Summarizing, I detail the leverage sources for “weak” local COIN proxies. As postcolonial military intervention conceptualizes local partner regime success as a fundamental component of a successful foreign military intervention, local allies have much political influence over wealthy intervening patrons. Local allies that offer political inputs necessary for the COIN effort can capitalize on their indispensable role to extract concessions and assert influence over intervening wealthy patrons. Comparing the nine wars, I find consistency in local ally compliance, with one-third of requests from intervening forces resulting in compliance, one-third partial compliance, and one-third noncompliance. Interestingly, rates of local compliance had little impact on war outcome as intervening forces did not always offer great advice to local partners, and stronger local partners, such as Sri Lanka, that were more capable of combatting insurgents, could simultaneously resist the policy prescriptions of intervening patrons. These findings show the complexity of COIN by proxy, and should temper expectations about how much local reform can (and perhaps should) be coerced by intervening patrons.

I propose a model analyzing patterns in local compliance in response to requests from intervening COIN allies. I argue four primary variables affect the likelihood of compliance with policies proposed by intervening forces: (1) the capacity of the local partner to implement the requested policy, (2) whether the respective interests of the local and intervening forces converge or diverge over the policy, (3) the dependency of the intervening ally on the local regime to implement the requested policy, and (4) acute external threats from insurgent forces. The theory contends that these are key to understanding the seemingly curious behavior of local COIN partners, who at times seem to undermine the strength of a joint COIN effort by remaining obstinate against key reforms promoted by intervening patrons. Instead of presuming local allies comply with such requests when it is in their interest to do, and refuse when their interests diverge, I argue there is a specific pattern of interaction between interests, and the reliance of foreign intervening forces on local actors to implement policy, that affects the likelihood of compliance by local partners with policy demands.

Detailing the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka this chapter provides a list of policy requests from New Delhi to Colombo and the rate of Sri Lankan compliance from 1986 to 1989. Providing a summary of the Indian-Sri Lankan counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the alliance, including the unique dynamics of New Delhi initially supporting the Tamil insurgents to later sending troops into Tamil regions of Sri Lanka to fight Tamil separatists alongside representatives from the Sri Lankan regime in Colombo. An overestimation of its ability to coercively influence both the Tamil insurgents as a proxy faction and the government in Colombo as a proxy ally backfired, costing New Delhi both politically and militarily. Overall, similar to other interventions, local compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of Indian and Sri Lankainterests, interacting with Indian dependency on Colombo to implement particular policies. There are 79 Indian policy requests to Colombo identified and detailed, including electoral, law enforcement, and governance policies as well as policies to address Tamil grievances.

Introduces the big questions asked in this book, namely: When do intervening forces have coercive leverage over local partners in large-scale counterinsurgency interventions? When can local partners coerce their powerful patrons? What makes these partnerships so notoriously problematic? This chapter specifies why local allies matter in counterinsurgency and what political dynamics have changed from the colonial to postcolonial era of intervention, including the effect of local partners exercising (nominal) legal sovereignty that provides important political opportunities for local partners. The chapter also summarizes the argument that certain structural incentives embedded within intervention motivate local counterinsurgency proxies to comply with certain requests from intervening patrons, while defying others, detailing that the record on local compliance is varied.

Detailing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1989 this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the Soviets to the Afghans and the rate of Afghan compliance from 1978 to 1980. Providing a summary of the Soviet-Afghan counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the alliance, including the Soviet takeover of the Afghan state in 1980. Instead of asking its Afghan partners for new reforms, Moscow instead chooses to use internal Soviet agents embedded in Kabul to carry out requests within the Afghan regime. The chapter identifies and details 21 policy requests from 1978 to 1980 that pre-date the Soviet takeover of the Afghan state. Afghan compliance with those requests are remarkably similar with rates of compliance in other interventions, including the US intervention in Afghanistan. Soviet requests include negotiating with local powerbrokers and expanding governance structures.

After the Italian declaration of war came the period of their short-lived ‘parallel war’, where they attempted to fight independently of Germany in the theatre. Chapter 2 highlights the great numerical disparity between the scarce British and Commonwealth forces spread from the Middle East to Gibraltar versus those of Italy. Despite this lack of resources, British theatre commanders recognised the need to make inroads into Italian sea communications, and they also received clear direction from Whitehall to pursue this objective. Consequently, the failure to do so was not for lack of will at any level of command, but a question of means. The scattered, incoherent efforts that were made are shown to have been completely ineffectual, with British success against the Italians in North Africa during 1940 instead being the product of a series of other factors. Nevertheless, this period set important foundations for an anti-shipping campaign in terms of the recognition of the vulnerability of Italian sea routes and the need for greater resources to prosecute it.

Despite the qualified successes of Operation ‘Crusader’, Britain was faced with a disastrous turn of events in early 1942. The entry of Japan to the war had compelled a redistribution of force to the Far East, while some key British losses and new in-theatre German commitments had further redefined the Mediterranean balance of power. Chapter 5 outlines how the British were forced to adopt a defensive posture throughout the theatre, as their gains from ‘Crusader’ were rapidly reversed. As the Axis then advanced into Egypt, Malta was subjected to an intense aerial siege and came perilously close to being starved into submission. The difficulties in conducting anti-shipping operations during this period were numerous. Yet in a reversal of the thesis advanced by historians such as van Creveld and Gladman, the chapter demonstrates that significant sinkings (of over 300,000 tons) were achieved during this period. The continued attrition was greatly troubling for the Axis, contributing to a shipping shortage that was to reach crisis point later in the year.

This book opens with a discussion of the importance of the Mediterranean to the British Empire, highlighting its role as a ‘vital artery’ of communication between the eastern and western worlds. By examining the changing position of the Mediterranean in British strategic policy from the construction of the Suez Canal through to the Italian declaration of war in 1940, it shows how important the Mediterranean would be in the event of another global war. However, British foreign policy in the late interwar period included numerous efforts to keep Italy neutral, allowing the Mediterranean to be denude of military assets in favour of their deployment against threats elsewhere. Consequently, these decisions led to a difficult context in which to plan realistically for war in the Mediterranean, and the subsequent paucity of British forces stationed there at the start of hostilities. It was this situation which set the foundation for early failures in the anti-shipping campaign. The pre-war planning debates did, however, see the British develop an appreciation of the importance of cutting Axis sea communications, even if they initially lacked the military power to do so and were initially restricted by legal criteria prohibiting attacks on merchant shipping in most cases.

Chapter 6 begins by illustrating the respective positions of each side by September 1942. It shows that while the Axis position can in retrospect be viewed as highly precarious, the British evinced real concern about a complete collapse in Egypt. It highlights the resurgent emphasis that was placed on the Mediterranean from Whitehall, and on anti-shipping operations by the theatre commanders. These attacks were pursued with a ruthless prioritisation; even after clear evidence that some Axis vessels were carrying British prisoners of war. This allowed anti-shipping operations to thrive, aided by the effective use of intelligence to target the most critical cargoes of fuel and ammunition. As a result, over the three-month period, ninety-five vessels of nearly 200,000 tons were sunk, with grave effects on the Axis. These sinkings helped curtail the final Axis offensive in Egypt and contributed to the vital British victory at El Alamein by depriving the Axis of essential fuel and ammunition. In contrast to arguments put forward by scholars such as van Creveld, Barnett and Gladman, the book uses a mix of Italian, German and British material to conclusively show that the supply shortages suffered by the Axis were primarily the result of seaborne sinkings.

The failure of Italy’s ‘parallel war’ was followed by turmoil caused by a combination of German intervention in the theatre and the British decision to send aid to Greece. The shift in focus towards what would be a disastrous Greek expedition resulted in neglect of the Axis sea lanes with North Africa, and abortive efforts at interdiction were made in the Adriatic instead. Yet, as this chapter shows, there were also positive developments in the campaign. New types of more suitable equipment and weaponry were employed, accompanied by the beginnings of a learning process to develop new tactics and procedures and to incorporate new technologies. This offered the potential for greater efficiency in anti-shipping operations, but it was only from April onwards that significant attention was again paid to them. Sinking rates promptly increased and, although the overall required Axis supply quotas were generally met, the losses did cause logistical pressure in certain key areas. While anti-shipping operations had been relatively limited in terms of quantity and effect over the first year of the war in the Mediterranean, an important foundation was laid in terms of recognition of their importance, increasing priority and operational learning. This provided the platform for what would be become a decisive campaign within the Mediterranean war.