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Chapter 2 investigates the extent of the use of Bank notes in British society during the Bank Restriction period. Drawing upon the Bank of England’s Lost Note Books – the record of claims submitted by customers who had lost their Bank notes – this chapter traces the geographical and social distribution of Bank note users. Following in the footsteps of John Clapham, who explored what he called the ‘radius of the Bank of England note’, this chapter reveals the patterns of the Bank note’s diffusion into British society and the underlying causes of its penetration into a number of places on the British Isles. The three factors that significantly affected the pattern of diffusion were commerce, the culture of sociability and Britain’s ongoing wars with France. These economic and extra-economic factors determined where the Bank notes were likely to see relatively extensive use. This chapter’s argument is underpinned by a large data set compiled from the Lost Note Books, which contain information about Bank note users’ identity as well as their geographical and social distribution. This unique source provides valuable insights into the diffusion of Bank note use.
The Introduction provides the general context for what this book calls the communal currency tradition in British society. Its chronology starts in the early 1790s when the French revolutionary government’s experiment with the state-issued fiat paper currency, the assignat, caused heated discussion in Britain, which eventually consolidated Britain’s currency exceptionalism. The recent revival of the state theory of money (neo-chartalism) provides a reference point for the book’s unique theoretical outlook, which is explained by drawing upon the existing literature on economics, sociology and historical studies. After an overview of the development of monetary ideas, the communal currency tradition, which was closely associated with the idea of voluntary acceptance, is further explained based upon the writings of Edmund Burke and his involvement in the legal ban on the circulation of assignats in England. The broad outline of the book’s discussion is delineated by presenting the scope of communal currency as it impacted the economic, political, cultural and social aspects of British society.
The Conclusion summarises the main arguments presented in the book. It contextualises, once again, the book’s discussion of communal currency by contrasting it with the statist and metallist perspectives. The book ends by briefly describing how the memory of the Bank Restriction was forgotten and then rewritten by nineteenth-century authors such as Harriet Martineau and Thomas Carlyle as they saw the ‘cash nexus’ as the antithesis of communal relations.
Chapter 5 describes the dramatic changes of situation surrounding paper currency in post-war Britain. It focuses on the forgery crisis of 1818, which significantly undermined public trust in the Bank and its notes. Forgery became an acute problem after 1815, when the risk of becoming a victim (and unintended perpetrator) of the crime was not negligible. As the Bank claimed to be the sole arbiter of Bank notes’ authenticity, note users regarded the Bank’s ability to nullify economic transactions as a grave threat to the security of economic relations and private property. This chapter discusses the public backlash against the Bank as a radicalised version of communal currency. Britain’s note users rejected the idea that the Bank had the exclusive claim to authentic and unauthentic notes as Bank notes, according to the Bank’s critics, belonged to note users and their community. The forgery crisis gave ammunition to anti-paper radicals like Cobbett, while Britain’s note users were losing faith in the system of inconvertible paper, which now rested upon the state’s power to enforce currency circulation – under the Stanhope Act – and the Bank’s judicial violence.
We study how Spanish equity investors assessed firms’ exposure to political risk during the regime change of the 1930s. We show that shifts in political uncertainty regularly predicted a general deterioration of future investment opportunities in the stock market. However, we also find that firms differed in their sensitivity to uncertainty, reflecting important differences in their perceived exposures to political risk. The negative impact of uncertainty was significantly milder for firms with political connections to republican parties. The price of some stocks increased in periods of heightened uncertainty, thus allowing investors to hedge against reinvestment risk. In the case of firms that became targets of hostile political actions, we observe that investors frequently adjusted their assessment of individual stocks to changes in firm-specific political circumstances. Over the whole period of the Second Republic, investors’ systematic preference for safer equity hedges led to a continuous decline in the price of stocks perceived as more exposed to political risk.
Chapter 6 traces the last years of Britain’s communal currency. From the chapter’s examination of the resumption debate, it emerges that the decision on resumption stemmed from loss of faith in inconvertible currency and the fractured state of British society, rather than from unanimous support for the theory or policy of the gold standard. This chapter reveals that the supporters of resumption were a mixed group of people, including those with metallist and non-metallist views alike. The anti-resumption campaign lacked coherence, but ultimately it was the fractured state of British society that made inconvertible currency unsustainable: Britain’s note users no longer saw themselves as a single community of money users but as competing groups with different economic interests. The rest of the chapter illustrates the process by which the remnants of communal currency were gradually chipped away in the following twelve years, which were punctuated by major events such as the financial crisis of 1825 and the political run on the Bank of England in 1832. This chapter closes in 1833, when the fate of currency voluntarism was finally sealed as the Bank note became legal tender.
The European financial crisis of 1931 was a pivotal moment in the economic and financial history of the twentieth century. Based on extensive archival research and a cultural conceptual framework, There Will be the Devil To Pay offers a new and much needed understanding of the European financial crisis. It tells the dramatic story of the five months that led to the breakdown of the gold standard, writing the history of the crisis from the perspective of central bankers, private bankers, and government officials. It provides a new narrative of how those involved struggled to understand and respond to the crisis as it unfolded. Contributing to the emerging literature on radical uncertainty and narrative economics, this book provides a detailed analysis of how decision-makers confront uncertainty and shape narratives that create actionable knowledge and enable decision-making.
Large-scale comparative economic history of westernmost and easternmost Eurasia can be beneficial for the understanding of global history. This book provides a description of material life in North-western Europe and East Asia, for the period from the late fifteenth to the late nineteenth centuries, with a focus on developments in Great Britain and the Dutch Republic on the one hand and China and Japan on the other hand. With maps, tables, graphs and figures as a prominent and integral part of the book, it provides information, in an accessible format, on the main characteristics of the economic landscape of this period. It demonstrates the constraints to which all pre-industrial economies were subjected because of their dependence on organic natural resources but also the different ways in which the societies discussed dealt with those constraints. To provide a better understanding of this economy of limited possibilities, the final chapter of the book is devoted to the emergence of modern economic growth in Western Europe.
Located in Manchuria (Northeast China), the geopolitical borderland between China, Russia, and Japan, among others, Anshan Iron and Steel Works (Angang) was Mao-era China's most important industrial enterprise. The history of Angang from 1915 to 2000 reveals the hybrid nature of China's accelerated industrialization, shaped by transnational interactions, domestic factors, and local dynamics. Utilizing archives in Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and English, Koji Hirata provides the first comprehensive history of this enterprise before, during, and after the Mao era (1949–1976). Through this unique lens, he explores the complex interplay of transnational influences in Mao-era China. By illustrating the symbiotic relationship between socialism and capitalism during the twentieth century, this major new study situates China within the complex global history of late industrialization.
In the first detailed examination of Britain's transition to paper currency, Hiroki Shin explores how state, nation and community each played their respective role in its introduction. By examining archival materials and personal accounts, Shin's work sheds fresh light on societal, institutional, communal and individual responses to the transformation. The dominance of communal currency during the Bank Restriction period (1797–1821) demonstrates how paper currency derived its value from the community of users rather than the state or the intrinsic value of precious metal. Shin traces the expanded use of the Bank of England note – both geographically and socially – in this period, revealing the economic and social factors that accelerated this shift and the cultural manifestations of the paper-based monetary regime, from everyday politics to bank-note forgeries. This book serves as an essential resource for those interested in understanding the modern monetary system's historical origins.
Plebeian Consumers is both a global and local study. It tells the story of how peasants, day workers, formerly enslaved people, and small landholders became the largest consumers of foreign commodities in nineteenth-century Colombia, and dynamic participants of an increasingly interconnected world. By studying how plebeian consumers altered global processes from below, Ana María Otero-Cleves challenges ongoing stereotypes about Latin America's peripheral role in the world economy through the nineteenth century, and its undisputed dependency on the Global North. By exploring Colombians' everyday practices of consumption, Otero-Cleves also invites historians to pay close attention to the intimate relationship between the political world and the economic world in nineteenth-century Latin America. She also sheds light on new methodologies and approaches for studying the material world of men and women who left little record of their own experiences.
The conclusion of Money, Value, and the State reflects on the rise of a neoliberal government of value. The architecture of political economy for postcolonial Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—their currency management, agrarian credit, export monopolies, and price controls—was similar to how many other nation-states managed capitalism, exerted sovereignty, and cultivated citizenship in the postwar decades. And like many other parts of the world, by the late-1970s, the government of value in East Africa was challenged by new models of determining worth. The neoliberal proviso to “get prices right” targeted the legitimacy of the moneychanger state: instead of controlling the conversion between currencies and managing exchange rates, central banks would delegate power to commercial firms. It was likewise a call to eliminate state monopolies on the valuation of export crops and other commodities in favor of merchants’ power to set prices. Yet, instead of merely being a project of marketisation, neoliberalism was always a theory of state power and the ethos of citizenship. As structural adjustment was imposed—haltingly, imperfectly—by international creditors and their East African partners, the problematic of price continued to imply far more than the value of a commodity. It was a call to revalue the relationship among people and between citizens and states. As a result, the state government of value has not disappeared--it has been disavowed by central banks and bureaucracies that dismiss popular claims-making in favor of serving the sovereignty of capital.
If political independence provided Africans more latitude in how to pursue economic sovereignty, it hardly settled the matter of how it should be institutionalized. Debates about currency, for instance, persisted in East Africa after formal decolonization, and only in 1965-66 was the colonial money replaced by money issued by the independent states. This chapter traces the unexpected trajectory of decolonization, including the persistence of the imperial East African Currency Board. Decisions about the postcolonial monetary regimes were delayed, in part, by the machinations of British officials who tried to protect the racial capitalism of East Africa from the challenge of African independence. Yet, the establishment of national currencies and central banks was also delayed by Africans’ own commitment to supranational linkages, including an East African common market and currency. This chapter shows that the fortunes of a proposed East African Federation rose and fell on the dynamics of uneven and combined development in the region. And, finally, it examines how the central banking model adopted by postcolonial leaders reinforced the dependence of their nations on the accumulation of foreign currencies. The “moneychanger state,” in which postcolonial governments intermediated between domestic and foreign currencies, was critical to their own survival and ideas about development. Ultimately, though, it was the rural cultivators who would bear the burden of maintaining national solvency, a material reality that spurred a productivist ideology in which merit was revealed through earning export value.