In the immediate aftermath of Edward's death on 6 July, the navy found itself in what could have been the front line. This was because the King had attempted to decree that his successor should not be his Catholic half-sister Mary, who was the heir both by statute and by their father's will, but rather his Protestant cousin the former Lady Jane Grey, now married to Northumberland's youngest son. Jane apparently had the support of the Council, and was duly proclaimed. Mary made her way to Kenninghall in Norfolk, which was in the heart of her own estates, and in turn proclaimed her right. By 13 July the Council believed that she was in flight for the Low Countries and sent a squadron of half a dozen ships to intercept her [II.1]. Mary, however, had no such intention. Not only was she the lawful heir, she was also the popular choice. First at Kenninghall and then at Framlingham in Suffolk her supporters rallied to her and she soon had a formidable force, led by her committed servants. Meanwhile the naval operation had been frustrated by bad weather; five of the ships sheltered in the Orwell, while the sixth, Greyhound, ended up at Lowestoft [II.2]. There the captain, Gilbert Grice, was arrested, but Mary's Council duly accepted his submission on the 17th, and he was continued in command of his ship [II.3]. Perhaps inspired by Grice's example, or perhaps solicited by Sir Henry Jerningham on Mary's behalf, the other ships followed suit, and some of their guns were transported to the Queen's camp at Framlingham. As a temporary measure, the six ships under the Queen's control were, on 19 July, put under the charge of an experienced shipman, Sir Richard Cavendish. On the 25th he was superseded by William Tirrell, appointed as Vice-Admiral [II.4]. The Lord Admiral, Lord Clinton, made his peace with the new regime, though his actual submission is not recorded. The rapprochement was brief because in November he was dismissed in favour of Lord William Howard [II.5–7]. Then William Winter, the Surveyor, was suspected of involvement in Sir Thomas Wyatt's rebellion of January 1554, which was provoked by the Queen's intended marriage.

Duckworth's ship, Orion (74) was retained at Spithead for two months once the French Revolutionary War began, when Duckworth had nothing to do but a series of administrative tasks, impeded fairly effectively by Admiralty bureaucratic procedures [2, 4–9]. He was a notable mentor to young midshipmen, including the future Admiral William Parker, the nephew of Earl St Vincent [1, 3]. He knew the ship was destined for foreign service, but not until March was the destination clear, with the formal notification from the Admiralty and Admiral Gardner [10, 12]. Once at sea, however, all communication, at least in written form, ceased.

In the Leeward Islands, Admiral Gardner, having failed in an attack on Martinique [14–16], was soon sending Duckworth on independent missions, none of them at first very notable [17, 18], but at the end of July he was sent to assist the Jamaica convoy past the French colony of St Domingue, and then on to a delicate diplomatic mission to Virginia [19]. A fairly ludicrous internal dispute between two of his officers was composed by Duckworth by the simple expedient of isolating the disputants until they had cooled down and had considered the consequences [20–22].

The Admiralty's pernickety behaviour and the nonsensical sensitivity of the officers are both indications that the Navy as a whole was not yet free of the more relaxed procedures of peacetime – though the officers’ behaviour persisted throughout the war, particularly among the senior ranks.

The detachment to Virginia missed the Jamaica convoy he had been told to watch for. He made a good impression as he approached Norfolk, Virginia, by the capture of the French privateer Sans Culotte [23]. Duckworth rapidly established cordial relations with the British consul in Norfolk, John Hamilton, and his presence was evidently regarded with interest and approval by the local gentleman – the capture of the privateer probably helped here [24–32]. He carefully avoided, by sensible research, becoming involved in fighting another French privateer which was not only in American waters but actually in the harbour, despite being urged by the consul to seize it [25], but he carefully gathered information about the French naval presence in American ports, noting that the discipline of the ships was particularly bad [26, 27]. His earlier experience in American waters as a lieutenant was clearly valuable in his estimation of the value of information.

Ramsay's Essay originated as a long private letter he wrote when he was a ship's surgeon to an aspiring young officer, a midshipman about to be commissioned in 1760. The same material was given a further airing in 1762 to prepare a petty officer for the life he was hoping for as a commissioned officer. The recipient of this second letter was a seaman whose abilities had attracted the attention of Captain Charles Middleton, who advanced him to the command of a small armed vessel with the local rank of lieutenant. As he was a poorly educated man who might soon be expected to hold his own amongst the more polished lieutenants of the wardroom, Ramsay wanted him to have advice tailored to his situation. He explains he could find no book that gave the kind of advice he felt necessary for any young officer, and he therefore had his original letter of 1760, with the additional material of 1762 as an appendix, published anonymously in book form by a London printer in 1765.

Fifteen years later no comparable work on officer-training had appeared in print, while the need for capable officers had become still more urgent in the face of the dangers threatening Britain from her enemies in arms. Middleton, comptroller of the navy from July 1778, was in anxious correspondence with his friend and former shipmate Richard Kempenfelt, now chief of staff in the Channel fleet, as they considered ways to strengthen the navy materially, tactically and morally. Middleton sounded out Ramsay's availability to help with his paper work in 1779; and, with danger in the background and reform in the offing, the times seemed to call for a reissue of his treatise on the duties of sea officers. An improved and extended second edition appeared in February 1780, followed by a third later the same year, and others in translation. The time for anonymity had passed, and the author was declared to be the Reverend James Ramsay, chaplain in his Majesty's navy.

Despite its success the book was long lost to view and its significance overlooked. For many years the Essay was wrongly attributed to Admiral Sir Charles Knowles since the Bodleian Library's copy of the first anonymous edition bore his name on the cover.

Direct evidence of a struggle between two Tudor politicians for the same office is rare in itself; the more so over the Admiralty, because it seems only to have been in Mary's reign that appointment to this office was politically contentious. The replacement of Lord Clinton is documented from the State Papers Foreign simply because his chosen successor Lord William Howard was then serving as Deputy of Calais [II.5–7].

The Queen's marriage to Philip of Spain created an unprecedented constitutional uncertainty, never fully resolved. Unlike the consorts of later Queens Regnant, Philip had the title of King, and all official documents were issued jointly by the King and Queen. Philip's kingship was also expressed in regnal years running in complicated canon with those of his wife. Yet it was never clear just what power Philip had in his own right. While he was in England he acted jointly with the Queen; when he was in Brussels (which was most of the time) she sought his advice on all important issues. Philip also maintained direct contact with English ministers, including the Lord Admiral. For some while after his first departure in September 1555 he communicated (in Latin) with a select group of Privy Councillors, returning their regular reports with his minuted decisions and comments. One such exchange [II.8] shows the King acknowledging the Royal Navy's fundamental value to the nation's defence. Though there is a certain irony in this observation from the future sender of the Invincible Armada, the second half of Philip's reply reveals his real interest. The English fleet now under his control was a valuable accession in protecting the passage between Spain and her territories in the Low Countries. There was, however, a failure in providing a suitable escort for Philip's own crossing to Calais, prompting a frosty rebuke to the Lord Admiral [II.9]. Soon afterwards the Privy Council ordered a thorough review and overhaul of the navy, though the only direct evidence of this is an entry in the Council Register [II.10]. A year later this was followed by a radical reform of naval financing, replacing piecemeal supply with a fixed budget. For this we have only the registered decision [II.11], with no indication of the debate which prompted it.

1. The Board of Admiralty to Milne

[Milne Mss MLN/114/6]

[6 February 1860]

Whereas by Our Commission, dated the 13th Jany. 1860, We have appointed you to succeed Vice Admiral Sir Houston Stewart1 as Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels employed on the North American and West India Station between the limits therein described, and We have ordered your Flag to be hoisted on board Her Majesty's Ship Emerald at Devonport.

You are hereby required and directed so soon as the Emerald shall be in all respects ready, to put to Sea in her and proceed to Bermuda for the purpose of meeting Sir Houston Stewart[,] to whom you are to deliver the accompanying Despatch, and he will hand over to you all unexecuted Orders and Instructions relative to the Station (including our standing Orders dated 5 Feb 1857 of which a Copy is enclosed) and will direct the several Captains and Commanding Officers of the Ships and Vessels … now under his orders to place themselves under your command, after which the Vice Admiral will return to England, and on his parting company you are to assume the Chief Command of the North American and West India Station.

[Enclosure]

You are to take as early an opportunity as circumstances will admit of to put yourself in communication with the Governors, or Officers administering the Government of Her Majesty's Colonies and Settlements within the extent of your Station; as also with her Majesty's Ministers and Consuls residing at places, within, or bordering on the same; understanding that you are generally to afford them, or any of them, such ready aid and co-operation in all matters for the benefit of the Queen's Service as they may from time to time require from you, or as circumstances may call for, and which may be in your power to afford consistently with your opinion of the necessities of the Service, and you are to make such disposition of the Force under your command, as you may deem most beneficial for the safety and Welfare of the said Colonies and Settlements, and for protecting the Trade of Her Majesty's Subjects throughout the extent of your Command.

The British, evicted from Europe in the spring of 1940, vowed to return but it was clear that they could not do so alone, nor, they felt, could an invasion of Nazi-held mainland Europe take place for several years and until Germany had been severely weakened by attacks elsewhere, notably round the periphery of her conquests. In the end, an Allied return to the continent owed much to Soviet pressure on Germany from the east; the bulk of the German army was held on the eastern front. The Allies – chiefly Britain, the United States and Canada but also including elements of the occupied European countries – achieved a return to the continent in June 1944.

The date of the landings was a matter of dispute in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Americans, true to their military tradition, advocated an early and direct assault on Europe. They had argued for a diversionary landing in 1942 to draw pressure from the eastern front, where the Germans threatened to force the Soviet Union to surrender. The British Chiefs of Staff held firm against the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not only did they wish to promote their own traditional indirect strategy, based on the Mediterranean, they felt that a descent on Europe in 1942 would be premature. Command of the surface of the Channel could not then be assured, while the Allies did not have overwhelming supremacy in the skies over the sea and Normandy. American troops in Britain in 1942 were very few and the majority of Britain's own soldiers were occupied mainly in North Africa, Burma and Madagascar. Moreover, the major bottleneck, never satisfactorily cleared throughout the war, was the lack of sufficient landing craft [129–30, 133–4, 144]. Even after the troops had been got ashore, much would depend on Germany's army being stretched by operations elsewhere and its means of reinforcement in Normandy effectively blocked. Moreover, as important as the initial landings was the capability to reinforce and supply the army quickly and steadily over many months. Planning for the great expedition, the assembly of much specialised equipment, the gathering of intelligence, elaborate deception and secrecy schemes, not to mention the training not only of the common soldiery but also numerous specialised units, would take many months. The JCS, somewhat chastened and chagrined after losing the argument over a 1942 invasion, proposed 1943.

The Spanish Civil War dragged on throughout 1938 and for much of the year it seemed as if neither side had the strength to bring it to a successful conclusion. This meant that the Mediterranean Fleet was obliged to continue the onerous duty of detaching cruisers and destroyers to the eastern coast of Spain to protect British shipping. The rotation of destroyer flotillas was particularly disliked because it interfered with training and flotilla work with the remainder of the fleet. At the beginning of the year it seemed as if there would be some relief. The Nyon agreements were apparently working, attacks by unknown ‘pirate’ submarines on shipping in the Mediterranean apparently ceased. This was not surprising since the perpetrator of those attacks, the Italians, had become part of the agreement. The British in early January were able to secure French and Italian agreement to a reduction in the patrols with the proviso that a small force was ready in each area to resume them if necessary [256–8]. The period of relief was short, for by mid January there were reports of attacks on British and other ships by submarines working outside of territorial waters. The Spanish Nationalists had only a pair of submarines obtained from Italy, but the Admiralty suspected the Italians might have been behind the attacks as they knew the Nyon patrols had been reduced [259]. Acting on Admiralty orders, Vice Admiral Cunningham, at the moment senior naval officer in the western basin of the Mediterranean, delivered a stiff protest to Admiral Moreno, the Nationalist naval commander at Palma. Cunningham sarcastically summed up Moreno's eventual reply after investigation: ‘The ships which were not sunk were attacked by Insurgent submarines whose Commanding Officers disobeyed their orders, whereas those which were sunk were not attacked by them’ [260]. The formal protest by the British Government to both sides in the war contained a threat to attack any submerged submarine encountered in the British zone [261, 262]. The protests and threats had their effect, Admiral Moreno agreed to restrict activities of the Nationalist submarines and Lieutenant Commander Hillgarth, the industrious consul in Palma was confident similar incidents would cease except, perhaps, for British merchant ships risking damage from air attack in Republican ports [264]. Attacks by aircraft on merchant ships, particularly Italian-manned aircraft according to Moreno, were likely to remain a problem.

Command of a ‘gunboat’ in the nineteenth century provided valuable experience for the Royal Navy's junior officers. On the West Africa station the duties carried out by such vessels included intercepting slave runners at sea, close blockade of slave ports, exploration, trade security and the furtherance of British foreign policy in the region. One of these vessels, HMS Investigator, was built for, and spent its entire short career on the West Africa station. Amongst its many tasks was an annual ascent of the Niger River in support of the Niger Expedition primarily under Dr Baikie based at Lokoja, the settlement at the confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers.

The Niger Expeditions of 1854 and 1857 were reviewed in a Foreign Office note which summarised the purposes of the expeditions as being:

By 1864 the Foreign Office considered that the work of Dr Baikie, who had been resident at Lokoja since 1857, had largely achieved the purposes and expectations outlined above, and it was time for him to be relieved. In consequence, Investigator, under the command of Lieutenant Charles George Frederick Knowles, was ordered to take Lieutenant Henry S. Bourchier, Royal Marine Light Infantry to Lokoja to take command there in Baikie's stead. In addition to Bourchier, Investigator carried other passengers, the most important being Bishop Samuel Crowther, the first consecrated African bishop, who was being taken to his diocese on the Niger. The site of Crowther's first church is today marked by a white cross on the banks of the Niger opposite modern Lokoja.

Throughout Investigator's ascent of the Niger in 1864, Knowles kept a detailed journal containing a narrative of the voyage and a comprehensive study of the people met and places visited. A résumé of the ascent was published in the Royal Geographical Society journal in January 1865. The original of Knowles's journal is held in the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, and it is this that is reproduced in part here.

Exploration of the Niger River

The Niger River's history is well documented.

With the resolution of the Chanak Affair the Mediterranean Fleet was able to resume a more normal pattern, ushering in a period that can be viewed in retrospect as something of a golden age in the interwar period. There were flaws in this rosy picture and some serving at the time might have considered it as a golden age only in the light of what was to follow. The government imposed strict economy measures that translated into reduced fuel allowances resulting in curtailed time at Sea, unrealistically slow ‘economical speed’ in exercises and a much resented increase in bureaucracy and paperwork to account for expenditures. The staff of the Mediterranean Fleet became notorious for excessive regulation and attempts to foresee and schedule everything with exercises crammed into every available minute. It was, as Admiral Chatfield later wrote, ‘staff work run mad: the Germanic method of complete preparation and organisation, successful perhaps on land but ill adapted to the Sea’. Admiral Brock was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief in June 1925 by Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, a well-known and popular figure because of his leadership of the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918. Keyes was followed in June 1928 by Admiral Frederick Field who commanded for the remainder of the 1920s. The atmosphere of the mid-1920s, with its impressive annual combined manoeuvres with the Atlantic Fleet followed by the cruising Season with visits to various Mediterranean and Adriatic ports, can be discerned in the letters from the flagship written by Lieutenant Duckworth [280, 281]. Duckworth also reflects the pride in the immaculate appearance of the Fleet and the importance attached to ‘showing the flag’, coupled with a somewhat condescending attitude towards foreigners that was characteristic of that time [282, 283].

The arrangement of the summer cruises was more complicated than it might seem at first. The first part of the cruise in the eastern Mediterranean, primarily in Greek waters, posed relatively few problems and took place each year. The second part of the summer cruises was more difficult, that is the very size of the Fleet made it desirable not to outlast its welcome in the western Mediterranean by visiting ports too often. Consequently, the second half of the summer cruise alternated each year between the ports of the western Mediterranean and the adriatic [302, 304].