Implementing treaties and policy papers, particularly when they are the result of a precarious compromise between multiple international players, is notoriously troublesome in the functioning of coalitions. A coalition grand strategy is shaped by usually conflicting national war aims, which are the products of distinct domestic considerations and strategic views. That is why general agreements are often followed by implementation documents providing an operational framework. These, however, are rarely flexible enough to survive contact with the enemy, as well as unpredictable situational changes. The implementation of the London Treaty is a clear example.

Leading lesser allies is a classic feature of coalition warfare. That was Britain’s task in the Entente. Through diplomacy and blackmail, London tried to reconcile Rome’s national interests with the needs of the Entente.

The Peace conference was the climax of Anglo-Italian relations. Traditional interpretations of it need to be significantly revised to fully grasp how and why Italy’s victory was ‘mutilated.’

Caporetto had changed the very nature of Italy’s war from an offensive war into a struggle for survival. Italian armed forces, morale, supplies and finance needed to be bolstered, and Britain made the greatest effort – but not for free.

Anglo-Italian ‘traditional friendship’ was a widely-assumed principle in European diplomacy during the second half of the 19th Century. But at a closer look, Anglo-Italian relations were less idyllic than it seemed.

Anglo-Italian relations played a major role in shaping how Britain and Italy participated in World War I. This book reconstructed how the idea of a ‘special partnership’ between the two countries came to fruition in Italian and, to a lesser degree, British elites. This was a largely artificial concept based on history and cultural heritage, and was not complemented by a deeper mutual understanding, as revealed by the persistent stereotypes that characterised the perception the two peoples had of each other and that marred their relations, especially in British eyes. Italy was the most solicitous in emphasising Anglo-Italian traditional friendship because it needed a stronger partner to deter its European competitors, whereas Britain was more interested in ensuring the European balance of power and safeguarding its imperial interests.

The Caporetto disaster, together with the Russian collapse, threatened the very existence of the Entente. The Allies reacted with unprecedented speed and resolution, accelerating inter-allied integration.

After the signing of the German Treaty, interest in the Peace Conference in international public opinion began to wane, and many governments shifted focus to post-war economic and social needs and demobilisation problems. But not in Italy. The newly appointed Prime Minister was Nitti, who chose Tittoni as Foreign Minister. They had to cope with an increasingly desperate domestic situation. The United States was holding up a badly needed credit of $25 million and increasing discontent in the Italian peasantry – largely caused by unfulfilled promises of land re-distribution – threatened the very institutional structures of the nation.

Turning a friend into an ally might appear to be an easy job. The case of Britain and Italy at the outbreak of World War I shows how uneven and contested such a process really is. Anglo-Italian friendship was an obvious element of European international relations in the Belle Époque. Britain had sponsored Italian unification in 1861, which was subsequently consolidated mainly thanks to the Pax Britannica; furthermore, the two countries had strong commercial ties; they shared the same liberal values and seemed to have close colonial and Mediterranean interests.

The Treaty of London detailed the post-war Italian gains and wartime inter-allied coordination in Europe, but it only vaguely mentioned the colonies. Negotiations over the post-war colonial settlement revealed how little British and Italian goals really overlapped.

Greater inter-allied collaboration spurred by Caporetto did not iron out all the differences between the Allies. They re-emerged during the formulation and implementation of Allied grand strategy for 1918 and in the early peace-planning talks that occurred in parallel in Allied countries.

As the end of the war approached, inter-Allied competition came more clearly to the surface, as did Italian Adriatic ambitions. This cast a shadow on the Peace Conference, and particularly on Anglo-Italian relations.

To break Austria-Hungary, the Allies resorted to an unprecedented propaganda campaign. Britain and Italy were at its forefront, which seemed to suggest that the two countries shared a common position on the settlement of the Austrian Adriatic littoral. It was a key misunderstanding.