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April 2022: One of us is talking to a group of Dalits from a Tamil village, mainly women. The discussion revolves around price increases, and the villagers debate which increases are most problematic, from fuel to onions and oil. ‘It is the price of gold that is a problem,’ exclaims one of them. ‘If the government wants to help us, it must lower the price of gold.’ The price of gold is indeed a permanent and daily concern. In the same discussion, another woman wonders how she will find the five gold sovereigns for her daughter's future wedding. To give less to in-laws would be to lose face but also, as we shall see, to lose the investment in her son's education and housing. Gold acts as a currency, used as a unit of account and a means of exchange for matrimonial transactions. It is also a store of value: its price has increased tenfold between 2000 and 2020, while the general consumer price index has increased threefold. Through pledging, gold is also a payment technology for daily transactions, now used to access cash to smooth out expenses and income and make ends meet. Long reserved for the dominant castes as a symbol of purity and prosperity, gold is now a currency accessible to many, even if its uses and meanings remain deep markers and drivers of social differentiation.
In this chapter we explore the political and moral economies of gold as money and its profound transformations in rural Tamil Nadu over the past two decades. The political economy of gold refers to the structural and material conditions that allow the unequal access and use of gold to occur and be sustained.
Gold ornaments play a critical role in the production of goods and services – and the sustaining of life – in India's informal sector. Held largely in the form of ornaments, the gold owned by Indian households is estimated to weigh 25,000 tonnes – which is equal in combined rupee value to about 40 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) (Pattanayak 2019). Since Independence in 1947, policymakers in India have been preoccupied with preventing gold acquisition and ownership – which they see as keeping capital idle and unproductive in addition to being a drain on foreign exchange reserves (EPW Research Foundation 2005; see discussion in Chapters 1 to 3 in this volume). Yet even from prior to the period of colonial rule1 and despite a three-decade-long set of restrictions on imports, gold has constantly been in circulation in agricultural and business cycles, in festivals and marriages.
In this chapter I show how gold has not been idle or deployed for unproductive purposes. Indeed, it is essential for production. The opening up of markets to gold imports through the 1990s came as part of broader liberalisation reforms in India. These included dismantling trade barriers on thousands of commodities. Silk, the commodity focus of this chapter, was one (Patnaik 2005). At this time, ‘monetising’ gold by promoting lending against it by banks and specialised gold loan companies became a policy priority (Vaidyanathan 1999). This reshaped the landscape of gold-based lending in India.
While this book shows how gold is produced, distributed and then deployed in socially separate stages, the same is true of many other commodities in India. Silk is no exception.
Gold has been unaccountably neglected as an object of study. In this chapter, to remedy this dearth of scholarship, we use a systems approach to political economy and reconnoitre the material circuits of gold, its institutional ‘ecosystem’, relations of power and control and their impact on the distribution of wealth. In tracing the pathways and connections between its production, distribution and consumption, we pursue how and why the system of gold has continually adapted in response to a series of public policy interventions by the state, which it mostly acts to avoid. Our sources have ranged from official data, specialised press and business association reports, academic analyses and think-tank reports to granular ethnographies steeped in local field experiences. In scratching the surface, this overview – and our volume – shows how and why much more scholarly effort is needed to mine the political economy of gold.
India's gold does not originate in India. Local mining hardly figures in quantitative terms. Gold originates elsewhere but comes to India in the form of bullion or of mine-head alloys known as doré,1 mainly through Dubai, whose gold economy is umbilically connected to India’s. A great – and mostly informal – refining industry is growing in the north of India to purify the imported doré, while local scrap gold is largely recycled in the south.2 By-products from doré, such as silver, disappear into other workshops in the informal economy. Some of the new doré refineries are being added to corporate portfolios that also include other precious metals and gemstones.
Gold gets dug out of the ground. Then we melt it down, dig another
hole, bury it again and pay people to stand around guarding it. Anyone
from Mars would be scratching their head.
—Attributed to Warren Buffet in 1998
Our book has shown how Indian gold is different. And since we finished the manuscript, changes have been taking place in the structure of the gold economy more rapidly than we envisaged while we were working on our histories and ethnographies. So here, in this briefest of epilogues, we pan some small and scattered nuggets from 2024 which hint at likely surprises and riches for future research.
THE CONTEXT OF PRICES (INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTERS 1, 2 AND 3)
From the fourth quarter of 2023 to that of 2024 global gold prices surged by 30 per cent. By April 2025 they had hit USD 3,400 – a further rise of 30 per cent – and showed no sign of spiking. These new demand-led peaks have been attributed to familiar processes – the role gold plays as a safe haven and hedge for central banks and retail purchasers alike. What is less familiar, however, is the context of these age-old responses: a new conjuncture involving new scales of geopolitical uncertainty, a move by some trading countries towards de-dollarisation, and domestic economic volatilities in India.
Time will tell whether the price jump was a bubble rather than a trend, but in India last quarter prices for 2024 declined rather than rose. Reasons suggested for this countercyclical Indian behaviour cover culture, policy and financialisation. They range from postponed festival sprees and the doubling of goods and services tax (GST) on crafted gold to the lure of cryptocurrencies, competitively high interest rates, and the attraction of US treasury yields (Vivek 2024; Anshul 2024).
My mother's side of the family came to India as refugees from East Pakistan in 1947. As a result, we grew up with what my brother and I coded as ‘stories of relentless lament’. But some of the Partition lament narratives were also stories of bravery and heroism. Among those, an oft-repeated one was how our grandmother crossed the border with her four daughters, an infant son and a box of gold. When land is lost, gold offers the only hope as security for fleeing families. But these heroic stories quickly morphed into family intrigues and outright fraud, often by the close relatives whom one trusted the most. And there were gendered stories of jealousy: who got or did not get which piece of jewellery or how much gold, from whom! Gold possession and its emotionally fraught distribution are the staple of the familial bonds (and their breakdown) in India. Gold is most contentious when dowry prestations are calculated. Yet, as in my family, until the idea of this book took shape, they are so quotidian that they easily escape academic scrutiny. Gold dominates our rituals and customary exchanges and, at the same time, it functions as a quasi-currency and store of value. It constitutes the lifeblood of women's inheritance.
Through a multidisciplinary study of gold in India, this volume connects a reconnaissance of the roles of gold in familial and gendered wealth with a range of key issues in political economy. It shows how exploring the quiddity of gold offers a perfect plot to deepen our understanding of the socially regulated Indian economy.
The Tamil Nadu State Legal Aid Board in Madras runs a family counselling centre which is open two days a week. Estranged couples, those who desire to end their marriage or, alternatively, mend a battered relationship, approach the centre to discuss their problems, seek legal advice and voice their fears and apprehensions. The counselling takes place in a room packed with unhappy, worried faces and, often, this space acquires the character of a public tribunal, with so-called domestic matters brought within the remit of a hearing that is potentially open to all, that is, other families waiting their turn. Typically, wife and husband, and their respective kin, harangue each other, resort to pleas and accusations, upbraid counsellors (many of whom are elder citizens) for not heeding their points of view, and seek to build their arguments to a dramatic climax.
Such performances, however diverse in content and differently accentuated in their appeal, heed a certain grammar: for instance, while narrating their tales of woe, women often observe that if the gold pawned away by their husbands, without their knowledge, was redeemed; if the jewellery they brought from their natal homes was restored to them; if the precious-somany- sovereigns-worth necklace that had been pawned or sold to provide working capital for the family's petty vending be recovered, they would end the marriage honourably, without acrimony and without going to court, or strive for a reconciliation, as the case may be. Men, in their turn, insist that a part of the gold thus claimed by the women is actually theirs, earned out of their sweat and blood, their labour and, in fact, had been made over as loving gifts to ungrateful wives.
This article examines the factors that enabled French merchants to enter the Spanish Indies markets during the 1620s, particularly in the period betwen the Peace of Monzón (1627) and the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish War (1635). It highlights how the French nation of Seville received unprecedented support from the Crown to develop their marginal enterprises in the Carrera de Indias. Royal patronage played a significant role in integrating—or exluding—wealthy merchant communities from the Spanish Atlantic trading system, therby expanding their networks for direct exchanges with the Americas. The study reconstructs French commercial connections within the Spanish Atlantic trade, contextualized alongside Flemish and Italian networks already operating in New Spain. These three nations dominated much of the cargo legally shipped to and from the viceroyalty in the 1620s and 1630s. The analysis details French business interactions with “native” and “foreign” merchants, their resilience following the economic reprisal of 1635, and observations on the reconfiguration of foreign trading networks alongthe New Spain axis during the Spanish Empire’s economic and political crises of the 1640s.
This article analyzes the influence of hurricane strikes on the returns of sovereign bonds issued by Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti between 1905 and 1930. The study uses a fixed effects regression model to isolate the impact of hurricane-induced destruction on bond returns, providing a deeper understanding of market reactions following natural disasters. The article shows that hurricanes during this period, which have the potential to cause significant damage, increase bond returns by an average of 0.9 percent in the same month. This suggests that investors demand a risk premium on sovereign bonds from hurricane-prone regions due to the direct impact and broader economic consequences of these disasters.
The established economic historiography asserts that Brazil’s per-capita GDP stagnated in the 19th century and that it grew extremely slowly in the period of the monarchy (1822–1889). We argue that these conclusions are based on inadequate methods, insufficient statistical evidence, and disregard for available historical evidence. Building on the methodology followed by one of us in a previous article, with the use of new databases, and a reasoned exploration of alternatives, our best estimate is that over the 1820–1900 period, Brazil’s per-capita income grew at a trend rate of 0.9% per year, a performance like Western Europe and other Latin America countries. Only a sharp economic contraction at the end of the period dulled Brazil’s performance in the 19th century.
This research note presents a new dataset of comparable and consistently defined series on wage inequality in manufacturing in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela (LA6) from 1920 to 2011. There are also series of unskilled labor with a wider sectoral coverage. This resource provides sufficient data to inform us about trajectories and turning points across distinct developmental epochs. Overall, the evidence shows a steady rise in inter-industry wage inequality since c.1960 in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and later in the rest. Additionally, a decline in white-collar premiums across the LA6 during state-led industrialization, followed by rising trends in the decades of export-led growth, and a reversal in the 2010s. Similar contrasting trends are observed in the wage dispersion of unskilled labor.
The literature suggests that several factors, including trade costs, influence price formation. However, testing this hypothesis requires rich data, usually unavailable from historical sources. We use a large cadastre from 1749 to analyze wheat price formation in the Crown of Castile in the mid-18th century. We follow the logic of Von Thünen’s isolated markets, which closely resemble historical Spanish grain markets. We show and measure how trade costs heavily determine wheat prices. Accounting for spatial autocorrelation, we observe important spatial effects around the capital. We divide the sample between the interior and the periphery, showing that determinants of price formation do not work well around Madrid, suggesting that the political intervention of grain markets around the capital acted as a potential significant disruptor.
This article examines the reasons for the widespread use of sea loans in financing Spain’s transatlantic commerce before the 1780s, and for their subsequent decline. Although never in the hands of a company with monopoly rights, Spain’s colonial trade was heavily regulated before 1778. The system reduced market risk and unpredictability by operating through a single Spanish port, keeping the colonies undersupplied, and lowering the frequency of the exchanges to allow for silver accumulation in Spanish America. This afforded significant, though volatile, profit margins. Such conditions fostered the use of the sea loan because the instrument enabled the lender to reap greater returns by charging higher-than-standard interest rates while avoiding usury laws. In contrast, the 1778 free-trade regulations increased competition and unpredictability, narrowing profit margins. Trade expanded, and “marine interest” rates dropped, precipitating the end of the sea loan as the hallmark credit instrument of the Spanish colonial trade.
This paper examines whether the democratic shortcomings of Restoration Spain influenced the expansion of education spending. Specifically, we discuss how electoral outcomes conditioned the allocation of primary education investment across provinces from 1902 to 1922. Our results show that voting for minority parties and the extensive political patronage at the provincial level hindered public primary schooling outlays. We argue that the government punished “rebellious” provinces to preserve the regime, and that education was not well suited to support patron–client relationships. We also show that these effects diminished after World War I, as government control over electoral outcomes declined. Accordingly, by the end of the period, political voice gained a more salient role.