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26946 results in Economic history

Page 274 of 1348

  • DO DEMOCRACIES SPEND LESS ON THE MILITARY? SPAIN AS A LONG-TERM CASE STUDY (1876-2009)*

  • Oriol Sabaté
  • Journal:
    Revista de Historia Economica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History / Volume 34 / Issue 3 / December 2016
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 September 2015, pp. 385-415
    Print publication:
    December 2016

  • This paper analyses the influence of political regimes on the level and economic composition of military expenditure in Spain over the long run. In contrast with the widely accepted negative relation between democracy and military spending, the paper suggests that democratic governments established in the late 1970s and early 1980s after Franco’s dictatorship had a positive influence on the military burden owing to the efforts to reorient the army towards international threats and to involve the armed forces with the newly democratic institutions. In addition, the analysis of military expenditure allows us to conclude that the international orientation of democratic military policies took place along with financial efforts to obtain a capital-intensive army to confront international military threats.

  • BHR volume 89 issue 3 Cover and Back matter

  • Journal:
    Business History Review / Volume 89 / Issue 3 / Autumn 2015
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 September 2015, pp. b1-b6
    Print publication:
    Autumn 2015
    • Article
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  • THE CRISIS OF 1803-1805 IN THE TWO CASTILES: FOODSTUFF, MORTALITY AND INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE*

  • Enrique Llopis, Felipa Sánchez
  • Journal:
    Revista de Historia Economica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History / Volume 34 / Issue 2 / September 2016
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 September 2015, pp. 295-322
    Print publication:
    September 2016

  • The essential aims of this article are: (1) to measure the magnitude of the crisis of 1803-1805 in the two Castiles; (2) to analyse the causes and consequences of this crisis. Among the main conclusions of this essay we would like to underline: (a) the 1803-1805 crisis led to a fall in the population of Castile of about 15 per cent; (b) the severe rise in the price of grains in those years was due to the bad harvests and the sparse working capacity of the municipal grain stores, but more than anything else it was the collapse of the market for this produce as a result of the prohibition of removing grain; (c) government measures to deal with the crisis were numerous and relatively bold, but not very effective; (d) the strong mobilisation of the people disrupted the working of some of the basic institutions of the Ancien Régime.

  • ‘A new species of mony’: British Exchequer bills, 1701-1711

  • Richard A. Kleer
  • Journal:
    Financial History Review / Volume 22 / Issue 2 / August 2015
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    18 September 2015, pp. 179-203

  • This article studies the relationship between Bank and Treasury during the War of the Spanish Succession. It examines two new series of Exchequer bills implemented in 1707 and 1709. Far from being loans-for-rents contracts, the principal aim was to accommodate war-related pressures on the nation's monetary system by manufacturing a substitute for scarce specie. The article also shows there was a covert struggle within the financial community for access to the specie flows associated with the nation's system of public finance.

  • Conclusion

  • Steven L. Kaplan, Sophus A. Reinert
  • Book:
    Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV
    Published by:
    Anthem Press
    Published online:
    05 December 2015
    Print publication:
    15 September 2015, pp 677-702

  • Summary

    Like many parts of the Third World today, old-regime France was obsessed with subsistence—and for good reasons. Dependent for the most part on a single foodstuff whose production and distribution were hostage to a host of uncertainties, it is no wonder that the people of this society agonized over their material life. They had no sense of control over their environment—either the sociojuridical structure around which their lives were organized or the economic and physical circumstances in which they lived. Nor could the Enlightenment provide a dose of confidence and courage powerful enough to reach the bulk of the population. Not all the philosophical tracts on man's earthly potential, nor all the manuals on the application of vetch or the use of sainfoin, nor all the inoculations practiced on the children of princes could convince the “little people” of the eighteenth century that they lived in a world on the verge of mastering, or at least reaching an accord with, nature. Subsistence, of course, was not the whole story of man's predicament, but preoccupation with it was sufficiently universal and relentless to remind men every day of the precariousness of their situation and of their relative helplessness to change it.

    Even as the marketplace, like the cemetery, was at the center of popular life in the Old Regime, so subsistence was always at the center of public concern. In the crudest terms, it can be said that fear of the people commanded attention to the people's fears. Subsistence uncertainty and anxiety impelled government to give the highest priority to provisioning. But government intervened in the first instance not so much to reassure the people as to reassure itself. From top to bottom, officials believed that the social and political structures could not passively bear the strain or tolerate the risks of scarcity. Subsistence was the precondition to social order. Their assumptions about the psychology of human motivation, the nature of commerce, and the habits of cultivators and suppliers convinced authorities that grain distribution could not safely be left entirely to private initiative and the arbitration of free market forces.

    What nourished this ideology of fear and mistrust, what made the governors, like the governed, timid and conservative, what made intervention necessary and inevitable, was above all the nature of preindustrial society itself.

Page 274 of 1348