The arc of our story will show how Morgan evolved from being primarily concerned with providing aid to firms who were his customers to providing aid to the whole system, less centered on individual companies.

In the early nineteenth century the idea of self-making emerged along America’s many frontiers: western lands and growing cities; plus political, commercial, technological, cultural, material, communication, and religious frontiers. These all beckoned, demanding new choices and encouraging new feelings of self-agency. As before, the label “self-made” could point to a flawed person who had gone astray. However, use of the idea of “self-made” began to shift toward positive connotations that sanctified individualism and ambition if applied to religious, social, or patriotic service. Storytellers who grasped that connection transformed self-seeking and ambition from dangers into bulwarks against aristocracy’s evils. Competitors for political power told stories of self-improvement, self-fashioning, and self-making to align themselves with progress for their nation. Electoral politics increasingly induced ambitious candidates to claim that they had risen from lowly origins by their own efforts. Frontier tales of spirited heroes, such as Andrew Jackson and David Crockett, appealed to audiences who appreciated a rough-and-ready masculinity that the Founders had disdained.

We have analyzed how Morgan learned to link the three pools of global reserves during American crises, and the Panic of 1907 was no different. Morgan’s lender of last resort skills were on full display during the panic, the last and most severe of the National Banking Era panics. We analyze sixteen last resort activities (eleven domestic, five international) led by Morgan coordinating the three detached sources of liquidity.

After 1960, well-funded campaigns advanced individualism and reduced support for community-based progressive programs, including Great Society programs. The term “meritocracy” spread quickly, adopted by progressives and conservatives alike. Conservatives asserted that unions, poverty, and public institutions manifested unwillingness to “work hard.” They argued that democracy depended on “free enterprise,” which they imagined could solve all problems. Economic and cultural turbulence energized organizations such as the US Chamber of Commerce and the Horatio Alger Association of Distinguished Americans. Ronald Reagan, George Gilder, Milton Friedman, and others flourished selling individualism. Their accusations of self-made failure shamed anyone who struggled against social or cultural circumstances, racial or gender inequalities, the results of globalization, or inadequate access to education and other opportunities. Presidents Reagan and Clinton both rejected the welfare state and demanded “personal responsibility,” an updated term for self-making. A constant refrain that taxes punish success also drew on the myth and painted the recipients of progressive programs as freeloaders.

With Congress unwilling to authorize another public loan, the proceeds of which would be intended to buy much needed gold for the Treasury, Cleveland and Carlisle cast about for other ways to secure financing. Morgan would eventually create three additional transactions to stave off populist attempts to pursue a full-fledged bimetallic currency regime: one would be accepted, one would be rejected, and one would be executed without government request, approval, or oversight.

Wrestling with the eternal mystery of human agency, seventeenth and eighteenth-century Euro-Americans built cultures in which the idea of self-making could begin to take hold. Along the way they developed new mindsets about self-fashioning, ambition, the value of work, materialist consumption, and whether individuals or communities were the proper beneficiaries of people’s improvement. The eighteenth-century’s prominent cultural movements—the Enlightenment’s intellectual developments and the First Great Awakening’s religious revivals—were both context for and products of the growing legitimacy of human agency. In very different ways, their participants and storytellers engaged in transitions that made it possible to imagine self-making. Cotton Mather and other religious leaders struggled with witch trials, epidemics, and spiritual challenges, including how to respond to the Great Awakening’s popular enthusiasms. In the spirit of the Enlightenment, Benjamin Franklin explored science and politics, invented useful devices and civic institutions. Uncertainties about human agency continued, but there was no doubt about the responsibility for self-improvement to serve God and community.

Farmers sought relief from the 1893 recession by lobbying for an increase in the money supply from newly mined silver. Railroads sought relief by reorganizing their debt, through extended maturities and combinations of smaller roads with larger ones. The specter of bimetallism in the US added to the financial uncertainty following the Panic of 1893 for European investors who became increasingly worried that US debtors would pay them with silver instead of gold. A slow-motion run on the US Treasury’s gold began and then gained steam. Morgan’s own business was not insulated from the turmoil surrounding the Treasury’s gold reserves.

This chapter examines how the theological ideas discussed in Chapter 5 were successfully disseminated throughout English society. To do this it examines the religious split between the established Church of England and non-conformity. The development of the theology self-love, happiness, and interest is examined in the writings of the enormously influential philosopher and theologian Richard Cumberland. It then discusses how this evolved into Latitudinarianism, and examines printed sermons as they commented on these ethical concepts, as well as on consumption and worldly goods. The writings of the Anglican ministers Joseph Butler and Josiah Tucker are examined to show how these ideas became directly linked to economic thought. The concurrent development of non-conformist theology relating to the same concepts is traced through the writings of John Locke on the mind, and the dairy of the student lawyer Dudley Ryder. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury and his theory of polite sociability is also investigated to show how it provided a less austere means to disseminate Locke’s psychology of the mind. Central to this investigation will be the process by which individual selves were able to become comfortable with trusting new institutions by using the concept of interest as a form of commitment.

Mid-nineteenth-century American stories of self-making increasingly oriented toward material ambition rather than service. Values evolved within cultural venues as diverse as advice literature, temperance advocacy, business guidance, and phrenology. Expanding expectations for “self-reliance,” for example, promoted beliefs that alcoholism and status were entirely matters of personal choice and moved mainstream Americans toward accepting self-made success and failure. After the Civil War, more stories offered some version of self-making—always judging, prodding, urging, and rewarding. But no consensus had yet emerged on what it meant, what qualified someone as self-made, or how to measure a “self-made” man’s worth. Whereas Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1872 compilation of traditional biographies praised service and disdained wealth, James D. McCabe, Jr.’s 1871 anthology embraced wealth as a measure of worth. Despite her fame, his volume sold vastly better. His often repeated “We are emphatically a nation of self-made men” glorified a materialist American exceptionalism and a social and economic system that demeaned many while it praised a few.

This chapter moves back to institutions to deal with the general decline in litigation over failed credit that began around 1690, and argues it came about largely because of changes in credit networks. It demonstrates how attorneys’ business moved away from litigation to conveyancing, and how they profited by becoming local credit. It also looks at the increasing use of local summary justice in the Courts of Requests in London, Bristol, and Newcastle to enforce the small debts of poor consumers, as well as the growing use of arrest and imprisonment in the common law courts. While the use of paper currency provided greater liquidity in credit markets, and reduced the overall level of litigation massively, those debtors who went broke began to be treated in a much harsher fashion.

We find it plausible that Morgan’s recurring ability to include subject matter experts in routine syndicates could have been applied to the task of coordinating lender of last resort facilities. This provides at least one plausible explanation for how he developed the skills to act as lender of last resort in the American setting that did not include a central bank.