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Challenging current ideas in mainstream scholarship on differences between female labour force participation in southern and north-western Europe and their impact on economic development, this article shows that in Portugal, neither marriage nor widowhood prevented women from participating in the labour market of mid-eighteenth-century. Our research demonstrates that marriage provided women with the resources they needed to work in various capacities in all economic sectors.
This article also argues that single Portuguese women had an incentive to work and did so mostly as wage earners. Finally, the comparison of our dataset on female occupations from tax records with other European cases calls for a revision of the literature and the development of a more nuanced picture of the north-south divide.
Technological change is about more than inventions. This concise history of the Industrial Revolution places the eighteenth-century British Industrial Revolution in global context, locating its causes in government protection, global competition, and colonialism. Inventions from spinning jennies to steam engines came to define an age that culminated in the acceleration of the fashion cycle, the intensification in demand and supply of raw materials and the rise of a plantation system that would reconfigure world history in favour of British (and European) global domination. In this accessible analysis of the classic case of rapid and revolutionary technological change, Barbara Hahn takes readers from the north of England to slavery, cotton plantations, the Anglo-Indian trade and beyond - placing technological change at the centre of world history.
In September 1939, Portugal made a realist strategic choice to preserve the Portuguese Empire maintaining by its neutrality and also remaining an ally of Great Britain. While the Portuguese could rely largely on their colonies for raw materials to sustain the mainland, the country had long depended on British transportation for these goods and the Portuguese military. With the British priority now given to war transportation, Portugal's economy and Empire were particularly vulnerable. The Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar sought to mitigate this damage by maintaining particularly friendly financial relations with the British government, including increased exports of Portuguese merchandise and services and permission to accumulate credits in Sterling to cover deficits in the balance of payments. This paper gives an improved set of comprehensive statistics for the Anglo-Portuguese and German–Portuguese relationships, reported in Pounds and according to international standards. The reported statistics include the trade in merchandise, services, capital flows, loans and third-party transfers of funds in favour of the British account. When compared with the German statistics, the Anglo-Portuguese figures show the Portuguese government favoured the British in financial relations, an active choice by Salazar to maintain the Portuguese Empire.
Farley Grubb's recent article in the Financial History Review contains econometric results designed to support his theoretical propositions concerning the paper money of the American colonies. This comment demonstrates that some of his results are spurious and the rest are based on using incorrect testing procedures and incorrect critical values of test statistics.
Ron Michener takes issue with my approach to and analysis of colonial Virginia's paper money. He objects to how I calculate the paper money's asset present value when the paper money is hypothesized to be zero-coupon and interest-bearing bonds. He questions my data on the amount of Virginia's paper money in circulation, and he objects to the econometric treatment I apply to my model of that money's performance. He, however, presents no alternative data constructions, or any alternative explanations for the patterns in the data, nor does he present any alternative hypotheses or do any hypothesis testing to account for the level and movement in the value of Virginia's paper money.
This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.
In the present work we study the evolution of the prices of the most representative goods of the Buenos Aires market in the decades after independence from the Spanish empire. The paper analyses the evolution of import, export and local prices in Buenos Aires for the first half of the 19th century and intends to contribute to a more accurate estimate of the intense process of price inflation and changes in relative prices that occurred in Buenos Aires during this period. We also aspire to be able to analyse the relationships between the increases in prices and the institutional effects of commercial blockades, the issuance of paper money and changes in the demand for goods that occurred in the commercial interaction of Buenos Aires. An attempt is also made to compare the dynamics of various baskets of goods, allowing us to evaluate the differentiated effects in local, regional and overseas supply and demand. With this in mind we analyse both general price indexes, with their main changes, and also aim to integrate a variety of products in baskets that represent as accurately as possible the diverse demands of the commercial space offered by the Buenos Aires market. Finally, we reexamine the effects of the price variations of the baskets of prices on various social sectors and regions linked to the significant interregional plaza represented by the Buenos Aires market.
The economic advisers of the 1924 Dawes Committee enacted currency and banking reforms as a means of resolving financial and geopolitical problems. Although the committee members stated that they had no plans to resolve the Ruhr occupation, evidence from the technical advisers demonstrated the opposite. Economists Edwin Kemmerer, Joseph Davis and Arthur Young sought to appease Franco-Belgian demands for a resolution to the reparations debate by balancing the German budget and reorganising the banking system, thereby also addressing the question of military occupation. This research delves into the advisers’ reports on public finance, currency stabilisation and the gold standard, arguing that their attempts to assuage reparation-related concerns rested on major reforms to German central banking.
In this paper we show that Portugal benefitted from comparatively low-interest rates from the 13th century onwards, well before the generalised drop in interest rates in Europe. Contrary to the thesis that frontier economies struggle with high-interest rates and scarcity of capital, we find that the country's low and stable interest rates can be explained by its wide availability of land, combined with monetary stability and a favourable institutional network. These conclusions are built upon an entirely new dataset of interest rates and returns on capital for Portugal in the period 1230–1500.
Pre-industrial money supply typically consisted of multiple, often foreign currencies. Standard economic theory implies that this entails welfare loss due to transaction costs imposed by currency exchange. Through a study of novel data on Finnish nineteenth-century parish-level currency conditions, we show that individual currencies had principal areas of circulation, with extensive co-circulation restricted to the boundary regions in between. We show that trade networks, defined here through the regional co-movement of grain prices, proved crucial in determining the currency used. Market institutions and standard price mechanisms had an apparent role in the spread of different currencies and in determining the dominant currency in a given region. Our findings provide a caveat for the widely held assumption that associates multi-currency systems with negative trade externalities.
This chapter analyzes government policies in the three principal Japanese colonies in the five decades up to 1945. It examines the extent to which the Japanese colonial governments in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria succeeded in centralizing tax and other revenues, in leveraging these revenues in order to borrow, in establishing accountable government fiscal systems and in using revenues from taxes, non-tax sources and from loans to fund not just administration and policing but also expenditures on capital works. We also assess the important body of literature developed over the past five decades that emphasized the more positive aspects of the Japanese legacy, including the agricultural transformation, and the development of industry and transport infrastructure. When viewed in a broader Asian context, Japanese colonial policies were not as exceptional as some scholars have argued. There were a number of similarities with both revenue and expenditure policies in other Asian colonies, and while economic policies did diverge in the 1930s as the military-industrial complex in Japan became more powerful, the outcomes for indigenous populations in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria were not always positive.
This chapter asks three questions about the British state in India. Why was it poor? How did fiscal capacity matter? What was colonial about the colonial fiscal state? The chapter shows that the poverty of the state had owed to reliance on land revenue. Although reforms in property rights in land delivered a boost to the revenues between 1800 and 1860, the effect wore off. The puzzle is, British India had relatively easy access to the London money market, but reduced its reliance on debt from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The chapter suggests that the restrained use of debt was a response to the nationalist attack on the ‘drain.’ Weak state capacity did not affect business adversely, but limited the ability of the state to transform a resource-poor agriculture. British India shared with many other colonial territories some of these features; the politics of the public debt made the Indian story somewhat distinct.
Official revenue collections in French Indochina were low compared with most other colonies in East and Southeast Asia. This fact stands in contrast to a large body of literature that claims French tax demands were a crushing burden on many indigenous people. French Indochina is often put forward as an example of one of the most extractive colonial states in Asia. This chapter reconciles these seemingly opposing interpretations by examining the formation of the colonial fiscal state, its capacity, and the potential impact on the local population. We argue that the French colonial administration is best characterized as complex, bureaucratic, and centralized. Its fiscal capacity was heavily dependant on the expansion and growth of commercial activities. This led to significant geographical asymmetries in wealth generation and investments, and a complex system of budgetary transfers amongst the different levels of administration. French rule was, however, indirect and responded to local differences. Pre-colonial fiscal institutions survived under French colonial rule, but were not adequately recognised in the figures. This reinforces the claim that the burden to the majority of the population was greater than officially recorded, but it was unevenly distributed.
This chapter contrasts and compares the ways different colonial states in West Africa developed local fiscal capacity. We show that per capita revenues were higher in the more commercialised coastal export economies than in remote parts of the interior. We argue that British and French approaches to fiscal expansion differed partly because opportunities to tax trade were lower in French West Africa, where a larger share of the revenues were drawn from direct taxes, usually in combination with mandatory labour services or forced cultivation programmes. The imposition of a federal system in the French-ruled territories created tighter financial ties between the AOF and France than were seen in the British colonies, who enjoyed larger scale advantages in revenue collection based on higher population densities and lower barriers to transport and communication. Despite these differences, all fiscal regimes remained too weak to function as a solid basis for sovereign debt creation by the time of independence. This put the post-colonial states of West Africa in a precarious situation, especially when world market prices for their export commodities dropped in the 1970s, while interest rates on public debt shot up in the 1980s.
This chapter introduces and motivates the main theme of the book and the key questions related to the development of fiscal capacity in colonial Asia and Africa. We situate the colonial fiscal state in the context of the changing world order in the long century between 1850 and 1960. We discuss the historiography and existing theoretical perspectives on fiscal development, arguing that these remain biased towards the European, or Eurasian experience at best. We also summarize the key insights of all the chapters in light of the general patterns that emerge from the comparative perspective adopted in this book. Finally, we formulate a brief future research agenda which identifies the next steps to be taken to improve our understanding of the various ways in which fiscal states have developed across the globe since the mid-nineteenth century.