Can low emigration rates from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic economy partly explain its relative economic decline over the 19th century? Time series tests of real wage integration show that the Maghreb and Eastern Mediterranean exported enough labourers to experience labour market integration, while the emigration rates of the northern Mediterranean, were not high enough. As the latter group comprised most of the region’s economic weight, the Mediterranean as a whole was held back. The wage gap between the first two groups and the Atlantic economy was the highest, but journey costs relative to wage levels were roughly similar across the Mediterranean. The incentive-vs.-cost arithmetic favoured emigration from the Maghreb and Eastern Mediterranean.

The international banking crisis that began in 2007 has brought the relationship between international banking activities and financial crises to the forefront. The growing reliance on foreign interbank funding by domestic banks has been recognized as a crucial factor in explaining the banking and sovereign debt crisis currently affecting several peripheral European countries. This article shows that the link between financial crisis and international interbank lending is not a new phenomenon; a similar trend can be observed in the Mexican banking sector during the run-up to its 1982 debt crisis. I explore the international activities of Mexican commercial banks in the years preceding the country's default and demonstrate that they became involved in international lending which was funded largely through heavy short-term interbank foreign borrowing. I provide new archival evidence which shows that in intermediating foreign finance with local public and private borrowers, Mexican banks incurred maturity, interest rate and currency mismatches and dangerously increased their risk position. This article provides insights for understanding the Mexican debt crisis as closely intertwined with problems in the domestic banking sector, which were, in turn, linked to its involvement in the international financial system.

In this article I build an analytic narrative to provide an integrated and analytical view of the economic reforms that took place in Colombia during the years 1974-1978. Through the use of basic game theory and historical evidence, I present the core of the strategic interactions between several players: Government is depicted as a committed but poorly endowed agenda setter, Coffee as the dominant player and Industry as the contending but relatively weak player. The analysis shows that the 1976 coffee boom changed the interaction between sectors from an assurance to a prisoner’s dilemma game, and identifies as the post-boom solution the Government–Coffee coalition, which carried out a soft version of the initial reforms.

The history of the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), one of the most prestigious business schools in the world, highlights the role of multinationals in establishing business education in Europe and the problem of legitimacy. The creation of IMD's predecessors CEI and IMEDE by Alcan and Nestlé also illuminates the role of Harvard Business School in their development and the reciprocal influences of American and European management education after World War II.