Steve Jobs was the most charismatic businessperson in the modern era. When he died, on October 5, 2011, Apple was inundated with condolence messages from all over the United States and from around the world. These notes were sent not only to Apple headquarters in Cupertino, California, but to Apple retail stores. The stores posted them on their windows. In addition, bouquets of flowers were brought to the stores. Think of this—flowers in front of hundreds of stores in dozens of countries because of Jobs's death. No one knows how many notes were received at Apple and in the stores. According to the “Remembering Steve” page on Apple.com, “Over a million people from all over the world have shared their memories, thoughts, and feelings about Steve.” As he was dying, people made a pilgrimage to his home in Palo Alto. His daughter has written that “a few people he didn’t know came to the doors wanting to see him … , wandering into the garden. … A stranger in a sari begged to talk with him. A man came in through the gate and said he had flown in from Bulgaria just to see my father.” After Jobs's death, California governor Jerry Brown declared October 16 to be “Steve Jobs Day.” The president of United States and the First Lady, Barack and Michelle Obama, posted a condolence note. Nothing remotely like this outpouring had ever taken place on the occasion of the death of an American CEO.

The political hazards that host country governments pose multinational companies are multifaceted and persistent. This study focuses on the experience of the Canadian subsidiary of British retailer W.H. Smith and Son in order to examine how host country policy can influence a multinational operating in the cultural industries. While bargaining models have previously provided the principal analytical lens for analyzing the interaction between multinationals and host governments, I argue that such frameworks lack the necessary nuance in order to explain fully the interaction between the Canadian government and W.H. Smith. In order to address the intricacy of these relations, it is necessary to integrate insights from new institutional economics with conventional bargaining frameworks.

Leaders of business schools and other educational institutions have enjoyed decades of stability. Today, we confront a set of systemic global challenges, including a pandemic, severe economic weakness, heightened inequality, racial injustice, and a climate emergency. Taken together, these challenges redefine the environment in which we operate—and offer us an opportunity to reimagine our organizations. We can learn about how to deal with this level of upheaval by studying how leading U.S. business schools responded to World War II. All shrank as students and faculty were drafted, most innovated in fairly traditional ways while still maintaining existing activities alongside of war-time innovations, and some pushed forward long-standing institutional change. One school choose a different path, shutting all peacetime programs as it fully committed not only to helping win a global war but, just as importantly, to forging a lasting peace—the long-term economic prosperity that followed the war. The lessons we can draw from academic leaders from nearly eighty years ago are apt today.

Banians acted as intermediaries for European merchants in Bengal. They were highly influential in the eighteenth century but their importance waned thereafter. This article reexamines their role in the nineteenth century and argues that their importance persisted but evolved in response to changes in the Bengal economy and issues of contracting and governance. It shows that the banians remained a nexus between the local and global economies, facilitating a bidirectional transfer of knowledge. They enabled the development of innovative Indian business forms and contributed to the emergence of a diverse ecology of organizational forms and ownership in Bengal at the end of the nineteenth century.

This article examines the history of the Royal Dutch Shell scenarios, from the first horizon scan exercise in 1967. It proposes that forward-looking scenarios were integrated in planning at Shell as tools for managing uncertainty in global time and space relations of oil after 1967. Specifically, the article proposes that Shell strategically used the scenarios to respond to arguments, emanating both from OPEC and from the Club of Rome, of oil as a limited resource. Shell used the scenarios to create images of a future oil market dominated by innovation, creativity, and sustainable solutions.

This paper provides a new index of money market and bank lending interest rates in Spain for 1900–1935. New archival evidence reveals a structural change in market interest rates vis-à-vis the official rates charged by the Banco de España (BdE). Before 1914, the BdE rate operated as a ceiling to market rates. The outbreak of the First World War caused market rates to soar and the BdE rate started operating as a floor, as bank liquidity started depending on the BdE. This was accompanied by new banking legislation introduced in 1921, which changed the collateral framework through which the BdE lent to banks. The resulting interest rate index illustrates the persistent impact of financial deglobalisation caused by the outbreak of the War.

This article analyses the reasons why most Latin American governments frequently defaulted on their debts during the nineteenth century. Contrary to previous works, which focused on domestic factors, I argue that supply-side factors were equally important. The regulatory framework at the London Stock Exchange prevented defaulting governments from having access to the capital market. Therefore, the implicit incentive for underwriting banks and governments was to accelerate negotiations with bondholders, particularly during periods of high liquidity. Frequently, however, settlements were short-lived. In contrast, certain merchant banks opted to delay or refuse a settlement if they judged that the risk of a renewed default was too high. In such cases, even if negotiations were extended, the final agreements were more often respected, allowing governments to improve their repayment record.