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Agriculture has been the main source of livelihood for the overwhelming majority of the world's population for thousands of years, from the first production of crops some 8,000 years ago to the start of world wide industrialization in the nineteenth century. The acceleration in the rate of growth of the world population after World War ii was matched by an even sharper acceleration in the rate of growth of agricultural production, from about 1 percent per annum to over 2 percent. The increase of trade relative to output is strong evidence of a growing specialization of agricultural production. Since the beginning of the movement, credit cooperatives have established regional and national organizations for mutual support. In more recent times, these private organizations have been given formal guarantees by governments. Finally, the chapter focuses on extensive growth, modern property rights, intensive growth, consumer protection, competition policy, and the support given to scientific research.
This chapter examines the role of business enterprises as actors in the spread of global capitalism since 1848. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, firms have been the strongest institution to operate across national borders, with the possible exception of the Roman Catholic Church. From the mid nineteenth century tens of thousands of firms, mostly based in Western countries which had experienced the industrial revolution, crossed borders and established operations in foreign countries. The global spread of firms rested crucially on the formal and informal institutions put in place during the nineteenth century, and sometimes earlier. The meltdown of the global economy during the interwar years is an important topic in economic history. Global capitalism had flourished within the context of Western colonialism, and became associated with the political and racial injustice of such regimes. After World War II ended, multinational firms made significant contributions to the reconstruction of a global economy.
This chapter explores the interaction between technological innovation and the global spread of capitalism from 1848 to 2005. It then examines the interaction of technological innovation, the global spread of capitalism, and the varied ability of nations to "catch up" with the technological and economic leaders in the world economy during this period of more than 150 years. Technology is the integration of knowledge, organization, and technique, directed towards material transformations. The importance of incremental innovation underscores the complex relationship between the appearance of a new technology and its adoption. Innovation in transportation and communications technologies was essential to the growth of domestic and international commerce during the period between 1870 and 1914. The rise of industrial capitalism also changed the process of innovation itself. Government policies exerted a direct and indirect influence on innovation in the post-1850 world. Innovation was spurred by the growth of capitalism, but technology had powerful effects on the global spread of capitalism.
This chapter explores whether capitalism existed in ancient Greek between circa 800 BCE and the Common Era. Reintegrating the economies of the past, those of Babylon or those of classical antiquity, into the debate on capitalism presents a series of advantages. It is sufficient to justify the place of ancient Greece in a world history of capitalism, both for the comparative evidence it provides for later and more elaborate economic developments. Although figures or evaluation will be constantly an object of debate, the reality of growth is beyond doubt, and this totally changes the picture of a stagnant society of the old paradigm. Archaeological evidence points not only to population growth but also to growth of per capita production and consumption. By massively increasing the aggregate input of labor, slavery was one of the basic factors of accelerated economic growth in the classical and Hellenistic world.
This chapter assesses the Chinese economic history before the late nineteenth-century development of capitalist firms and markets transforming China's economy. It makes a distinction between economic growth as a general category and industrialization as a more specific species of economic growth. The social organization of agricultural production was based on family farming across varied ecological conditions. Improved technologies of tilling, sowing, fertilizing, weeding, and harvesting spread across the empire after the third century. To understand the institutions that promoted a flourishing commercial economy across and beyond the vast spaces of China's agrarian empire, the chapter looks more closely at how production and exchange were organized. It is difficult to create metrics for early modern era legal practices that are judged by economic effects, but the growth of the porcelain, tea, and silk trades to Europe and colonial America suggest that the Chinese institutional nexus for foreign trade did not stifle exchange in a consequential fashion.
This chapter first examines the literature on law and the rise and spread of capitalism, and shows that much of it pays substantial attention to the unique features of each of the two European traditions, and to the different role played by each in enhancing capitalism. Max Weber was among the first to attribute a significant role to the law in the rise of capitalism. Next, the chapter surveys the development of the law in the core capitalist countries, in four fields of law that are postulated by economic theory as crucial for economic growth: the concept of freedom of contract, the establishment of land registries, patent law, and the formation of business corporations. Before the rise of capitalism, Western European states encouraged technological innovations in two ways, monetary payments and grants of monopoly. Finally, the chapter traces the spread of European capitalist law in these four fields to the rest of the world.
Business enterprises are organized very differently in different countries, and neoclassical economics is built around only one such model. Both historically and across modern economies, business groups are usually organized as pyramids. A family firm controls a first tier of listed companies by holding a dominant equity block in each. Business groups figure prominently in economic history, especially in late industrializers. Japan, an industrial power by the 1920s, was the first non-Western country to industrialize successfully. Large family-controlled business groups may well possess a genuine economic advantage over freestanding professionally run firms in low-income economies. Large pyramidal business groups persist in some highly developed economies. Their controlling families strive to be seen as good citizens, and are often keen to cooperate with popular governments. A high-income economy's Big Push commencement exercise can be traumatic for the graduating class of business group controlling shareholders.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, excavations in Iraq, Syria, and Iran have brought to light the remains of the civilizations that flourished in the ancient Near East in the third to first millennia BCE. Text are available in three ancient Near Eastern languages: Sumerian, Assyrian, and Babylonian. Ancient Mesopotamian societies were complex peasant societies: strongly stratified, state-building societies characterized by a comparatively high degree of urbanization. The environmental conditions determined to a large extent the economic activities. A two-sector paradigm of the Mesopotamian economy has been developed predominantly on the basis of evidence from the third millennium BCE. The model's most sustained challenges come from the documentation for long-distance (and domestic) trade that proves the existence of market-based and profit-oriented commerce supported by complex social and legal institutions, and from evidence dating to the first millennium BCE that shows a period of economic growth driven, inter alia, by increasing monetization and the market orientation of economic exchange.
This chapter assesses the Chinese economic history before the late nineteenth-century development of capitalist firms and markets transforming China's economy. It makes a distinction between economic growth as a general category and industrialization as a more specific species of economic growth. The social organization of agricultural production was based on family farming across varied ecological conditions. Improved technologies of tilling, sowing, fertilizing, weeding, and harvesting spread across the empire after the third century. To understand the institutions that promoted a flourishing commercial economy across and beyond the vast spaces of China's agrarian empire, the chapter looks more closely at how production and exchange were organized. It is difficult to create metrics for early modern era legal practices that are judged by economic effects, but the growth of the porcelain, tea, and silk trades to Europe and colonial America suggest that the Chinese institutional nexus for foreign trade did not stifle exchange in a consequential fashion.
Based on a variety of archival sources, this paper presents estimations for cost of living and living standards for Lima, Peru during the 19th century. During this century Peru experienced deep swings in economic activity marked by the independence wars, the War of the Pacific, and a commodity boom. These new series show that a sizable inflationary period during the guano age had dampening effects on the living standards of the popular class. While living standards peaked by mid 1850s, GDP per capita did not do so until two decades later. These results suggest that the guano bonanza failed to lift working-class living standards above subsistence levels. Even though living standards climbed steadily, almost reaching those of England, all these gains were lost by the end of the century.
By “the first knowledge economy” we refer to the era of the Industrial Revolution from roughly the 1760s to the 1850s, first in Britain and then in selected parts of Northern and Western Europe, with particular attention to Belgium. Only and first in this period did economic growth based upon technological innovation become continuous. There were ebbs and flows to be sure, recessions, even depressions, but still the wealth of the affected nations continued to grow, and, slowly, so too did per capita income of families. Put another way, the so-called Malthusian dictum, that prosperity would fuel population growth that would inevitably be stopped by food shortages, came undone. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, real wages had risen, as had the population in general, and output in agriculture and manufacturing had also risen to meet the new demand.
Since that time the debate has raged as to how the dictum had been broken. What were the key factors that made sustained Western prosperity possible? The answer presented in this book focuses upon mechanical knowledge, derived largely but not exclusively from Newtonian science, and the theoretical underpinnings that it supplied to technological innovation in mining, manufacturing, and the application of steam power more generally. The new knowledge economy displayed many cultural elements – wider circulation of information, new teaching venues, and curricular reforms – more visible first in Britain than on the Continent. None of the elements was more important than the organized body of mechanical knowledge distilled in lectures, textbooks, and curricula. It was what French observers came to call industrial mechanics and it became crucial to technological innovation. When we speak in the present about our knowledge economy, it helps to know where and when an earlier version of it began.
Sometimes the lives of two men and their families open a previously obscured history and point toward the human capital expended, the striving and achievement at the heart of early industrial development. James Watt (b. 1736) of steam engine fame, and his partner, a manufacturer of metal objects, Matthew Boulton (b. 1728), need little introduction. The nature of their partnership does. It offers a paradigmatic example of the human qualities and shared values that propelled early industrial growth. Their partnership embodied a marriage between business sense and mechanical knowledge that together made possible the application of power technology to the mining and manufacturing process. Boulton did not simply supply the capital and Watt the know-how, as has been assumed. In the mid 1770s, Boulton and Watt established a partnership that rested on trust, thrift, mechanical knowledge, technical skill, and market experience.
Almost every successful partnership visible in the first generation of industrialists, from the 1780s to the 1820s, independently replicates the Boulton–Watt relationship. Sometimes the business acumen and mechanical knowledge rested in the same mind; most times it did not, as we shall see in the partnerships at work in textile manufacturing and coal mining. Mr. Clark, whom we met in the introduction, sought to bring his technical skills into contact with Lieven Bauwens, a Belgian but British-trained capitalist with a deep knowledge of the mechanization of cotton manufacturing.
Explanations about economic change are still bedeviled by unspoken philosophical assumptions. When talking about work and prosperity, or lack thereof, or about the production of goods and machines, we assume that the forces at play must be material – money being foremost among them. They have to be countable, movable, and capable of mathematical expression. Being truly scientific when studying economic change means that the historian, whenever possible, must use equations and numbers to express change over time. What a disruption to introduce something as vague as knowledge or education – that is, culture which, it is assumed, must be immaterial.
The unspoken assumptions rest on the old matter/spirit, body/mind dichotomy, with its roots deep in Western thought, both classical and Christian. Seen in this manner, one-dimensional homo economicus responds to material stimuli, rushes to make profit, invents technology when it is needed, and prides himself on the rationality of his choices. For example, when faced with an exorbitant cost of wage labor (even when he does not know, comparatively, that it is exorbitant), he seeks to develop other sources of energy, and in an effort to reduce his wage bill, turns to coal. To caricature the argument, he comes upon the right knowledge that just happens to be there when he needs it. In the eighteenth century, whether engaged in manufacturing or mining, the best means of achieving profitability meant accessing the new, coal-driven steam engine, among other mechanical devices.
The story about the need for technical knowledge to access coal in Northumberland’s deep mines has an analogue in the manufacturing of cotton. For decades, in both industries, we have been told that learned knowledge – as distinct from practice – had nothing to do with the First Industrial Revolution, that skilled artisans who seldom cracked a book held the key to British industrial prowess in cotton. In the production of cotton cloth, emphasis has been laid upon water power as distinct from steam, and thus the knowledge of mechanics – the science of local motion – needed to employ power technology has been neglected.
As with Boulton and Watt, two leaders in mechanized cotton production will have to stand in for the first generation of cotton manufacturers. As a leading cotton baron and one of the subjects of this chapter, John Kennedy (b. 1769) eventually became a wealthy man. In order to assemble his factory Kennedy had to understand different rates of velocity and the impact that a steam engine would have on spinning. Just as important, he had to understand and approve – or alter – plans for the mechanization of his cotton factory drawn up by civil engineers, in this case Boulton and Watt. Eventually Kennedy, in partnership with James M’Connel (b. 1762), figured out how to use the Watt engine effectively, and together they became among the leading cotton industrialists of Manchester.
Boulton and Watt knew that their steam engines, and those that preceded them, were vital for coal extraction, but history has forgotten just how important. Everyone agrees – then and now – that coal was essential in the early stages of what came to be called the Industrial Revolution. By the mid eighteenth century, even foreign observers sensed the growing importance of coal in Britain. In the 1750s French ministers charged with the task of overseeing industry and commerce devoted time and personal energy to assessing the state of manufacturing in both England and France. After seeing for themselves what was happening in England, they reported nervously on the great usage of coal in dyeing, cooking, and heating. Owners of mines can exploit the mines freely; indeed, the French ministers claimed that both owners and workers enjoy a greater freedom in Britain.
How did the British come to tap into the locked-up energy of coal? To answer the question we need look no further than the coal fields of Northumberland. When reading the records of early eighteenth-century mines there, it is routine to find computations made by viewers, as coal engineers were known, explaining how much coal cannot be accessed: “Both these seams in an acre, (to take half and leave half) will yield … 87000 tons at 12 s ten pence rent [and] will amount to £52,000. Little can be expected from a second working, because of fire & the water that lies above which will be let down by working the walls.” Again, the mine of Bowers and Rogers in Northumberland “has in it low and bad top coal, main coal must be won by a pumping Engine & ¾ of coal not worth working … main coal being cast down 7 or 8 fathoms & therefore cannot be wrought without drawing water.” In the same vicinity the viewer reported that “the seam at Monkcaton is 5 quarters & the coal exceeding good and clear, but not winnable, without a fire engine.” In 1749 an eighty-five-year-old miner recalled how it was not possible to get down to the coal in a mine “on account of the water which there was then no other way of drawing but by horses and coals not being so valuable then as now.” Another old-timer recalled “there being no way then for drawing it but by horses which would have been too great a charge.”