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Beginning with Harry Truman and the Korean War, America’s so-called “first limited war,” too often US leaders have refused to admit that the US is at war, been unclear about what they want, and failed to seek victory. Helping drive this is broken ideas about limited war that intertwine all US thinking about war and poisoned the US ability to fight any war. We need a clear foundation for critically analyzing our wars. The only thing that provides this is the political aim. Do we seek regime change, or something less than this? Anything less is a limited political aim. Our definitions of and ideas about limited war are generally based upon the military means used, something too subjective to provide a basis for analysis. You must understand the aim to understand the nature of the war. If you don’t understand the nature of the war, it is hard to figure out how to win it. Cold War works on limited war also taught us to not seek victory, which injured the US ability to do just this. If you aren’t trying to win the war, you aren’t trying to end it. This leaves us with “forever wars.”
All wars are fought under constraints. Wars for limited aims generally suffer from more numerous and intent constraints because the value of the political objective sought tends to be lower, and thus states will often do less and pay less for a shorter time. The most important constraints are the value of the enemy’s political objective, time, internal public opinion, the international political environment (which usually means third-party nations with an interest in your war), geography, and the military means (which includes nuclear weapons). Military and political leaders need to understand how these constraints affect their ability to fight and win the war, and they must also determine whether the constraints are actual or self-imposed, and, if they are self-imposed, whether or not they are wise. The constraints are examined via examples from the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq Wars.
dedicate sufficient forces and use them decisively. In the Korean War, the US failed to grasp opportunities to decisively defeat the enemy and failed to commit forces sufficient to bring about a quick conclusion to the struggle. The result was an attritional stalemate. In both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the US overestimated and misunderstood the effectiveness of airpower. Moreover, the US has also too often failed to understand that winning in a counterinsurgency struggle hinges upon three key factors: gaining the support of the people, eliminating insurgent sanctuaries, and isolating the insurgents from outside support.
How can you achieve victory in war if you don't have a clear idea of your political objectives and a vision of what victory means? In this provocative challenge to US policy and strategy, Donald Stoker argues that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war, particularly limited wars. He reveals how ideas on limited war and war in general evolved against the backdrop of American conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. These ideas, he shows, were flawed and have undermined America's ability to understand, wage, and win its wars, and to secure peace afterwards. America's leaders have too often taken the nation to war without understanding what they want or valuing victory, leading to the 'forever wars' of today. Why America Loses Wars dismantles seventy years of misguided thinking and lays the foundations for a new approach to the wars of tomorrow.