This chapter asks how a new generation of central banks in the interwar period changed their function, away from state financing and financial stability provision, and toward stabilizing prices and avoiding fiscal and financial dominance. The new concept of a central bank as an institutional constraint, imposed from the outside, and movement from a “can do” to a “can’t do” institution, ultimately ended in failure. It made for bad policy and poor outcomes, specifically contributing failure to stem contagion in the 1931 financial crisis. After 1945 a new reinvention of central banking involved the elaboration of a social consensus that bought back ele-ments of the “can do” environment.

The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) was restructured repeatedly between 1926 and 1935, but these restructurings were superficial and incoherent, producing contradictory outcomes. The liberal spirit of the initial 1926-8 reforms dissolved with the onset of the Great Depression. Subsequently, the BNB was endowed with new instruments and tasked with carrying out the interventionist policies adopted in the 1930s, thus paving the way for the bank’s eventual role in the communist planned economy. This chapter focuses on the significance of BNB’s state ownership and on the tight economic conditionality attached to 1926 and 1928 loans sponsored by the League of Nations. By contrasting policies followed in Bulgaria and Greece during the Depression, it challenges Eichengreen’s hypothesis that heavy defaulters and countries leaving the gold exchange standard performed better relative to those that sought to maintain their reputations as decent debtors.

The chapter describe the pivotal role of central banks in stabilizing the international system after 1918. It explains how central bankers were drawn into peace-making efforts, although they had no formal role either in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, or in the League of Nations, the world’s first multipurpose international organization that was set up in the wake of the war. In the 1920s, central banks would play a pivotal role in global governance, aided by the League’s Economic and Financial Organization (EFO), a forerunner of the institutions created at Bretton Woods after the Second World War. The EFO was instrumental in stabilization of central and eastern Europe, helping also to establish new central banks in the region. The chapter concludes by exploring the significance of central bankers’ breach with the EFO after 1928, the creation of the Bank of International Settlements, and the legacy of these developments for global order in the second half of the 20th century.

Established at the behest of the League of Nations to help the country secure an new international loan, the Bank of Greece was regarded with a mixture of suspicion and hostility from its very foundation. The onset of the Great Depression tested its commitment to defending the exchange rate against domestic pressure to reflate the economy. Its policy response has been criticized as being ineffectual and even detrimental: the bank is said to have been unduly orthodox and restrictive, not only during but also after the country’s eventual exit from the gold exchange standard. This chapter combines qualitative and quantitative sources to revisit the Bank of Greece’s decisions during the Great Depression. It argues that monetary policy was neither as ineffective nor as restrictive as its critics suggest, thanks to a continued trickle of foreign lending but also to the Bank’s own decision to sterilize foreign exchange outflows. It reappraises Greece’s attempt to maintain the gold standard after sterling’s devaluation, a decision routinely denounced as a policy mistake. Finally, it challenges the notion that Greece constitutes an exception to the rule that countries that shed their ‘golden fetters’ faster recovered earlier.

Like other developing countries, Poland based its interwar monetary policy on the gold exchange standard. Following a bout of hyperinflation , Władysław Grabski’s 1924 reform led to the establishment of the Bank of Poland. Early efforts to return to the gold standard, however, were not entirely successful. In 1925, an economic crisis weakened the zloty dramatically, before futher monterary reforms were introduced in 1927. Post-war monetary instability made Poland reluctant to abandon the gold standard after 1929 and foreign exchange controls were first introduced as late as 1936. The central banks reluctance to abandon the gold standard contributed to the depth and persistence of the Great Depression in Poland. The chapter thus reveals the challenges faced by a newly-formed country lacking adequate reserves and a financial track record to stabilise its currency; it also points to the path dependent nature of interwar monetary policy: the hyperinflation of 1919-23 and the crisis of 1925 created the belief that any easing of monetary policy would trigger an inflationary spiral. When the Great Depression struck, exchange rate stability trumped all other macroeconomic and financial policy objectives.

This chapter analyses macroeconomic policy, with a focus on monetary policy, relating it to the performance of the economy in Turkey in the Great Depression. The Depression was transmitted to Turkey primarily through a sharp decline in agricultural commodity prices. In response, the government adopted strongly protectionist measures starting in 1929 and pursued import-substituting industrialization. In contrast, Turkey’s macroeconomic policy was cautious. Fiscal policy adhered to the principle of balanced budgets. The policies of the new central bank, established in 1930, were similarly restrained: as a result, the monetary base increased very little before 1938. While this restraint resulted in some appreciation of the currency, Turkey’s economy did better than most others around the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter argues this performance was primarily due to strong protectionism, which paid benefits in the short run, and recovery in the agricultural sector.

The Bank of England and its governor, Montagu Norman, who had a decisive influence on monetary reconstruction after the First World War considered the new Austrian central bank too accommodating of Viennese banks, which clung to a prewar business strategy no longer appropriate to the economic environment. The fraught relationship between the Bank of England and the Austrian National Bank limited Austrian access to the London capital market. Thus, much-needed long-term capital for restructuring and modernizing of the Austrian economy was not available in the quantities needed, only short-term deposits that were not rolled-over after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1931. Austrian National Bank President Reisch was replaced in 1932 by Viktor Kienböck, a former minister of finance who then masterminded Austrian economic policy until the German invasion in 1938. In accordance with the League of Nations, which guaranteed a second international bond of Austria in 1932, Kienböck adhered to the orthodox economic policy paradigm, rigorously defending the currency in the face of growing overvaluation. As a result, Austria’s economy shrank, and by 1937 its GDP stood 14% below its level of 1929.

The interwar decades saw the emergence of central banking institutions in the prosperous white settler ‘dominions’ of Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Canada. Local political and business interests promoted central banks with a view to fostering domestic economic and financial stability, while the Bank of England and British government imagined a chain of central banks across the empire that would support their policies. Given that financial markets in the dominions were underdeveloped, it was difficult for the new central banks control monetary conditions, mirroring problems in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the British discovered that they could not impose their ideas on the dominions, especially when local economic concerns conflicted with those of the imperial centre.

This chapter challenges the conventional chronology of the interwar era that distinguishes the conservative 1920s, when policy makers were preoccupied with the restoration of the pre-First World War liberal economic order, and the revolutionary 1930s, when they reacted to the global economic and financial crisis by pursuing isolationism, state interventionism, and trade blocs. Taking the example of Hungary’s monetary management in the 1920s, it shows that there was more continuity between the two decades than is usually recognized. Due to the dislocations arising in the wake of the war and subsequent peace arrangements, the fragmentation of empires into small ethnonationalist states, and revolutionary and counterrevolutionary political and social upheavals, institutional and policy adjustments in the direction of what was to become mainstream in the 1930s were already budding in the 1920s. The chapter provides empirical evidence of this sneaking nationalization in Hungary’s monetary management, manifest in a combination of adherence to the rules of the gold standard game, on the one hand, and capital-flow neutralization, on the other, depending on what was appropriate to stimulate or sustain domestic economic activity.

Establishing the National Bank of Czechoslovakia was the culmination of an eight-year process. Although Czechoslovak representatives had envisaged an independent monetary institution before founding an independent state, it took a long time to realise their vision. The chapter describes events surrounding the creation of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia and shows how ideas about the bank’s structure and constitution developed between 1919 and 1926. It emphasizes external factors that led Czechoslovak politicians and economic policymakers to establish a bank of issue even before joining the gold standard, thus deviating from their original intentions. The chapter then compares the two competing Czechoslovak monetary authorities (Banking Office of the Ministry of Finance and National Bank of Czechoslovakia) and analyses whether the chosen solution helped to maintain the desired independence of the newly established central bank during its first years of its existence (1926-1934).

To date, research on Latin American central banks in the interwar years has focused on their loss of autonomy due to the slump and subsequent implementation of innovative, countercyclical monetary policies. These policies, although fostering economic recovery, led to higher rates of inflation and exchange-rate volatility. The chapter shows that these policies resulted from more than loss of autonomy and subordination of central banks to governments. In fact, the need for countercyclical monetary policies had been foreseen by foreign advisors to newly established central bank before and during the crisis, but Latin American central bankers had been reluctant to implement them for fear of damaging the credibility of the gold-standard regime. This finally changed with the collapse of the gold exchange standard. In the 1930s, central banks had become effective actors, channeling credit to the real economy and supporting the emergence of state institutions that would promote the development of local industry.

In the 1920s, the Bank of England promoted central banking to preserve London’s control over Indian financial policies and insulate those policies from political changes sweeping the colony. This chapter traces India’s deepening distrust of London in the monetary sphere, and the role envisaged by the Bank of England for an Indian central bank operating under its tutelage. After the failure of efforts to create a central bank in the 1920s, the Bank of England and Whitehall insisted on a privately owned, ‘independent’ central bank as a precondition for Indian constitutional reform. In the end, notions of an independent central bank did not stand up to the vicissitudes of colonial bureaucratic politics. Efforts of the colonial government and the Bank of England to curb the independence of the Reserve Bank of India offer important insights into the early history of central banking in India, but also shed new light on the role central banks in economies undergoing the transition from colonialism to independence.