Revisionist literature portrays a British counter-terror stretching across 1948–9, if not longer. This chapter shows how, in fact, counter-terror was ‘bureacratised’ in 1949, becoming far more controlled but also larger-scale, with ‘structural violence’ (slow-burn long-term reduction in life chances due to deportation, huts burned etc.) taking off as excess killings declined. Meanwhile, the insurgents tried, and failed, to establish main bases and larger forces. On failing, they switched to attempting to build multiple, local-based company-level forces, more indirect roots towards growing their strength. This sent incident levels soaring again. This chapter therefore revises the revisionist accounts, but just as importantly tells a cohrent story about the main-base strategy that the MCP hoped would set it on the path to victory, and its replacement strategy of building from more numerous, smaller base areas.

The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is a valuable case study in the coercive use of air power. Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign demonstrates the danger of employing a punishment approach against a subnational actor in a multi-sided internal conflict. Strategies of collective punishment, blockade, and decapitation have all malfunctioned against a stubborn and resilient Houthi adversary. The early audit from Yemen endorses a denial strategy, supports the growing orthodoxy that air attack is most effectively applied in support of ground forces, and offers insight on the relative utility of interdiction and close air support for that purpose. The Saudi-led coalition’s performance also underscores how difficult it is to achieve positive objectives with proxy warfare, regardless of air support. This chapter dissects the campaign, assesses its effectiveness, and draws lessons about air power’s ability to influence the outcome of similar complex civil war scenarios elsewhere.

This chapter examines the new architecture of air power enabled by remote warfare. The development of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) such as the Predator and Reaper, combined with global communication networks, manned aircraft, and precision-strike capabilities, created a far-flung kill web that exploited permissive skies to target pernicious threats. Leveraging local surrogates and special operations forces along with increasingly sophisticated sensors and weapons, RPAs rendered high-value terrorists, enemy concentrations, and military infrastructure visible and vulnerable in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Somalia. Persistent surveillance-strike capabilities reduced risk to US and allied forces and fostered rapacious demand for RPAs as contemporary air warfare became increasingly remote, digitized, and precise. As the kill web’s architecture evolved, RPAs became vehicles of political expediency. Yet new questions emerged about the allure and efficacy of remote warfare and air power operations in countries not at war with the United States.

NATO’s 1999 air campaign over Kosovo represents a rare example of a purely coercive air power campaign. Most coercive air campaigns are combined with a ground element, making it difficult to empirically distinguish the specific role played by air power. In Operation Allied Force, though, the prospect of a ground campaign was discussed and no meaningful ground threat materialized. There is also little evidence that Slobodan Milosevic perceived NATO was seeking to generate a threat of invasion. Accordingly, this is an unusual case of a significant military campaign that led to a successful outcome relying on air power alone. NATO did not plan for the campaign to last as long as it did, nor were plans in place that would have guaranteed the Western alliance’s desired outcome. Nevertheless, the campaign achieved NATO’s primary goals. It thus represents an example of a purely coercive military strategy leading to a successful result.