Chapter 6 traverses the aftermath of Mughal rule as members of the Maratha confederacy, led by the Gaekwads, and officials of the early colonial state in the form of the British East India Company sought to capture Ahmedabad and strategic routes connected to the city. It was in this context that the sons of Khushalchand, Nathushah (1720–1793) and Vakhatchand (1740–1814), became entrenched in financing new forms of political organization by guaranteeing loans to groups seeking the purchase of revenue farms from emerging stately authorities. I call this phase of political-business relations competitive coparcenary. By becoming speculators in land revenue farms and advancing capital to those seeking to establish state power, the Jhaveris tactfully adapted their expertise to new political circumstances. This was a major departure from the high tide of Mughal rule in the seventeenth century when power manifest through warfare. Now, principles of the market and revenue sharing diplomacy became the hallmark of political organization, and the later Jhaveris were central to such emerging diplomacy.

There are several factors in the host country and the country of origin that might cause people to emigrate. Pre-existing historical contacts and a favourable economic situation in the country of destination are amongst the primary elements to influence migrants’ choices. This chapter will examine the political and economic developments in England, and in Flemish and Brabantine cities before the mid fourteenth century, and how they created the conditions for the migration of textile workers. It will be argued that the migratory process was driven by the prior intensity of trade relations, the existence of communication and transportation links, and the relative frequency of travel between the countries, as well as the political situation, which led to some involuntary migration too.

By the late eighteenth century, Mughal power gave way to more pluralistic geopolitics led by the Marathas and representatives of British East India Company authority in India. Chapter 7, a postlude, focuses on how the Gaekwads of Baroda consolidated power in the wake of Mughal dissolution in Gujarat. The political landscape was held together largely by debt relations and novel forms of financial diplomacy. This chapter explores how the Jhaveris, and the analogous Haribhakti family of bankers, became central to post-Mughal political power in Gujarat. The chapter demonstrates how, by the late eighteenth century, the Gaekwads were able to establish and grow their stately influence by relying on a group of elite financiers led by family banking firms. Over time, this led to the accumulation of enormous debt. Such a decisive shift to debt-based sovereignty both enhanced and challenged those in the business of bankrolling the state, and ultimately provided the British East India Company an opportunity to coopt native state formation as a strategy of establishing their colonial hegemony.

One of the ways for immigrants to speed up the process of integration was by expanding their social and business networks. The fact that they arrived as a large group with similar backgrounds (e.g. textile workers, exiles with families) provided them with the basis to form a network of family and friends that would reduce the economic and psychological risk of migration. The evidence confirms this pattern, as the immigrants from the Low Countries maintained closer relationships with their compatriots. They inevitably mixed with the native population; however, as we will see later, their relationships with the English were largely based on business . But what were the strategies the new arrivals used to strengthen their position in the new environment? How did the Flemings create and expand their social and business networks? The present chapter is concerned with exploring the integration process of the immigrant community, and how it reflected on both their daily life and the organization of their trade. It will examine the social and business networks of the Flemish immigrants as evidenced in the surviving testamentary records and through the judicial documents.

Chapter 3 focuses on the final years of Shah Jahan’s rule, including the princely rivalry between Aurangzeb and his brothers for their father’s throne. Through local evidence, I demonstrate that during moments of crisis when members of the state needed ready capital, they relied on the Jhaveris to provide cash loans. The timeliness of loans was the most important factor, since battles for the imperial throne were fought quickly and decisively. Such loans were deployed by princely retinues to muster additional troops and resources. Even the slightest advantage in resources could catapult a prince to emperorship. This chapter traces how the Jhaveri family entered into the risky business of political financing. We learn that their services as merchants, bankers, and financiers were highly valued by Mughal elites, and even bad bets placed on a losing prince did not compromise their exalted positions as preeminent merchants of Gujarat. I characterize this phase of Mughal-Jhaveri relations as political commensalism, for the Mughals benefited immensely from emergency loans, while the Jhaveris neither benefited nor were decisively harmed in any manner.

Taking a pause from direct focus on the Jhaveris, Chapter 4 is an interlude that outlines major shifts across the Mughal Empire between the 1680 and 1720s. I suggest that military campaigns in the Deccan region impinged the Mughal treasury and undermined administration to an extent never seen before. Officials in Gujarat started to engage in behavior that undermined Mughal sovereignty. Yet, they also had little choice as monetary resources were becoming scarce. Financial limitations impacted the quality of state machinery including the upkeep of buildings, delay in salary payments, and even the ability of officials to legitimately demand taxes. Despite this, local Gujarati poems suggest that residents preferred Mughal rule to ruthless attacks from the Maratha marauders, whose periodic raids were increasing in frequency and intensity. After Aurangzeb’s death in 1707, successive Mughal emperors were poorly equipped to revive the grandeur of their ancestors. Their short stints as emperors, sometimes as brief as a few months, led to the further breakdown of Mughal authority. This manifest most clearly in the form of rivalries between Mughal governors sent to control and profit from Gujarat. Insecure in their positions and strapped for cash, these governors turned to assaulting key members of the business fraternity in the city of Ahmedabad.