coloured by their spiritual beliefs and inherent Christian values, as well as by their own place within the social hierarchy. In order to gain a more rounded view of how war was perceived, it is important to seek an understanding of the combatant's view of the business of war. For some men, war increasingly became an occupation, one for which they had trained and into which they had invested varying sums of money in order to ensure their personal safety and to achieve a financial return. Nonetheless, for the medieval warrior there was more to fighting than simply money. Alongside the practical consideration of profit, medieval soldiers also sought more idealistic rewards in their desire to achieve honour, prowess and renown. Crucial to an analysis of the perception of war as portrayed by both chroniclers and soldiers is establishing a contemporary definition of acceptable behaviour – that is, in effect, contemporary understanding of the concept of chivalry.

Unfortunately, the sources available for this period of Anglo-Scottish warfare provide serious challenges for analysis of contemporary perceptions of war. No contemporary Scottish chronicle material survives. Accounts of the Second War of Independence compiled by John of Fordun, Andrew Wyntoun and Walter Bower were written sometime after the events of 1332–1357. Fordun's source compilation, constructed in the 1380s, has been shown to have incorporated now-lost chronicle material produced by clerical writers in St Andrews. As a continuator of Fordun's work writing in the 1440s, Bower likewise reproduces such material in his own chronicle, and adds further to it with sources of his own.